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SUMMARY 
In the aftermath of a wave of land law reforms across Africa, this thesis seeks to re-
orientate current debates on women’s land rights towards a focus on the law in action.  
Since the 1970s Tanzania has been at the forefront of African countries giving statutory 
recognition to women’s property rights and ‘equal rights’ to land.  Equally, ‘customary 
law’ incorporating gender discriminatory social practices is recognised as a source of 
law in Tanzania’s plural legal system.  Centring on disputes involving women litigants 
in Tanzania’s specialist system of land courts, this study considers the extent to which 
women are realising their interests in land through legal processes of dispute resolution. 
The starting-point for the analysis is the legal claims to land which women bring and 
defend themselves against in practice.  The study draws upon a year of ethnographic 
fieldwork, including courtroom observation, archival research and interviews conducted 
between January 2009 and January 2010, with particular focus on two districts of 
Arusha region.  The thesis is structured to reflect the progression of women’s claims to 
land, from their social origins through processes of dispute resolution to judgment.  
The thesis explores three central issues.  Firstly, it considers the nature of women’s 
legal claims to land in family contexts, how and to what extent the issues raised are 
addressed by Tanzania’s contemporary statutory legal framework.  Secondly, it 
examines how agency and power relations between actors engaged in the ‘semi-
autonomous social field’ of land courts affect women’s access to justice and the 
progression of claims.  Thirdly, it evaluates the process of doing justice and the way in 
which women’s claims are judged by land courts in practice.  Particular attention is paid 
to how customary practices and judicial attitudes to female land-holding are evolving 
with contemporary Tanzanian discourses of justice and equal rights. 
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1. Introduction 
1.0 A Mount Meru shamba 
On the fertile lower slopes of Tanzania’s second highest mountain, bounded by narrow 
mud pathways and bougainvillea hedgerows, there is a shamba.  Over the years banana 
trees, maize, beans and vegetables have been cultivated on this small parcel of land by 
successive generations of a family.  The shamba lies surrounded by others just like it in 
the tranquillity of an Arusha mountain village.  Yet on closer inspection it is noticeable 
that many of the banana trees have been deliberately slashed.  Nothing remains of a 
woman’s house that once stood there.  The shamba, it turns out, is the setting of an 
extraordinary legal battle in which a woman farmer claimed that her land was sold by 
her husband without her consent.  There is a notice nailed to a tree - a temporary High 
Court injunction restraining the husband and his agents from damaging the shamba or 
doing anything to prejudice the woman’s interest in it whilst the court proceedings are 
on-going. 
The battle over this shamba is one of many in Arusha in an era of urbanisation and 
commoditisation of land.  The journey of this woman to secure her interest in the 
shamba from village to High Court forms the subject of an extended case study in the 
penultimate chapter of this thesis.  The thesis as a whole takes her and other women’s 
experiences of making legal claims to land as the starting-point for a contemporary 
empirical study of the law in action in Tanzania’s statutory court system.  
The urban fringes of Arusha City lie an hour’s walk down the mountain from this 
shamba.  A major highway connects Arusha with Nairobi to the north and Moshi and 
Dar es Salaam to the Southeast, bisecting the city from the lower slopes of Mount Meru.  
The route has ensured Arusha’s urban and rural development over many years.  Today 
the city is the hub of the East African Community, the location of the United Nations 
(U.N.) Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the closest major urban centre to some of 
Tanzania’s most significant mineral resources and national parks.  Mount Meru’s rich 
volcanic soil has also made the land extremely valuable for large and small-scale 
agriculture.  The region attracts tourists and investors as well as migrant workers from 
other parts of Tanzania, East Africa and worldwide.  Together these factors have 
generated a burgeoning market for land in Arusha.  Unplanned peri-urban settlement 
2 
 
 
has crept up the mountain.  A proliferation of urban slum areas gives a palpable sense of 
rapid urbanisation and pressure on land.  The demand for land has provoked exponential 
increases in its commercial value and a great incentive to sell. 
1.1 Context, overview and aims of the thesis 
The rapid urbanisation and commoditisation of land in Arusha forms part of a bigger 
picture of social change, economic development and a ‘land rush’ across Africa – both 
causes and consequences of a wave of national land reforms that have taken place since 
the 1990s.  As Manji and others discuss, the land reform agendas of African 
governments emerged both in response to grievances and conflicts over land within 
states and in the context of wider international pressures towards the liberalisation of 
African economies (Manji 2006: 31, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003).  During this period 
the international neo-liberal economic policy agendas of Hernando de Soto (2000) and 
the World Bank became a major driving force behind African government policies for 
the marketisation and formalisation of land tenure.   Such policies emphasised the 
benefits of privatisation and land titling for economic growth, individual tenure security 
and the realisation of capital (World Bank 1975, 1989, 2001, Deininger 2003). 
There is now a vast body of academic, policy and activist literature reflecting on the 
implications of these developments for women’s land tenure security in Africa.  Many 
of the debates have focused on rural land-holding and revolve around the relative merits 
of ‘customary’ systems versus statutory titling for securing women’s interests in land.  
Scholars within the fields of socio-legal studies and legal anthropology have for many 
years discussed the interaction of multiple norms, laws and modes of dispute settlement 
within African legal systems.  There is now considerable interest in policy circles in the 
merits of ‘customary justice systems’, which are seen as more accessible fora than state 
courts for the majority of disputants.  This has led to a recent convergence in these areas 
of scholarship (Harper 2011a, 2011b, Ubink and McInerney 2011, Tamanaha, Sage et. 
al. 2012).  Yet, very little recent detailed empirical socio-legal research on African land 
dispute resolution fora exists to inform the debates.  This thesis seeks to contribute both 
to the policy debates on women, land and law in Africa and to socio-legal scholarship 
on the law in action through an empirically grounded study of women’s legal claims to 
land in practice. 
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Tanzania,
1
 as the location for this study, is widely considered to be amongst the most 
progressive states in Africa in its commitment to protecting women’s interests in land.  
Since the 1970s Tanzania has been at the forefront of African countries that have 
enshrined women’s property rights in statute.  As Read writes, the Law of Marriage Act 
of 1971 (LMA) was ‘a pioneering step of enacting the first measure in Commonwealth 
Africa ... to integrate the diverse personal laws of marriage and divorce’ (Read 1972: 
19).  Equally, gender equality provisions in Tanzania’s Land Act (LA) and Village Land 
Act (VLA) of 1999 (collectively known as ‘the Land Acts’)2 were celebrated by many 
Tanzanian gender activists and women MPs as a significant achievement in successful 
outreach, lobbying and advocacy (Tsikata 2003, Mallya 2005).  Crucially however, 
these gains for women’s rights have always occurred alongside the continued statutory 
recognition of so-called ‘customary law’, aspects of which are regarded by many as 
discriminatory against women. 
This thesis considers the extent to which women in the location of study are realising 
their interests in land through statutory processes of dispute resolution.  The starting-
point of the analysis is the legal claims to land which women make in Tanzania’s 
specialist system of land courts established under the Land Acts.  The study draws upon 
ethnographic fieldwork including courtroom observation, archival research and 
interviews conducted in two districts of Arusha region between April 2009 and January 
2010.  The thesis as a whole is structured to reflect the journeys of women litigants in 
Arusha and traces land disputes from their social origins through the land court system 
to judgment. 
This introductory chapter contextualises the present study within the debates on women, 
land and human rights in Africa and outlines the methodological foundations of my 
research.  1.2 reviews the contemporary policy debates surrounding ‘customary’ and 
‘human rights-based’ approaches to protecting women’s interests in land.  1.3 discusses 
how literature from legal pluralism studies informs these debates in the context of 
securing women’s interests in land through processes of dispute resolution.  1.4 reflects 
                                               
1 The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) comprises Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar; however the 
judicial system is not a Union matter under the 1977 Constitution (Cap. 2 R.E. 2002).  In this thesis all 
references to the Tanzanian legal system and laws are to the system applying to Tanzania mainland. 
2 Land Act (Act No. 4 of 1999) Cap. 113 R.E. 2002, Village Land Act (Act No. 5 of 1999) Cap. 114 R.E. 
2002.  The Land Acts were brought into force on 1.5.01. 
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upon the major methodological approaches that have shaped the research design.  The 
chapter concludes with an overview of the structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Contemporary debates on women, land and human rights in Africa 
In the centre of Arusha City lies the Arusha International Conference Centre (AICC) – 
home to the East African Community and U.N. Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  In the 
main courtyard beyond the security gates stands a monument to Tanzania’s first 
President, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, inscribed with the words: 
Africa knows no class.  I doubt if there is a word in any African language 
which is equivalent to class or caste.  If I protect Africa for anybody, it will 
be to protect it for Africa. 
These words epitomise much of Nyerere’s African Socialism (Ujamaa) and his 
resistance to the privatisation and commoditisation of land.  In contrast to the 
privatisation agendas of international financial institutions and foreign governments 
Nyerere believed land to be a ‘gift from God’ that should not be expropriated to create 
class inequalities or to serve foreign interests at the expense of Africans (Nyerere 1958 
– reprinted in Nyerere 1967, see also Kamata 2010).  As Kijo-Bisimba and Peter write, 
as a communitarian and a religious man, he also believed in the equality of all human 
beings and in his writings, he emphasised the importance of equality between men and 
women for the development of the country (Kijo-Bisimba and Peter 2010). 
The monument bearing Nyerere’s words came to my attention when I attended the 
International Association of Women Judges (IAWJ) Africa Region conference held at 
the AICC during my fieldwork year.  The theme of the conference was ‘Access to 
Justice’ and the importance of the occasion was marked by the presence of the President 
of Tanzania, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, and Tanzanian Chief Justice, Augustino 
Ramadani, as well as other senior members of the judiciary of Tanzania and beyond.  
Amongst other issues, several papers were presented on the topics of legal issues 
concerning women’s property rights and violence against women.  Throughout the 
papers and the plenary discussions which followed a recurrent theme was the need for 
stronger statutory provisions to address domestic violence and women’s property rights.  
Gender discriminatory ‘customary law’, ‘patriarchy’, and ‘culture and traditions’ were 
frequently argued to be the biggest obstacles to securing women’s property rights.   
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In a lively debate, I was particularly struck by the comment of one audience member: 
“Why are we moaning about inheriting or marrying property when we can buy our 
own?”  The question highlights not only how far the meaning and use of land in 
Tanzania today has shifted from Nyerere’s vision, but also the socio-economic 
differences between women and their ability to acquire property.  Despite Nyerere’s 
belief in a classless Africa and public ownership of land, social and economic 
inequalities increasingly separate individuals’ abilities to access and buy land in the age 
of newly liberalised African land markets.  As Peters notes, increases in the market 
value of land and land conflicts have been both consequence and cause of growing 
social inequality to the benefit of local elites (Peters 2004).   
Inequality operates through a number of structural levels – international, national, 
community and family, and these levels intersect with individual differences – age, 
religion, race, marital status, tribal identity, health, personal wealth and education – as 
well as gender.  In a 1990s case study of land tenure and social change in Iringa region, 
Tanzania, Daley notes that wealth, age, marital status, education, knowledge and above 
all - confidence were all important factors mediating a woman’s ability to acquire and 
register land in that area (Daley 2008).  What is noticeable both in the literature and in 
live debates on women and land more generally is that often insufficient attention is 
paid to socio-economic differences between ‘women’ as a social category, and the 
complexity of power relations that attach to various modes of land acquisition. 
It is important to emphasise the diversity of ways in which land is used by families in 
Tanzania.  Agriculture remains a major livelihood activity for the majority of 
Tanzanians living in rural areas.  However, in rural areas on the fringes of urban centres 
such as Arusha, family-owned land is increasingly being utilised to build rental 
accommodation or small business premises to provide other income alongside small-
scale farm production.  In the unplanned areas of Arusha City land has become valuable 
first and foremost for housing and there is little space between the tightly packed houses 
for any farming.  A recent study by Kweka and Fox (2011) conducted across several 
urban areas in Tanzania found that families engage in a range of agricultural and non-
agricultural household enterprises for their livelihood and subsistence. 
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Despite the growing commoditisation of land, for many Tanzanians living in rural areas 
customary systems of land tenure have endured.  This is associated with the continued 
importance of clanship and kinship, through which men’s and women’s claims to land 
are differentiated by gendered social ties that are closely connected to the life cycle.  For 
example, amongst Tanzania’s northern patrilineal peoples, whilst a man may expect to 
inherit a portion of land from his father, a woman’s interests in inherited land are 
typically contingent on her status as a wife and relations with her husband’s family.  
Her interests in, and claims over land and her family home change throughout her 
lifetime - as a daughter, wife, widow and mother.  Both men and women can acquire 
land in other ways – such as through purchase, cultivation or debt default.  However, 
limitations on resources mean that in practice many more men than women are able to 
do this. 
As Whitehead and Tsikata observe, there is significant contestation between scholars as 
to the nature of such socially embedded, so-called ‘customary’ interests in land.  Whilst 
some identify a hierarchy or ‘bundle of rights’, distinguishing  secondary ‘use’ claims 
from primary ‘control’ claims to the land; others argue that tenure relations are 
‘negotiated, dynamic and fluid’ (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 77).  My contention 
throughout this thesis is that the rigidity or flexibility of customary systems can only be 
understood through empirical investigation.  For debates on women’s interests in land to 
be meaningful they must pay close attention to the factors that differentiate women’s 
abilities to access, acquire and control land – hence to questions of agency and to social 
power relations that are linked with different modes of land acquisition. 
The term ‘customary’ is widely used in academic and policy debates on land tenure and 
legal systems, but its actual meaning is contentious in a number of respects.  Frequently 
in the policy literature ‘customary’ is used interchangeably with ‘informal’, ‘traditional’ 
or ‘local’ to describe systems and practices recognised by a particular community as 
having normative significance.  The ‘informal’ or ‘customary’ is then often juxtaposed 
with ‘formal’ or ‘statutory’.  However, many scholars in the fields of law and 
anthropology contend that in so-called ‘plural legal systems’ (discussed further at 1.3) 
multiple legal orders coexist and intersect (Roberts 1979, Comaroff and Roberts 1981, 
Galanter 1981, Von Benda Beckmann 1984, Allot and Woodman 1985, Griffiths 1986, 
Santos 1987, Merry 1988, Woodman 1988, Vanderlinden 1989, Griffiths 1997, Von 
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Benda Beckmann 2002 amongst others).  Moreover, in Tanzania and in some other 
African plural legal systems, both living social practices and codified versions of the 
customary are recognised by the state and applied by different courts in various ways in 
their decision-making.  In these contexts, definitional dichotomies of the customary that 
are too rigid or based on state-centred conceptions of law are somewhat artificial. 
‘The re-turn to the customary’ 
One of the most detailed discussions of gendered power relations and African land 
reform to date is Whitehead and Tsikata’s widely cited 2003 article, which reviews the 
contemporary policy debates on women and land tenure.  The authors highlight an 
emerging consensus then taking place amongst policy institutions, and some academics 
and lawyers in favour of a ‘re-turn to the customary’.  The theoretical underpinnings to 
this convergence were ‘evolutionary’ theories of land tenure, most notably Platteau’s 
‘evolutionary’ theory, which became prominent in the 1980s.  In summary, Platteau’s 
theory contends that demand for the state to initiate a formal system of individualised 
property rights comes ‘from below’ in response to commercialisation of agriculture, 
population pressure on land and conflicts between land users.  It is argued that these 
state measures serve to reduce the number of land conflicts, promote tenure security and 
generate a range of economic benefits (Platteau 1996, Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 71). 
A further main influence was growing evidence of the adverse impact of privatisation 
and titling policies on many women’s interests in land in Africa, most notably in Kenya.  
As Mackenzie (1993), Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) Yngstrom (2002) and others have 
observed, in areas of land shortage in particular, where land is privatised and then 
registered in the name of a male head of household this has in many cases diminished 
women’s pre-existing claims to matrimonial or inherited family land.  African feminist 
lawyers, who had worked extensively for reforms to improve women’s access and rights 
to land, were the most significant voices against this re-evaluation of the customary. 
As Whitehead and Tsikata (2003) discuss, proponents of a ‘re-turn to the customary’ 
were pointing to the resilience of customary land tenure and the advantages of a system 
that recognises multiple claims to land, and which is also flexible, socially embedded 
and locally understood.  They noted a diversity of standpoints lying behind this renewed 
support for customary systems.  For example, the Land Policy Division of the World 
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Bank, which had begun to favour ‘evolutionary’ approaches to privatisation and 
formalisation, sees customary tenure systems as providing a useful framework from 
which incremental titling can be achieved from the ground up (World Bank 2001).  By 
contrast Toulmin and Quan’s ‘human-centred’ approach identifies the inherent 
advantages for the poor of customary systems of land tenure that are cost-effective and 
relatively secure.  They argue in favour of reformed customary systems developed by 
African people themselves to suit particular local circumstances (Toulmin and Quan 
2000).  Those advocating democratisation and greater community level participation 
support a strengthening of local-level institutions and their incorporation into statutory 
systems (Shivji 1998, Palmer 2000, Alden Wily 2000 – see also 2006).   
Whitehead and Tsikata point out that these policy debates give relatively little 
consideration as to how social power relations might affect women’s interests in land if 
customary systems are strengthened.  Arguing from a gender perspective, their central 
contention is that policy makers must consider how to ensure that women’s claims to 
land will not be undermined as a consequence of the strengthening of local institutions 
which are socially embedded in local and gendered power relations.  Debate is still on-
going as to the relative merits of preserving customary practices and institutions versus 
their abolition or reform through statute.  The complexity of the issue, as Whitehead and 
Tsikata highlight, lies in the fact that the strength of women’s claims to land often lies 
precisely in their social embeddedness.  In customary land tenure systems both women 
and men often successfully base their claims to land on gendered kinship relations.  
These same social ties are the power relations that underpin existing gender inequalities. 
‘Human rights-based approaches’ (HRBA) 
Proponents of statute-driven land tenure reform at one stage divided into two distinct 
camps – neo-liberal economists on the one hand, and human rights advocates on the 
other, each approaching issues of development, empowerment and poverty reduction 
from quite different normative standpoints.  However, these divergent standpoints have 
increasingly converged through the adoption of what have become known as ‘rights-
based approaches’ to development.  The origins and growth of these approaches may be 
traced to the discourse of international development agencies in the early 1990s and the 
World Social Development Summit at Copenhagen in 1995 (Cornwall and Nyamu-
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Musembi 2004, Ikdahl, Hellum et al 2005), as well as to the work of the economist 
Amartya Sen (Sen 1999, Nussbaum 2003: 59, Banda 2005: 273).   
Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi observe that although the phrases ‘human rights 
approaches’ or ‘rights-based approaches’ to development have been widely adopted, 
there is no one sense in which they are used or understood.  They tend to be viewed 
either ‘legalistically’ as standards for designing or assessing interventions; or as norms 
‘underpinning the entire development enterprise’.  They may be used as a means of 
addressing issues of duty-holders’ accountability, or to enable people to empower 
themselves towards the realisation of their social and economic rights (Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi 2004: 1431).  Gauri and Gloppen (2012) identify four institutional 
mechanisms which they observe as using human rights-based approaches (HRBA): 
global compliance, policy and programming, rights talk, and legal mobilisation.   
The mechanisms Gauri and Gloppen identify are particularly seen in the work of 
international human rights organisations concerned with realising women’s interests in 
land.  The U.N. Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), the U.N. Entity for 
Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) and the U.N. 
Development Programme (UNDP) are all publicly committed to using HRBA as a 
conceptual and practical framework for development policy.  In the case of UN Women 
HRBA is also a tool for promoting states’ compliance with the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  of 1979 (CEDAW).   
One international development institution that has stopped short of wedding itself with 
HRBA is the World Bank.  In a 2004 speech the World Bank’s General Counsel, 
Roberto Dañino welcomed the growing recognition of human rights as central to the 
World Bank’s development work, within the confines of its remit as a financial agency 
(Dañino 2005).  In practice the Bank appears to place more emphasis on ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ than human rights in its approach to policy-making on land issues 
(Giovarelli, Katz et. al. 2005, World Bank 2009).  In its most recent 2012 World 
Development Report, which takes Gender Equality and Development as its theme, the 
authors observe the interdependent nature of various social and legal institutions, 
markets, households and the transformative power of actors in creating economic 
opportunities and enabling women’s greater agency generally (World Bank 2012). 
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HRBA is now widely appealed to by advocates of statutory solutions to securing 
women’s interests in land at the regional and national level.  The phrase ‘rights-based 
approach’ is publicly used by the regional African women and law organisations – 
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF), Federation of Women Lawyers 
(FIDA) and Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) to define their strategic 
frameworks for legal and development programming.  Tripp observes that the majority 
of African women activists and scholars have adopted a rights-based approach in their 
campaigns (Tripp 2004).  Opinions expressed by a number of African women judges at 
the 2009 IAWJ conference in Arusha suggest that there remains strong support amongst 
African feminist lawyers for legislative and rights-based approaches to strengthening 
women’s property rights against discriminatory customary practices.  In Tanzania, 
rights-based approaches are evident in the work of legal NGOs - notably the Legal and 
Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Women’s Legal Aid Centre (WLAC), Tanzania Women 
Lawyers Association (TAWLA) and the National Organisation for Legal Assistance 
(NOLA), whether in policy debates, strategic litigation, or in encouraging social change 
at a community level.   
Foreign funding of African human rights NGOs has undoubtedly contributed to the 
sometimes jargon-like use of the phrase ‘HRBA’.  This in turn reignites the ‘culture 
versus rights’ debate polarising universal rules and local cultural norms.  Such critics 
ignore the fact that human rights are also heavily contested within Western contexts (see 
for example Dembour 2006).  In seeking to move beyond this polarisation a number of 
scholars writing in African contexts adopt a more nuanced position on human rights 
within African cultural norms (An-Na’im and Hammond 2002, Butegwa 2002, Nyamu-
Musembi 2002).  For example, writing on women’s property rights in Kenya Nyamu-
Musembi argues that the local level is not ‘a repository of unchanging patriarchal 
values’; positive openings exist within a community’s value system which are 
complementary to human rights agendas.  Hence, local practices should be seen as 
pathways to the promotion of human rights and gender equality.  Alternatively, as 
Cowan, Dembour and Wilson argue, it is possible to see the tension between 
universalism and cultural relativism as ‘part of the continuous process of negotiating 
ever-changing and interrelated global and local norms’ (2001: 6).   
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Whilst An-Na’im and others see human rights ultimately as something positive, they 
nevertheless view the concept of human rights as something which was at least 
originally external to African societies.  Ultimately this concession to the notion of 
human rights as ‘external’ offers limited resistance to the imperialist charge and – from 
the perspective of women – limited moral resistance against those who claim the 
cultural authenticity of discriminatory norms against ‘foreign’ ideas of rights.  Even if 
‘universal’ ideas of human rights are translated into local terms – the process of 
‘vernacularisation’ of rights, as Merry conceptualises it – this does not ultimately 
transform the concept of rights itself at the local level.  Rather, as Merry contends, 
rights become ‘ornamented by local cultural signs and symbols and tailored to local 
institutions’ (Merry 2006: 216). 
My contention is that when human rights are translated into policy discourse (HRBA) 
something is lost in the power of human rights as a moral discourse.  Arguably, it is 
when the individual evokes a moral concept of rights that they offer the strongest 
normative resistance against discriminatory or oppressive laws or social practices.  
What is needed is for policy makers and activists to approach the concept of rights from 
a different starting-point.  Santos’ proposal for a ‘counter-hegemonic’ understanding of 
human rights, offers one such starting-point (Santos 2007, 2009).  Santos (2009) 
imagines human rights as ‘a struggle against unjust human suffering, conceived in its 
broadest sense ... encompass[ing] nature as an integral part of humanity’.  Writing on 
the possibility offered by progressive theologies to ‘help to recover the “human” of 
human rights’ Santos argues, ‘...if God were a human rights activist, He or She would 
definitely be pursuing a counter-hegemonic conception of human rights and a practice 
fully coherent with it’ (Santos 2009: 29).  In the context of women’s interests in land, a 
counter-hegemonic conception of rights urges us to pay attention to women’s 
experiences and the way women themselves frame their claims. 
Reforming customary land tenure practices through statute 
In the last decade the policy debates on land tenure explored in Whitehead and Tsikata’s 
article have continued to evolve.  Legislators and policy-makers are revisiting 
customary practices and institutions to explore ways in which they may be used to 
implement land law reforms whilst protecting women’s interests in land.  In the new 
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wave of African land reform most states have continued to recognise customary land 
tenure in statute, although to varying degrees.  Alden Wily’s 2012 survey of African 
land tenure reforms notes that customary land tenure receives most positive statutory 
recognition in Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (Alden Wily 2012).  
Amongst these countries Tanzania’s Land Acts stand out for their strong recognition of 
customary land tenure practices and gender equality.  The intention appears to be to 
preserve customary practices at the local level whilst mediating against any gender 
discriminatory aspects through a statutory clause enshrining men and women’s equal 
rights to land.   
Tied in with the current policy focus on customary systems and their role in local land 
administration, there is now renewed scholarly and policy interest in dispute resolution 
through ‘customary justice systems’ – or ‘traditional authorities’, which recognises their 
importance in African societies.  Past the hum of policy debates and land law reforms 
however, a fundamental question remains to be answered: what is happening in 
practice? 
Within the past thirty years there have been relatively few published detailed empirical 
studies by lawyers and anthropologists of how African ‘customary justice systems’ and 
state courts that have regard to customary practices actually work in practice (Comaroff 
and Roberts 1981, Moore 1986, Rwezaura and Wanitzek 1988, Woodman 1988, 
Griffiths 1997, the WLSA series 1999-2000, Ubink 2008).  The various methodological 
approaches taken in these case studies are discussed at 1.4.  In the context of the new 
wave of land law reforms across Africa, empirical legal studies are particularly 
important for understanding the impact of statutory reforms in the context of land 
administration and legal processes of dispute resolution.  Ultimately it is only by 
conducting context-specific studies of the law in action that it is possible to gain insight 
into whether people are able to effectively access justice through the new statutory 
systems, and how courts of different levels negotiate and interpret laws and other norms 
in practice. 
This thesis considers the law in practice in the context of women’s claims to land in 
Arusha.  A key question is the extent to which Tanzania’s new Land Acts and the pre-
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existing LMA provide an effective statutory framework for addressing the claims to 
land that women are making in practice.  Chapters 2 and 3 explore customary land 
tenure practices within the location of study and the kinds of legal claims to land that 
are being made by women in Arusha.  A study of the process of women’s legal claims 
to land raises two further overarching themes of inquiry.  Firstly, where do women go to 
make claims and resolve disputes over land and how do claims progress through various 
dispute resolution fora? Secondly, what are the normative frameworks operating within 
these fora and how do actors engaged in processes of disputing invoke, contest and 
apply various laws and other norms in practice? 
1.3 Normative pluralism in African legal systems 
Scholarship from legal pluralism studies may be employed to address these processual 
and substantive questions.  A detailed discussion of the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, it is important to note that leading scholars in 
the field of legal pluralism studies, notably Moore (2001) and Griffiths (2005) have 
questioned the meaning and use of the concept at a time when the notion is fast 
spreading beyond the disciplines of socio-legal studies and anthropology (Tamanaha 
2008).  In a detailed discussion of what he describes as ‘the troubled concept of legal 
pluralism’ Tamanaha observes that Griffiths, who has for many years provided the most 
authoritative answer to the question ‘What is legal pluralism?’ has reassessed his 
original definition.  In his seminal 1986 article Griffiths offers a descriptive theory to 
counter the ideology of ‘legal centralism’, or state-centred conceptions of law: 
A descriptive theory of legal pluralism deals with the fact that within any 
given field, law of various provenance may be operative.  It is when in a 
social field more than one source of ‘law’, more than one ‘legal order’, is 
observable’ (1986: 38). 
In a later article Griffiths revises his previous position: 
In the intervening years, further reflection on the concept of law has led me 
to the conclusion that the word ‘law’ could better be abandoned altogether 
for purposes of theory formation in sociology of law …. It also follows from 
the above considerations that the expression “legal pluralism” can and 
should be reconceptualized as “normative pluralism” or “pluralism in 
social control”. (Griffiths 2005: 63-64 – cited in Tamanaha 2008). 
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Moving beyond these definitional dilemmas, the concept of ‘legal pluralism’ or 
‘normative pluralism’ has nonetheless proved fruitful for illuminating fields beyond the 
state where women make claims, and the interaction of these fields with state systems.  
For example, Manji observes an ‘exit from the state’ by women in African contexts 
where, it is argued, the attitude of the state towards women has been ‘at best ambivalent 
and at worst physically and symbolically coercive’.   Drawing on MacKinnon’s theory 
that ‘[s]ubstantively, the way the male point of view frames an experience is the way it 
is framed by state policy’ (MacKinnon 1983: 653), Manji argues that  ‘legal centralism 
reflects male experiences of law as predominantly public, state law’.  By contrast legal 
pluralism affords an articulation of a ‘feminine view of the (legal) world’ where legal 
centralist paradigms have proved inadequate (Manji 1999).     
Dispute resolution beyond state legal systems 
Most lawyers practising in common law legal systems, including Tanzania, find that 
their professional training is focused largely on state law and adversarial legal 
processes.  Relatively little emphasis is placed on other modes of dispute resolution 
beyond the courtroom or lawyer’s office or to understanding the wider social dynamics 
of disputing.  Viewed through a juristic lens, state law and courts lie at the centre of a 
legal world in which litigants submit to a judicially controlled process of dispute 
resolution.  Yet, from the perspective of many litigants, courts are situated at the edge of 
the social world – often seen as unattractive, remote or feared fora of last resort.  In the 
Tanzanian context and elsewhere, it is very common in the case of a dispute over land 
that by the time it has reached the stage of court intervention, conflict and negotiation 
between the parties and other third parties will already have taken place in a number of 
other fora. 
Between 1997 and 2001 WLSA conducted an extended programme of research on 
administration of justice and delivery constraints in seven Southern African countries.  
The programme findings included that ‘justice delivery’ is not confined to the 
courtroom, but also occurs through a number of ‘justice delivery systems’ - family and 
clan, local institutions such as chiefs, police, legal aid offices, social welfare offices, 
churches and district administrators (WLSA Botswana 1999; WLSA Lesotho 2000; 
WLSA Malawi 1999; WLSA Mozambique 2000; WLSA Swaziland 2000; WLSA 
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Zambia 2000; WLSA Zimbabwe 2000).  A number of studies since then have drawn 
further attention to the role of non-statutory justice systems and social factors affecting 
women’s access to statutory fora (Stevens 2000, Nyamu-Musembi 2002, 2003, 
Wojkowska 2006, Magoke-Mhoja 2008, Henrysson and Joireman 2009).  ‘Legal 
pluralism’ is often used in this context to describe a concept of the ‘legal’ which is not 
confined to statutory systems; and/or the varying ways in which norms and laws prevail 
in different fora.  This may have an important bearing on disputants’ choice of fora and 
how disputes are handled and ultimately determined. 
The importance for women of justice delivery outside the court system was highlighted 
again in a 2010 Global Barometer Survey carried out across a number of African 
countries.  The survey found that women are more likely to contact a community leader 
than a government official when they have a grievance (UN Women 2011: 66).  
However for some women this may not necessarily be down to choice.  In her widely 
cited article, von Benda Beckmann (1981) applies the concept of ‘forum shopping’ from 
private international law to the local level in order to describe the behaviour of 
disputants who choose between fora, basing their choice on their hopes for the eventual 
outcome (1981: 117).  This implies that an individual who ‘forum shops’ exercises a 
degree of choice in engaging a particular forum.  However, as Whitehead and Tsikata 
argue, processes of allocation in dispute resolution are themselves socially embedded 
(Whitehead and Tsikata 2003: 97).  Hence, individuals with limited agency to choose 
between fora tend to follow conventional social pathways whilst those in positions of 
power within their family and community can also influence or drive the direction of 
the dispute.   
Very little empirical research in African contexts has been conducted on how actors 
within statutory fora impact upon women’s agency and influence the progression and 
outcome of a dispute.  Whilst studies of ‘customary justice systems’ focus on the role of 
community leaders, family members and increasingly - paralegals, little attention is 
given to the role of lawyers, legal NGOs and professional members of the judiciary and 
their impact on access to justice – particularly on women’s access to justice.  Taking a 
processual approach to studying disputes, chapter 4 of this thesis analyses the part 
played by social, political and legal actors from the origins of the dispute in its social 
context and as claims progress through the court system.  This offers a more complete, 
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litigant-oriented and socio-legal analysis of the law in action.  Particular attention is 
paid to agency, knowledge and power relations between actors engaged in legal 
processes and their role in framing, mediating, contesting and transforming claims.  
This adopts a broadly Foucauldian perspective on power relations (Foucault 1980) to 
examine issues of women’s access to justice, but also draws upon more recent work by 
feminist scholars (Yngvesson 1993, Hirsch 1998, Manji 2000) who pay attention to how 
women as disputants actively engage in processes of negotiation and resistance.   
Justice and judging in Tanzania’s plural legal system 
The process of doing justice and judgment represents the culmination of the statutory 
legal process.  Normative pluralism is embedded within Tanzania’s statutory legal 
framework, which judges are required to apply in practice.  Six sources of law are 
officially recognised: the 1977 Constitution, which includes the Bill of Rights,
3
 statute,
4
 
case law from the High Court and Court of Appeal, which is binding on the lower 
courts, Received laws,
5
 ‘customary’ and Islamic law,6 and international law (Nyanduga 
and Manning 2006).  The potential for contestation between these various sources of 
law is clearly illustrated in the area of women’s interests in land.  Tanzania is one of the 
most progressive African countries in its statutory commitment to gender equality.  It is 
a signatory to major international and regional human rights treaties
7
 and the Tanzanian 
Bill of Rights enshrines a right to equality.
8
  In the context of women’s land rights, The 
Land Acts explicitly provide that men and women have equal rights to acquire, hold, 
use and deal with land.
9
   
                                               
3 The Bill of Rights was inserted into the Constitution in 1984 under the Constitution (Fifth) 
(Amendment) Act (Act No. 15 of 1984). 
4 including all legislation (or Ordinances) which were enacted by the pre-independence colonial 
administration as Orders in Council (by virtue of the Laws Revision Act (Act No. 7 of 1994) Cap. 4 R.E. 
2002. 
5 including Common Law, the Doctrine of Equity and Statutes of General Application of England, 
applicable before 22nd July 1920 (by virtue of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act (JALA) Cap. 
358 R.E. 2002 (JALA), s.2(3). 
6 JALA s.11.  The Interpretation of Laws Act (Act No. 4 of 1996) Cap. 1 R.E. 2002 provides the 
Tanzanian statutory definition of ‘customary law’ (discussed below). 
7 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), UN International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (ICESCR), CEDAW, UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child of 1989 (CRC), African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 (ACHPR) and 
2003 Women’s Protocol thereto (the Maputo Protocol). 
8 The equality clause (Article 13) was amended with effect from July 2000 to include the provision 
expressly prohibiting gender discrimination.   
9 LA and VLA s.3(2) (see Appendix D). 
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These strong equal rights provisions are however, subject to other somewhat less 
egalitarian laws and norms elsewhere.  Article 30(2)(f) of the Bill of Rights – known as 
the ‘clawback clause’ is much criticised by human rights scholars and activists because 
it makes the human rights provisions in the Constitution subject to existing laws and 
promotion of the national interest generally.  The Land Acts did not alter the general 
statutory recognition of ‘customary law’ (discussed below) and land courts are required 
to apply it in practice.
10
  However, the legislation provides an important caveat that any 
rules of customary law denying women lawful access to ownership, occupation or use 
of land be held as void.
11
  This establishes a hierarchy of norms for courts to follow 
hinging on a legal centralist model in which statute trumps ‘customary law’ that is 
deemed to be discriminatory.  However, since land courts are also required to apply 
‘customary law’ this provision requires selectivity and normative assessment by land 
courts in their interpretation of whatever they perceive to be ‘customary law’ and its 
‘discriminatory’ features in order to accommodate statutory provisions for gender 
equality.  There are obvious challenges for interpretation where social organisation and 
land tenure systems are rooted in patrilineal principles.  
A complicating issue for legal practice is the heavily contested nature of customary law 
itself.  One contemporary definition proposed by Woodman (2011) is: 
A normative order observed by a population, having been formed by regular 
social behaviour and the development of an accompanying sense of 
obligation.   
Alternatively, the Tanzanian statutory definition is: 
Any rule or body of rules whereby rights and duties are acquired or 
imposed, established by usage in any African Community in Tanzania and 
accepted by such community in general as having the force of law, including 
any declaration or modification of customary law made or deemed to have 
been made under section 12 of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act, 
and references to “native law” or to “native law and custom” shall be 
similarly construed.
12
  
                                               
10 LA s.180(1)(a), Land Disputes Courts Act (Act No. 2 of 2002) Cap. 216 R.E. 2002 (LDCA) s.50. 
11 VLA s.20(2) (see Appendix D). 
12 Interpretation of Laws Act s.4. 
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Woodman’s definition conceptualises customary law as a normative order that 
originates from social behaviour rather than being imposed by the state.  In contrast the 
Tanzanian statutory definition of customary law encompasses both ‘living’ (Ehrlich 
1936) and codified versions of customary law that local district councils declare to be 
the customary law applying in their area.   
The way law itself is conceptualised has consequences for the approaches governments 
adopt in attempting to create, implement or seek to change it.  Attempting to define 
some uncodified customary practices as ‘law’ and others as customs and traditions (mila 
na desturi) is itself problematic because the concept of ‘law’ remains so contested 
within legal theory.  This is particularly the case whenever theoretical definitions of law 
are applied cross-culturally.  Within anthropology Bohannan argues ‘law’ to be a 
(European) ‘folk’ concept, the meaning of which cannot be translated across jural 
systems that operate in a fundamentally different way (Bohannan 1957).  Chanock 
contends that the codification of ‘customary law’ by colonial governments stemmed 
from a conscious decision to ‘stabilise’ and bring it under the control of the state rather 
than the people where it could be ‘modified and controlled only to a limited extent’ 
(1985: 47).  Mamdani (1996), most notably, asserts that it formed part of a process of 
‘decentralised despotism’ by colonial governments and local native authorities.  Some 
scholars therefore argue that because of its close associations with colonialism 
‘customary law’ is an illusory concept (Read 1972, Chanock 1985).   
Tanzania’s codified ‘customary law’ was the product of a project by the German 
anthropologist, Hans Cory undertaken during the period of British colonial rule.  
Twining notes that Cory collected individual statements on marital and inheritance 
matters from male elders of more than twenty patrilineal Bantu groups which were then 
unified and consolidated as draft rules of ‘customary law’.  In 1963 these drafts were 
amended and ratified by many District Councils and enacted as the Local Customary 
Law Declaration Orders (CLDOs)
13
 providing standardised rules regulating customary 
issues of marriage, divorce, guardianship, inheritance and other matters (Twining 1964: 
36-38).  The research process behind the CLDOs, which involved male colonial officers 
collecting statements from male elders, resulted in a highly patriarchal codified version 
                                               
13Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order (G.N. 279 of 1963), Local Customary Law (Declaration) 
(No. 4) Order (G.N. 436 of 1963), Cap. 358 R.E. 2002. 
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of customary law, which is today widely considered to be discriminatory against 
women. 
As Snyder (1981), Moore (1986) and Woodman and Obilade (1995) argue, the process 
of codification amounts to a process of transformation, which as Moore puts it – 
involves a major reinterpretation of guideline norms into mandatory substantive rules.  
Significantly, she notes that ‘the basis on which ... groups made discretionary 
exceptions and modifications is lost in the ‘translation’ from primary group to court, to 
say nothing of the difference between fact-finding and fact-knowing as the basis of 
discussion and decision’ (Moore 1986: 170).  The contentious provenance of Tanzania’s 
codified customary law and its gender discriminatory aspects have led to repeated calls 
from activist lawyers for their repeal.  However, to date they remain in force and 
applicable in many patrilineal areas of Tanzania where districts have adopted them as 
local law.   
By contrast, there is much greater scholarly support for recognition of uncodified or 
living versions of customary law that are more responsive to social change and 
contemporary notions of rights.  Perhaps the most prominent Tanzanian advocate for the 
judicial recognition of living customary law is Professor Issa Shivji, Chair of the 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters which preceded the Land Acts 
(the Shivji Commission).  As the Commission commented following its period of 
extensive field research: ‘in many parts of the country ... the various customary laws are 
not frozen, but living social organs which respond to social change’ (URT 1994: 252).  
Shivji’s positive view of living customary law and its potential to contribute to the 
development of common (land) law in statutory processes of dispute resolution is 
discussed further in chapter 3.   
The Tanzanian statutory definition of customary law, which recognises two kinds of 
customary law – codified and uncodified – has practical significance for courts in 
deciding which form of customary law to use, and how to find and interpret it.  The 
process of judging and doing justice is the subject of chapter 5 of this thesis.  In the 
context of women’s claims to land, questions are raised as to the form of customary law 
that adjudicators consider in practice and how they mediate between gender 
discriminatory customary law and equality provisions under the Land Acts.  It is widely 
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contended within legal scholarship that law and legal institutions are patriarchal (Conley 
and O’Barr 2005: 60).  In addition to considering how courts use and interpret 
customary law, this study also examines the extent to which legal processes and 
approaches to doing justice in the particular location of study appear patriarchal and 
gendered, and the implications of this for women’s legal claims to land. 
1.4 Methodological approaches and research design 
I began this research project from the perspective of a practising lawyer with a belief 
that human rights could serve as a legal tool to challenge inequality and realise 
women’s interests in land.  Postcolonial feminist critiques of human rights, notably 
Mohanty (1988) and Kapur (2002, 2006) however, caused me to reflect on some of the 
pitfalls of human rights-based scholarship and activism and its tendency to generate or 
reinforce a ‘victimisation rhetoric’ (Kapur 2002) about women.  The ‘dark side’ of 
human rights - as Kapur describes it - continues to receive little attention in mainstream 
human rights scholarship and advocacy.  Yet as Kapur argues, such scholarship and 
advocacy requires ‘understanding and learning from the postcolonial engagement with 
rights that are informed by the legacies of the colonial encounter’ (Kapur 2006: 685).  
These postcolonial critiques were a major factor in my decision to foreground the 
empirical and women’s experiences of making claims to land in my Tanzanian case 
study, rather than taking HRBA as the starting point. 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of using HRBA, I turned instead to feminist 
methodological approaches.  As Harding has observed, the distinctive power of 
‘feminist-inspired’ research lies in the researcher using women’s experiences to 
generate her research questions, designing research for women, and placing herself in 
the same critical plane as the overt subject matter (Harding 1988).  Yet, as Spivak 
warns, elite construction of the subaltern
14
 woman’s consciousness or subject brings its 
own ‘epistemic violence’.  Welcoming ‘information retrieval in these silenced areas’, 
she nevertheless urges scholars to learn to ‘speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) 
the historically muted subject of the subaltern woman’ by ‘systematically “unlearn[ing]” 
female privilege’ (Spivak 1998: 295).  In an interview with Shaikh, Spivak clarifies this 
                                               
14 The term ‘subaltern’, originating from the work of Antonio Gramsci and developed by the ‘Subaltern 
Studies’ group of intellectuals and Spivak herself, is used to describe an ‘effect’  rather than a defined 
category  of subordinated social groups not forming part of a (colonial) elite (Landry and MacLean 1996: 
203). 
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phrase as ‘learning to learn from below’, seeing one’s privilege as instrumental more 
than anything else.  She warns however, that this is a formula that is ‘very easy to agree 
with and extremely difficult to practice’ (Shaikh 2007: 183). 
Inspired and informed by these postcolonial and feminist scholars, I resolved to conduct 
a rich, detailed and empirically-based study of women’s claims within a broader socio-
legal inquiry into the law in action.  In the context of the new wave of African land law 
reforms, such empirical legal studies are particularly important for understanding the 
impact of statutory reforms on women’s interests in land, how women are engaging 
with new statutory fora for land dispute resolution, and how law is used and applied by 
courts in practice.  Whilst a focus on disputes, which leaves out ‘trouble-less cases’ can 
give only a partial picture of how laws and other norms are understood and used within 
a society (Holleman 1973), context-specific studies of the law in action have intrinsic 
value for other reasons.  Disputes amplify power relations between actors and a study of 
disputes reveals how power relations may be mediated by laws, norms and legal 
processes.  Empirical research of disputes in statutory fora can provide important 
insights into the opportunities and obstacles that statutory law and legal processes offer 
women making claims to land beyond family and community-based fora.   
Studying the law in action 
Within the past thirty years very few detailed empirical studies by lawyers have been 
published on how African ‘customary justice systems’ and local African courts actually 
work in practice.  Such studies include Rwezaura and Wanitzek (1988), Woodman 
(1988), Wanitzek (1990-91, 2002), Griffiths (1997), the WLSA series (1999-2000), 
Manji (2000) and Ubink (2008).  Further ethnographic studies of legal processes by 
anthropologists include Comaroff and Roberts (1981), Moore’s historical ethnography 
of Chagga customary law on Kilimanjaro (1986), Rosen (1989, 1995), Caplan (1995), 
Hirsch (1998) and Stiles (2009).  The latter four studies all focus on law in Islamic 
contexts. 
There is considerable diversity of approach between the case studies by lawyers.  
Rwezaura and Wanitzek analyse the application by courts of a particular statute - 
Tanzania’s LMA - in a large volume of court cases across four different regions of the 
country.  Woodman’s study examines how state courts ‘create’ customary norms in two 
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countries – Ghana and Nigeria.  Griffiths and Ubink take ethnographic approaches to 
data collection.  Ubink’s Ghanaian case study examines contemporary interpretations of 
customary law and the power of traditional authorities in both land management and 
dispute resolution.  The WLSA series, Griffiths, Wanitzek and Manji all take women’s 
claims as their focus.  WLSA’s research is activist-oriented and examines issues of 
access to justice and justice delivery in a range of local fora.  Griffiths uses life history 
narratives to explore the gendered nature of women’s access to resources and family 
law in Botswana.  Wanitzek (building on Hirsch’s socio-linguistic approach in her 
Kenyan study) analyses how legal language is used to express power and reinforce 
gender bias in the context of marital cases in Tanzania.  Manji uses individual case 
studies from Kagera region, Tanzania to illuminate women’s experiences of struggles 
over land and to propose a theoretical framework for conceptualising the interaction of 
women and property.       
My own study of women’s claims to land took a processual (Gulliver 1963, Collier 
1975, Moore 1978, Comaroff and Roberts 1981) and multi-sited ethnographic approach 
to fieldwork in order to explore the dynamics of disputing and ‘the interlocking of 
multiple social-political sites and locations’ (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 37).  The 
research design applies Moore’s methodological concept of the ‘semi-autonomous 
social field’ – one which ‘can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but ... 
is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger 
world by which it is surrounded’ (Moore 1973: 720).  The field of study was therefore 
not confined to the walls of the courtroom.  Throughout my fieldwork I took a 
‘grounded’ theoretical approach to my research questions and generated new ones in a 
continuous process of data collection, reflection and review (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 
Corbin and Strauss 1990, Bentzon, Hellum et al 1998).  Appendix 1 of this thesis offers 
a detailed account of my most significant research design choices and the ethical and 
practical challenges that arose during fieldwork. 
Field sites 
The fieldwork for this study was conducted in Tanzania between January 2009 and 
January 2010, of which over nine months were spent in Arusha itself.  The geographical 
context of the study is two districts within Arusha region - Arusha Municipality (now 
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Arusha City) and the peri-urban/rural agricultural district of Arumeru
15
 surrounding it.   
The 2002 census records these two districts as having the highest population density in 
the region.
16
  Data collection centred on legal dispute resolution fora within the two 
districts. The Land Acts established a five-tier system of land courts (Village Land 
Council – Ward Tribunal - District Land and Housing Tribunal (DLHT) – High Court 
Land Division - Court of Appeal) which now holds exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
land disputes.
17
  With the exception of the Court of Appeal, which is located in Dar es 
Salaam, all other levels of court operate within the two districts of this study.   
Arusha region’s first DLHT opened in Arusha Municipality in January 2005.  As at 
January 2010 there were two DLHTs - the second being based in Karatu - covering 
Arusha region’s six districts.  Whilst ward tribunals had already been established under 
the Ward Tribunals Act of 1985 (WTA),
18
 in 2009 not every ward in Arusha 
Municipality and Arumeru had a functioning ward tribunal and some villages did not 
have village land councils.  At the other end of the court hierarchy a shortage of High 
Court Land Division judges in Tanzania had resulted in a large backlog of appeals, 
meaning that very few judgments in land cases involving women claimants had been 
promulgated in the High Court or the Court of Appeal above it. 
I considered it necessary to study disputes in more than one level of court in order to 
explore the progression, mediation and judging of claims as they become shaped and 
transformed by family, community and legal professional actors at various stages of 
dispute resolution.  It was apparent from initial scoping research that the majority of 
legal claims involving women in the two districts were handled at the levels of Ward 
Tribunal and DLHT.  Consequently the institutional focus of my fieldwork became 
(although was not limited to) these two levels of land court.   
A substantial amount of archival and observational data was collected over a period of 
nine months at the DLHT in Arusha Municipality, as well as in five ward tribunals 
                                               
15 In 2007 Arumeru District was administratively divided into two district councils – Arusha Rural and 
Meru.  The two district councils continue to share a single District Commissioner. 
16 The 2002 population census records the populations of Arusha Municipality and Arumeru as 281,608 
and 514,651 respectively.  The two districts cover just 0.3% and 8% respectively of the area within 
Arusha region but accommodate 21.9% and 40% of the population (National Bureau of Statistics 2004).  
The region’s other four districts - Karatu, Ngorongoro, Monduli and Longido are by contrast more 
sparsely populated and predominantly pastoralist areas. 
17 LA s.167 and VLA s.60-62. 
18 (Act No. 7 of 1985) Cap. 206 R.E. 2002 
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covering urban, peri-urban and rural areas within the two districts.  I spent an average of 
2 months visiting each ward tribunal.  In addition I observed legal aid clinic sessions at 
a local NGO – the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and conducted semi-
structured and unstructured interviews with a wide range of people – litigants their 
family members and elders, as well as legal, executive and political actors engaged in 
legal claims and land administration.  I also kept a detailed ethnographic field diary.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured to reflect the progression of women’s claims to land from their 
social origins through processes of dispute resolution to judgment.  Chapter 2 locates 
women’s claims to land in their historical and social context.  Drawing upon a range of 
fieldwork data it surveys the common themes and issues that arise in women’s legal 
claims to land in Arusha and introduces the locations and people whose claims are 
discussed in later chapters.  Chapter 3 offers a technical overview of the statutory 
landscape for making legal claims to land provided in the Land Acts and LMA.  The 
chapter considers the extent to which this framework is effectively designed to address 
the kinds of claims that are made by women in the location studied. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 take a processual approach to studying the law in action.  Chapter 4 
examines the progression of women’s claims from their social origins through various 
dispute resolution fora.  The analysis centres on agency, knowledge and power relations 
between actors as they negotiate and contest claims in these various fora.  Chapter 5 
focuses on adjudicators and their approach to doing justice and judging claims.  This 
encompasses an analysis of procedural justice and how laws and other norms are 
interpreted and applied in practice.  Chapter 6 draws together the themes of previous 
chapters in an extended case study which explores gendered subjectivity, law, power 
and discourse through textual analysis of a dispute.  The chapter reflects upon how 
multiple actors engaged in the dispute shape, contest and ultimately transform the 
woman’s legal claim from home and village to High Court. 
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2. Social origins of women’s claims to land: 
Family and land tenure in Arusha 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter situates women’s legal claims to land in their social context.  Arusha 
region has been the location of intense struggles over land since pre-colonial times.  
These struggles, which continued throughout the colonial period and following 
Tanzania’s political independence, have shaped both the rural and urban landscape and 
social tenure relations that underpin many contemporary claims to land.  The chapter 
begins with an overview of the historical development of land tenure in Arusha and 
follows with a descriptive portrayal of the locations within Arusha Municipality and 
Arumeru where I conducted fieldwork in land tribunals.  The way in which land is 
acquired in Tanzania is then discussed, as this has significant implications for the 
degree of autonomy and control that an occupier has over its use and disposition.  In the 
context of land held according to local patrilineal land tenure practices this creates 
gendered and intergenerational social relations over the land.  The next section shows 
how these gendered social relations form the basis of many women’s claims to land in 
Arusha today.  The final part of the chapter introduces key issues concerning women’s 
claims to land that arose during my fieldwork, as well as the women whose claims are 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Arusha: people, land and livelihoods  
Struggles over the land 
The rural district of Arumeru is the heartland of the Arusha and Meru peoples.  Spear 
provides the most detailed account of the history of Arusha and Meru farmers on Mount 
Meru up until 1961 and their relations with the pastoralist Maasai and Chagga of nearby 
Kilimanjaro (Spear 1993, 1997).  A detailed history of the Arusha and Meru and their 
relationship with the land is beyond the scope of this thesis.  A brief overview will 
however, contextualise the present struggles over land. 
Spear traces the history of farming on Mount Meru back to the seventeenth century 
when Kichagga speaking Meru from Kilimanjaro established new farming settlements 
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on the south-eastern slopes of the mountain.  The Arusha (or Ilarusa as they are also 
known) were originally inhabitants of the semi-arid plains of Arusha Chini (Lower 
Arusha) and traded with the Maasai and Swahili caravans on their route to Kenya.  The 
conquest of the south-eastern Maasai plains by the Kisongo Maasai led some Arusha to 
relocate to the south-western slopes of Mount Meru in the 1830s.  However, the 
Kisongo Maasai and Arusha maintained close relations through the Kimaasai language, 
age-set ceremonies, intermarriage and cooperation in pasturing animals and agricultural 
production.   
According to Spear, in the mid-nineteenth century as both Meru and Arusha populations 
increased and cleared forest areas on the mountain slopes for cultivation they eventually 
came into contact and conflict with each other before joining together in raids of people 
and cattle on Kilimanjaro.  By the 1890s the Arusha had grown to dominate the 
mountain through more intensive farming practices, displacing Kisongo pastoralists and 
by assimilating many Meru, Chagga and Maasai into Meru clans.  The intimately 
connected history of the Kisongo Maasai and the Arusha and their shared language 
helps to explain why Arusha farmers are today also often known as Maasai – or ‘town 
Maasai’. 
German colonial rule (1885-1916) was a period of bloody conquest and resistance 
(Spear 1997: 61-74).  In Arusha, much of the land around the lower slopes of the 
mountain was alienated in favour of European settlers.  Land used by Arusha and Meru 
farmers was restricted to a band between the lowland settler farms below 4,300 feet and 
the designated forest reserve above 5,300 feet on the upper slopes of the mountain.  This 
contributed to an intensification in the farming practices of the indigenous farmers, who 
replaced fields of maize and beans with permanent cash crops of coffee and bananas, 
sent some of their cattle to the plains and stall-fed those that remained.  The practice of 
keeping cattle, sheep and goats in stalls – or ‘zero-grazing’ on the mountain continues to 
this day.   
As a consequence of German defeat in the First World War, in 1918 Tanganyika passed 
to the British under a League of Nations Mandate and later as a Trust Territory until the 
country’s political independence in 1961.  Tanganyikan lands that were alienated under 
German rule were sold, mostly to the British, some to Asians, with only a fraction of 
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one percent being bought by Africans (URT 1994: 10).  In Arusha, as population 
density rose in the 1940s and 1950s some Meru moved off the mountain to settle to the 
east and west on the plains where they kept large cattle herds.  Pressure on land from 
indigenous population increases and British colonial aspirations to develop European 
settler production led to the establishment of the Arusha-Moshi Lands Commission in 
1946 to resolve the growing crisis.  This resulted in further alienation of Meru land 
when it was proposed that Meru people be relocated from the north-eastern slopes of the 
mountain to land acquired for them in less fertile semi-arid lowlands (Spear 1997: 210-
225). 
Meru protest and resistance to the forced evictions in 1951 was reported to be non-
violent.  Their struggles culminated in the Meru land case before the U.N. Trusteeship 
Council and General Assembly in 1952.  However, despite two tabled resolutions 
condemning British actions, in the face of British statements that they would refuse to 
withdraw, the removals were accepted at the U.N. as a fait accompli (Spear 1997: 229). 
The post-war period also saw expropriation of Arusha land with rapid expansion of the 
town and relocation of the main road connecting Arusha with Moshi at Kilimanjaro and 
the Kenyan border at Namanga (Spear 1997: 201).   
Following independence in 1961 President Nyerere’s government pursued a series of 
national rural development policies aimed at fighting ‘poverty, disease and ignorance’.  
Significant budgetary resources were put into the agricultural sector to improve and 
transform agricultural production.   However, ultimately the country’s economic growth 
was too low to achieve these aims (Kamuzora 2010: 94).  Nyerere’s policy of Ujamaa 
(African Socialism) announced in the 1967 Arusha Declaration led to the nationalisation 
of former alienated lands into the hands of governmental and parastatal bodies.  The 
later policy of ‘Operation Vijiji’ (‘villagisation’) between 1974 and 1976 saw millions 
of rural peasants relocated to Ujamaa villages throughout Tanzania.  As Shivji writes, 
this caused widespread confusion and alienation of land in its disregard of customary 
land tenure (Shivji 1998: 12).   
As elsewhere in colonial Tanganyika, Arusha town was developed to serve the interests 
of the colonisers, and racial divisions that were created then have translated into racial 
and class divisions in urban land occupancy today.  The roads and the boma 
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headquarters of the German administration, which still stands in the centre of Arusha, 
were built by African forced labour.  The town was designed to serve the colonial power 
as a centre for commerce and administration.  While European town dwellers were 
given security of tenure through leases of up to 99 years in well-planned low-density 
housing areas, transient African inhabitants ‘squatted’ or held short term licences, which 
could be revoked easily by administrative officers (URT 1994: 65).  The Asian 
community lived in medium-density housing in the commercial area of town (Lugalla 
1995: 14, cited in Hughes and Wickeri 2011: 802).   
During the British colonial period laws such as the Labour Utilization Ordinance of 
1947
19
 were passed to serve colonial interests and restrict indigenous rural-urban 
migration.  Such laws were abolished after political independence leading to a period of 
increased rural-urban migration and very rapid growth of squatter areas (Lugalla 1995: 
8, 11, 27, cited in Hughes and Wickeri 2011: 802-3).  Various policies were introduced 
to meet the growing demand for urban housing.  These included the establishment of the 
National Housing Corporation and later projects intended to facilitate construction and 
lending (Mahanga 2000: 95, cited in Hughes and Wickeri 2011: 803-80).  Later 
attempts to instigate new building projects in place of slums and to encourage town 
dwellers to build new houses were largely unsuccessful (Lugalla 1995: 52, cited in 
Hughes and Wickeri 2011: 804).  
The legacy of colonial alienation of the Meru and Arusha from the land and subsequent 
post-independence land policies sowed the seeds for many contemporary land disputes 
in the region and left sharp racial and socio-economic divisions in the allocation of land 
that have endured to the present day.  In more recent years some parts of large settler 
farms surrounding Arusha Municipality have been sold to make way for new planned 
residential areas with more mixed populations.  Meanwhile as demand for land 
continues to rise, old conflicts flare up over farms that were historically owned by 
settlers and were later moved into government hands.  During my fieldwork year there 
were clashes between some 300 Meru villagers and police on the site of a government 
owned 500-acre farm near the Arumeru market town of Tengeru.  Following rumours 
                                               
19 R.L. Cap. 243. 
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that it had been sold to a public official, villagers claimed the farm to be Meru ancestral 
land and invaded it, slashing the banana trees to stake their claim.
20
 
Contemporary Arusha 
It is estimated that in the last ten years alone the population of urban Arusha has nearly 
doubled.
21
  In July 2010 - six months after I completed fieldwork - Arusha Municipality 
was officially declared a city.  Approximately 95,000 kilometres squared of land was 
administratively annexed from western Arumeru with some 27,947 Arumeru residents 
becoming citizens of the new Arusha City.
22
   For clarity and consistency, in this thesis 
the former district name of Arusha Municipality is used when referring to the 
administrative boundaries that were in existence during my period of fieldwork.  This 
section contextualises the claims discussed in subsequent chapters through a descriptive 
portrait of Arusha’s urban centre and the five wards I visited to conduct my Ward 
Tribunal study.  Four of the wards were located in Arumeru and one in Arusha 
Municipality.  To protect the identity of some informants and third parties I refer to 
these wards as ‘Upper Arusha’, ‘Arusha Plains’, ‘Meru Rural’, ‘Meru Town’ and 
‘Arusha Urban’. 
Today, the leafy area known as Uzunguni (‘Europeans’ place’), situated close to the 
centre of the municipality, is characterised by European-style housing, restaurants, 
tourist hotels and surfaced roads lined with jacaranda and flame trees.  The area is 
largely inhabited by foreign nationals and wealthy Tanzanians, many of whom work in 
Arusha’s most lucrative employment sectors – the nearby U.N. Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and East African Community, Tanzanite mining, commercial agriculture, 
tourism and safari companies.  The buildings are guarded by askaris (watchmen) – 
often Maasai who migrate to the town from other parts of the region for work.  Many 
local women are employed as maids and housegirls.  This is also the location of the 
High Court and the Regional Commissioners’ Building which houses Arusha’s DLHT.   
                                               
20 ‘300 villagers in Arusha clash with armed police’ The Guardian (Tanzania) 8.6.09 p.3. 
21 Fieldwork interview with Arusha Municipality Land Registration Officer 7.10.09.  Arusha’s regional 
population growth in the inter-censal period 1988-2002 was 73% - the fourth highest regional growth rate 
in Tanzania (National Bureau of Statistics 2006: 4).   
22 ‘Arusha elevated to city status.’ The Arusha Times 31.7.10 – Report of an interview with the Executive 
Director of Arusha Rural District. 
30 
 
 
In marked contrast, the western half of the centre - home for much of Arusha’s Asian 
population - is dominated by civic apartment blocks, offices, shops, fabric sellers, cafes, 
small bars and guesthouses, the main marketplace and bustling streets where many men 
and women make their livelihoods in countless small businesses.  The streets are alive 
with the enterprises of mafundi (tradesmen and women).  Maasai and Arusha women sit 
making their handmade shanga beaded jewellery to sell to passers-by.  There is a whirr 
of tailors’ sewing machines, alongside shoe repairers, key cutters and mobile phone 
credit sellers. Mama Lishe women serve up hot lunches of rice, beans, chicken and beef 
to local workers while street food sellers at the bus stand cater for travellers with chipsi 
mayai (omelette with chips) maandazi (doughnuts), chapattis and sweet chai (tea).  
Women roast maize on small charcoal stoves or sell bananas, mangoes, avocadoes, 
green vegetables and other produce from buckets. 
To the south-west of the municipality in the shadow of an imposing maize flour factory 
lies ‘Arusha Urban’ ward.  Rapid urbanisation since the 1980s has seen what were once 
village areas become an integral part of the municipality: a maze of unplanned housing 
and unsurfaced roads where the local population make their living in service industries 
or small businesses, selling home-grown produce in the market, or working as 
employees in garages or local factories.  The majority of the population living in urban 
Arusha are not Arusha or Meru and have migrated to Arusha from all over Tanzania.  
Lack of urban planning in these areas has caused a large number of land disputes 
concerning boundaries and roads blocked by people building new houses, as well as 
landlord and tenant disputes in rented properties.  This ward generated a high number of 
appeals to the DLHT. 
‘Upper Arusha’ ward is situated to the north of the Arusha-Moshi road on the periphery 
of the municipality.  The southern peri-urban part of the ward near the main road has a 
mixed population of Tanzanians and a small number of wazungu (Europeans).  Walking 
up the bumpy unsurfaced road from the main highway there is a concentration of 
cement-built houses, small businesses and shops, a bar and local primary school.  As the 
road stretches uphill onto the lower slopes of Mount Meru the scene becomes rural.  
Bananas, maize, beans, fruit and vegetables are grown on family shambas and houses 
are constructed of either mud or cement bricks.  Cattle for milk production and goats are 
kept near to the house in a kibanda (hut) and fed on chopped up banana stems and other 
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vegetation from the shamba.  There is the occasional small wooden kibanda where local 
women sell just a few neat piles of locally grown fruit and vegetables, a butcher’s 
kibanda, a church.  Further uphill the noise of the local shops and bars disappears to the 
sounds of cockerels and mountain streams flowing alongside the lush shambas and 
hedged mud pathways.  This is Arusha heartland, where the first language of many 
inhabitants is Kimaasai. 
Despite its location on the periphery of Arusha town this ward has not been subject to 
urban planning.  The area is mostly unsurveyed, informal settlement and family 
shambas.  Demand for land in the ward is high.  Population increases over successive 
generations have reduced the size of fertile agricultural plots that families rely on for 
their livelihood and subsistence.  The high cost of coffee production coupled with its 
declining value on the international market has led many families to reduce coffee 
farming in favour of vegetables with yields three times a year.  Increasingly people are 
building brick or cement houses on their shambas to meet population rises or to provide 
an additional source of income from renting.  The demand for land has created a market 
for it and now constitutes a great incentive for villagers to sell land that has been passed 
down through families for generations.  This has given rise to a high number of land 
disputes in the ward, particularly where sellers have failed to obtain consent from family 
members and the village authority.  A large number of appeals to the DLHT were from 
Upper Arusha Ward Tribunal. 
In contrast ‘Arusha Plains’ ward to the west of the municipality comprises a mix of 
commercial settler farms and smaller Arusha family plots.  Again, the commoditisation 
of land and expansion of the urban periphery has encouraged many local people to sell 
plots to migrant workers from other parts of Tanzania and beyond.  European settler 
occupancy of land close to the municipality in colonial times has remained substantially 
unchanged with large commercial coffee estates of several hundred acres extending 
south and north of the main road towards Kisongo, each managed by the descendants of 
European settlers.  Parts of the coffee estates are now being sold under separate titles for 
multiple concept land use. 
Beyond the irrigated coffee estates heading in the direction of Arusha’s small airport the 
landscape becomes wilder.  Undulating hills and plains like dustbowls in the dry season 
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rapidly transform into grassland in the rainy season when rains flow through channels 
produced by soil erosion, enabling local farmers to grow maize, beans, sweet potatoes, 
peas and groundnuts on rain-fed family shambas.  In contrast to the small half or quarter 
acre shambas in Upper Arusha ward, family shambas on Arusha Plains’ less fertile low-
lying plains are typically 1 or 2 acres.  In addition to growing crops, families ‘zero-
graze’ their livestock on maize, bean husks and grass cut from road boundaries.  Many 
of the inhabitants in this area are Arusha people and Kimaasai is widely spoken.  Cattle 
and goats are traded amongst Maasai and Arusha men at the livestock market in 
Kisongo.   
Urban expansion and the commercial value of land in this area has also encouraged 
selling.  One Arusha woman living in the ward told me that she was preparing to sell 
one of her inherited two acres and to use the sale proceeds to build small brick houses 
for rental to ‘high class’ people working in the town.  In 2010 more than 50% of the 
land in the ward had been registered, including settler farms and most of the village land 
that has subsequently become annexed to the new city.
23
  Land in the ward’s other 
villages is mostly unregistered.  It is from these unregistered areas, where land is held 
under customary rights of occupancy that the majority of disputes heard in Arusha 
Plains Ward Tribunal originate. 
Taking a daladala (public minibus) east from the municipality along the main Arusha-
Moshi road towards Kilimanjaro the landscape gradually becomes rural and the passing 
scene is one of farms large and small, growing bananas, coffee, sunflowers, maize, 
sugar cane and rice.  Women dressed in kanga and kitenge board the daladala with 
plastic buckets full of produce, and bundles of live chickens.  The women are heading to 
do business in one of the Meru market towns situated on the main road to Kilimanjaro, 
where they will trade seasonal fruit and vegetables, ground coffee, rice, beans, maize 
four, chickens and fabrics, alongside men selling second-hand clothing and general 
household goods. 
The rapidly developing ‘Meru Town’ ward lies to the east of the municipality along the 
Arusha-Moshi highway.  Besides the market, it is also a frequent stopping point for 
business people on the way to Moshi as well as tourists visiting Mount Meru’s Arusha 
                                               
23 Interview with Arusha Rural District Land Officer 4.1.10. 
33 
 
 
National Park.  Some employees in the Tanzanite mines of Merarani in the adjacent 
Manyara region commute to work each week from their homes in the ward.  People 
from many parts of Tanzania and a small number of wazungu live here, although the 
indigenous population is Meru.  Local officials I spoke to anticipated that many land 
disputes would arise with implementation of the local planning strategy and land 
registration in the hitherto unplanned ward.   
A number of large irrigated commercial farms adjacent to the highway around the ward 
were European settler farms during colonialism. Now they are leased by the government 
to foreign investors or wealthy Tanzanians and produce coffee and roses mainly for 
export.  Meru Town’s larger farms, including the rice paddies are a source of seasonal 
employment for locals.  There are also smaller family shambas in the ward although the 
soil here is not as fertile as on the mountain slopes.  During my fieldwork year low 
rainfall caused crops such as maize on many small rain-fed shambas to fail.  On one 
occasion when I attended the Ward Tribunal at Meru Town the day’s hearings had been 
cancelled to enable government emergency supplies of maize to be distributed to local 
people from the ward office during the drought.   
To the east of Meru Town is ‘Meru Rural’ ward.  Most of the inhabitants of this ward 
are Meru and rely on farming for their livelihood.  Kimeru is widely spoken.  Farms in 
the ward are typically one acre or so inherited family shambas growing coffee, bananas, 
beans, maize, sunflowers, fruit and vegetables.  Families also keep a small number of 
cows, goats and chickens.  Coffee farming in the ward remains an important source of 
income but has significantly declined in favour of vegetable production since the 1980s 
due to local religious conflicts and population displacements, along with rising coffee 
production costs and fall in market values.   
Typically, family coffee shambas generating cash crops are managed by men.  Women 
also cultivate other crops such as maize and beans on their allocated portions of family 
land.  Coffee producers sell their crop to coffee cooperative unions by the kilo for 
onward commercial sale.  As the history of struggles over land by the Meru clearly 
illustrates, family shambas on Mount Meru lie at the very heart of Meru identity.  
Disputes over land within families are said to be common, particularly between brothers 
fighting over unequal shares of inherited shambas.  However, cash and food crop 
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production in the area is generally well managed and social attitudes towards female 
ownership of inherited land tend to be heavily patriarchal.  This may explain why there 
were very few claims to land in Meru Rural Ward Tribunal involving women. 
2.2 The ‘shamba’ 
The Kiswahili word shamba defies any satisfactory English translation.  Its literal 
meaning is a farm or plot of cultivated ground (of any size) and therefore encompasses 
both commercial farms and small family plots.  The Standard Swahili-English 
Dictionary (Johnson 1939) suggests that the origin of the word may lie in the French 
word champ (field) and the cultivation of cloves on Zanzibar from the late eighteenth 
century onwards.  In the family context use of the word shamba holds a meaning which 
intimately connects people with the land, to ancestors and to future generations. 
In her historical study of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro Moore distinguishes shamba from 
the Kichagga (and Kimeru) word kihamba.  A kihamba is a homestead consisting of a 
banana garden surrounding the family home that could be occupied permanently by a 
man and his male lineal descendants, failing which, his brothers or other male agnates.  
The family lived on the land while ancestors were buried in a part of the kihamba 
bounded by masale (dracaena plants) (Moore 1986: 80-85).  Spear writes that for the 
Meru the kihamba has similarly been a place of upbringing and veneration of ancestors.  
Whilst the youngest son would usually inherit his father’s kihamba other sons cleared 
adjacent land to establish new plots, to be inherited by their own sons in turn (Spear 
1997: 26).   
Moore notes that unlike kihamba, shamba plots hitherto were not permanently held but 
lowland areas annually allocated, nominally by the chief and used to grow annual crops 
of maize, beans and millet (Moore 1986: 115-117).  During the British colonial period 
increasingly shamba lands were converted into kihamba as households moved down the 
mountain (Griffiths 1930, cited in Moore 1986: 117).  Nowadays Meru and Chagga use 
both the vernacular word kihamba and the Kiswahili word shamba to refer to inherited 
family (and clan) land.  With no remaining vacant land to clear on Kilimanjaro or 
Mount Meru, with each generation existing family shambas are being divided into 
smaller and smaller plots.   
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Early Arusha mountain farmers also cleared land for cultivation on the slopes of Mount 
Meru with the youngest sons inheriting land from their father.  Spear notes however, 
that whereas for the Meru the main form of social organisation was the clan and lineage, 
Arusha local social organisation centred on age-sets with age-mates pioneering new 
lands on Mount Meru together after they had retired from being warriors (Spear 1997: 
50).  Over time aspects of Arusha and Meru social practices have merged, for example 
the adoption of Arusha systems of age-sets by Meru (Moore and Puritt 1977: 125), and 
Meru agricultural practices by Arusha.  Today both Arusha and Meru use the Kiswahili 
word shamba to refer to cultivated inherited family farm plots.   
For both Meru and Arusha, livestock remain of socio-economic significance and many 
families living in rural areas keep at least some livestock – whether cows, goats or 
sheep in a stall on the shamba.  Livestock are generally controlled and exchanged by 
men.  They may be slaughtered on ceremonial occasions, used for bridewealth (mahari), 
customary pledges/mortgages (rehani) and fines as well as kept to produce milk, meat 
and manure. 
2.3 Owning, acquiring, using land 
[Land is] God’s gift, given to all His creation without any discrimination 
... When I use my energy and talent to clear a piece of ground for my use 
it is clear that I am trying to transform this basic gift from God so that it 
can satisfy a human need.  It is true, however, that this land is not mine, 
but the efforts made by me clearing the land enable me to lay claims of 
ownership over the cleared piece of ground ... Whoever then takes this 
piece of ground must pay me for adding value to it through clearing it by 
my own labour. 
- Extract from Nyerere’s 1948 pamphlet ‘Mali ya Taifa’24                            
The concept of ‘owning’ the land itself is one which is not recognised in Tanzanian law 
today.  It was introduced under German colonial rule when some 1,300,000 acres (1%) 
of Tanganyikan lands were alienated in favour of settlers through ‘Conveyances of 
Ownership’25 and later converted into freeholds by the British.26  In 1923 the other 99% 
                                               
24 (National Property) Reprinted in Nyerere (1967: 53-58). 
25 Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and Conveyance of Crown Lands and regarding the 
Acquisition and Conveyance of Lands in general in German East Africa, promulgated 26.11.1895, s.6. 
26 Land Registry Ordinance (No. 15 of 1923) R.L. Cap. 116 s.7(1). 
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of occupied and unoccupied lands of mainland Tanganyika were declared to be ‘public 
land’ vested under the control of the Governor for the use and common benefit of ‘the 
natives’27 (URT 1994: 9-11).  Executive power over land was retained after 
independence when the radical title became vested in the President as trustee.  At 
Tanzania’s independence in 1963, and consistent with Nyerere’s conviction that land 
was public, not private property ‘to be sold like a robe’ (Nyerere 1967: 55) the 
remaining 1% of settler freehold tenures were eventually extinguished and made part of 
public land.
28
  For a detailed history of land tenure reform in Tanzania see James 
(1971), James and Fimbo (1973), Lyall (1973), Fimbo (1974, 1993), URT (1994), 
Shivji (1998). 
The 1923 Land Ordinance also introduced the concept of the ‘granted right of 
occupancy’29 – the right to use and occupy land, which is still recognised in Tanzanian 
land law today.  In 1928 the Ordinance was amended to recognise customary or 
‘deemed’ rights of occupancy being ‘the title of a native or a native community lawfully 
using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom’.  In contrast to the 
contractual basis of the granted right of occupancy, as Shivji notes, the relation between 
customary occupier and the state was an administrative one and much less secure 
(Shivji 2002: 196).  According to the Shivji Commission the nature of deemed rights 
was interpreted with ‘considerable flexibility’ by the colonial administrators and 
provided customary rights-holders with virtually no legal security against land 
alienation in practice (URT 1994: 12).   
The Shivji Commission observed that the right of occupancy system was first developed 
in Northern Nigeria and is said to have been based upon what were thought to be 
fundamental principles of African customary tenure, most notably that land is held to be 
used and the occupier of land retains control over it so long as it is used.  However, it 
differs from customary systems in vesting the radical title in an outside (state) entity 
rather than tribe, clan or family, and unlike customary tenure, a granted right of 
occupancy is for a definite period (URT 1994: 13).   
                                               
27 Land Ordinance (No. 3 of 1923) R.L. Cap. 113 s.2 and 3. 
28 Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act (Act No. 24 of 1963) Cap. 393 R.E. 2002 
(repealed under the Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act (Act No. 44 of 
1969) Cap. 367 R.E. 2002 s.10). 
29 s.6. 
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The Land Acts have retained the principles of public ownership of land and the legal 
concept of the ‘right of occupancy’ – including customary rights of occupancy, as the 
only recognised type of land tenure.  Accordingly, the right of occupancy is the closest 
that any individual or corporate body today can come to ‘owning’ land in a legal sense.  
This is subject always to ultimate control and ownership being vested in the radical title 
of the President as trustee on behalf of the citizens – a highly centralised locus of power 
through which land may be acquired or transferred ‘in the public interest’.  Under the 
Land Acts what is ‘owned’ and can be ‘sold’ by the individual or corporate body is not 
the land itself, but ‘an interest in or over land’.30 
Customary practices of acquisition and disposition 
Land in Tanzania may be acquired in three ways: by cultivation, purchasing or 
inheritance (Fimbo 2007: 145).  As Fimbo notes, subject to any specific legislative 
exclusion, today customary land tenure is applicable to African settlements in both rural 
and urban areas of Tanzania (Fimbo 2007: 152).  The Land Acts categorise public land 
into three types: ‘general land’- all public land which is not reserved or village land; 
‘village land’- land within the jurisdiction of the village, which may be either 
communal, vacant, or land used or occupied by an individual or family under customary 
law; and ‘reserved land’- including forests, national parks and land reserved for public 
utilities.  Under VLA
31
 customary rights of occupancy apply to general land, village 
land, reserved land, planning areas as well as urban and peri-urban areas (Fimbo 2007: 
156).  
The mode of acquisition of a piece of land has very significant implications for the 
extent to which an occupier or user of the land has autonomy over its disposition.  
Although much discussion in this thesis concerns uncodified customary practices, the 
codified Rules of Inheritance contained in CLDO No. 4
32
 offer a useful starting-point 
for illuminating the distinction that is often made between three types of land held under 
customary principles of land tenure - self-acquired, family and clan land.   
‘Self-acquired land’ is land acquired by an individual through his or her own efforts, 
whether by clearing land, planting permanent crops or making other permanent 
                                               
30 Land Amendment Act (Act No. 2 of 2004) (LAA) s.2. 
31 VLA s.14. 
32 G.N. 436 of 1963 Second Schedule. 
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improvements to the land.  The practice of staking a claim to land through cultivation 
has a long history and is often evoked in disputes over land held under customary tenure 
today.  Generally speaking, the individual has absolute control over its disposition and 
his or her children have exclusive rights of inheritance.  According to CLDO No. 4 ‘If 
the deceased left sons, or sons and daughters these will inherit all his property 
exclusively.’33  However, unlike the position under the Indian Succession Act of 186534 
(discussed in chapter 3), which makes no distinction between the entitlements of male 
and female heirs, CLDO No. 4 provides that self-acquired land must be distributed in 
three ‘degrees’ (or grades of heirs) with preference given to sons in the first and second 
degrees, whilst daughters inherit between 1/20 and 1/10 of the property in the third 
degree.
35
 
In practice an individual has much greater discretion in the allocation of land than the 
Rules suggest.  Magoke-Mhoja observes that at one stage the rationale for giving the 
eldest son the largest share was tied to his obligations to care for younger siblings 
(2008: 135).  The ability to return to the family home under the care of a brother is 
particularly important for women who leave their natal home upon marriage, but 
subsequently return in the event of relationship breakdown or widowhood.  As Magoke-
Mhoja notes however, whilst this system may have worked well in the past, socio-
economic changes mean that today this principle is much less observed in practice.   
‘Family’ and ‘clan’ land is distinguished in terms of scale of family interests.  Hence 
family land is land which is passed between the generations of a large family, whereas 
‘clan land’ may be defined as land - whether privately or communally owned, or held on 
family tenure, ‘within the jurisdiction of a clan’ – namely a group of individuals who 
are related by virtue of a common ancestor (See James and Fimbo 1973: 427).  Rules of 
succession under CLDO No. 4 are the same for both.  In Arusha’s local patrilineal 
systems of landholding, including Arusha, Meru and Chagga, family and clan land is 
customarily heritable by male agnates, with a man’s sons being the first order of heirs.  
Wives gain access to the land by virtue of their marriage into the man’s family.  Under 
                                               
33 Rule 26. 
34 (Act X of 1865) made applicable in Tanganyika under British colonial rule by the Indian Acts 
(Application) Ordinance of 1920 R.L. Cap. 2. 
35 Rules 19-30.  The eldest son of the most senior wife inherits 1/3 in the first degree; other sons of all 
wives inherit between 1/10 and 1/15 of the property in the second degree.  
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VLA a woman’s interest in her husband’s customarily inherited land is classified as a 
‘usufructuary’ or ‘derivative’ right.  
Dispositions of family and clan land typically require the consent of male family 
members and approval by family or clan elders.  Issues of disposition are therefore 
discussed at boma
36
 (family) meetings, which may include senior members of the 
family or clan, such as the mshili wa ukoo (a Meru clan leader or headman)
37
 or 
laigwenani (an Arusha ‘counsellor’)38.  Family members have the right to refuse sale or 
to buy the land themselves.  Spouses also have a right to refuse to consent to a 
disposition under statute.
39
  Village councils are statutorily obliged to disallow an 
assignment of land which would defeat a woman’s right to occupy under a customary 
right of occupancy, derivative right or as a successor in title; or where there would be 
insufficient land remaining to provide for the family’s livelihood.40  The importance of 
maintaining a family connection with the land and a strong social group means that 
there is also a strong social presumption against sale unless the need is urgent, such as 
to pay hospital bills or school fees.  As one Meru mshili wa ukoo explained:  
Washili yo kazi yao yeeiringa nrema, kaam ali kwa kumba nrema 
kuchikooya wandu nndi.  Wanyanyakaa.  (It is the washili’s 
responsibility to protect the land, and if you just allow the selling of land 
you will lose your people.  They will be scattered.)
41
 
Despite the well established social and legal obligation to obtain consent, land is often 
sold without the consent of family, clan or village authorities, with serious social 
consequences for families who are left landless and homeless as a result. 
                                               
36 The term boma has two meanings – a family homestead, or a fort or administrative headquarters. 
37 The mshili wa ukoo is elected by clan members.  Puritt writes that qualities sought in an mshili are an 
ability to speak well at meetings, be wise and just and considered a ‘reasonable man’ (Moore and Puritt 
1977: 112).  Clan leaders will often carry with them a symbol of their authority.  An mshili wa ukoo I met 
kept with him a small pocket diary with ‘mshili wa ukoo’ and his clan area stamped on the cover.  This 
served as an identity card, which was recognised by clan members and public authorities such as the 
police. 
38 Gulliver translates this Kimaasai word as ‘spokesman’ or ‘counsellor’, chosen by elder lineage 
members for their intelligence, initiative, knowledge of people, lineage affairs and custom, diplomacy and 
persuasiveness (Gulliver 1963: 50, 101-109).  The traditional symbol of authority of an Arusha 
laigwenani is the ‘rungu neusi’ (orkuma in Kimaasai) – a dark wooden club that laigwenani often carry 
with them to tribunals when acting as witnesses. 
39 LMA s.59, LA s.85, s.114 (as amended by LAA) and s.161 (see Appendix D). 
40 VLA s.30(4)(b) and (c) (see Appendix D). 
41 Interview with mshili wa ukoo 12.1.10.  Translation from Kimeru by Charles Livingstone. 
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Disposition by way of a pledge (rehani), or ‘customary mortgage’ is often preferred 
over sale as a means of raising capital in cows or money – perhaps for bridewealth or 
funeral expenses whilst retaining land within the family.  Mortgage provisions in the 
Land Act (discussed in chapter 3) do not override customary practices of rehani.
42
  
Customarily, under the terms of a rehani pledgees are not entitled to plant permanent 
crops, as this is tantamount to ownership, although they may harvest crops on the land 
(James 1971: 346).  The right of a pledgee to take possession of the land depends on the 
terms of the pledge itself; for example, in default of payment of the debt, when the date 
of redemption has passed, or from the date of the mortgage where the debt is to be 
discharged through harvesting of crops by the pledgee (James and Fimbo 1973: 415-
424).  The terms of a rehani are generally witnessed and recorded by family or clan 
elders.  However, difficulties can arise if there is a dispute as to the terms of the 
agreement many years later if the witnesses or minutes of the rehani agreement are no 
longer available. 
Individualisation of land tenure - registration and titling 
One of the most significant developments in land tenure law under the Land Acts is the 
promotion of the individualisation of titles.  Administrative procedure for registration of 
a right of occupancy is determined by the type of land in question.  The granted right of 
occupancy to general or reserved land is legalised through the issuing of a ‘certificate of 
occupancy’ by the Commissioner for Lands.43  VLA vests authority in village councils 
to allocate and grant customary rights of occupancy as well as to issue certificates of 
customary rights of occupancy of village land.  The certificates must be approved both 
by the chairman and secretary of the village council and the District Land Officer.
44
  
The Act provides that the village may require the payment of a premium on the grant of 
a right of occupancy to a non-village organisation or persons not ordinarily resident in 
the village.
45
  However, many village governments in Arusha in 2010 were openly 
charging a 10% fee for all dispositions of land handled by the village.  One consequence 
of this appears to have been to discourage villagers from going through the village 
authorities to seek the necessary consent for a disposition of land. 
                                               
42 LA s.115(1) and (4) (as amended by LAA) (see Appendix D). 
43 LA s.29(1). 
44 VLA Part B. 
45 VLA s.26. 
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Before village councils are able to grant customary rights of occupancy and issue 
certificates they must have been issued with a certificate of village land demarcating the 
boundaries of the village and conferring upon the village council its functions of 
management of the village land.
46
   The village must also have established a registry.
47
  
According to District Council Land Officers I interviewed, by early 2010 approximately 
50% of all land within the area of Arusha Rural District Council had been surveyed and 
titled under the Land Act.  As for village land, whilst the boundaries of all but two of 
Arusha Rural District Council’s 76 villages had been confirmed only four villages had 
land registries and therefore most villages had not been given their village certificates.
48
  
In Meru District aside from a township urban planning process, none of Meru District’s 
66 villages had functioning land registries and few villages had been issued with a 
village certificate.
49
  In short, systems for registration of customary rights of occupancy 
under the Land Acts in most of Arumeru had yet to be implemented.   
In 2009 in Arusha Municipality, where all the land is classified as ‘general land’, I was 
informed that approximately 15% of the land had been registered under granted rights 
of occupancy.
50
  This included much of the centre and the planned housing areas of 
Njiro and Kijenge on the site of a former large sisal estate towards the outskirts of the 
municipality.  The cost of obtaining a certificate of right of occupancy is significant, 
typically comprising an application fee of 5000 Tanzanian Shillings (Tsh), plan 
preparation fee of 6000 Tsh, land rent payable to the government assessed at fixed rates 
according to the size and use of the land and its location, a registration fee of 20% of 
land rent, and survey costs of 600,000 Tsh upwards.
51
  Given that annual per capita 
GDP in 2010 was 770,000 Tsh (URT 2011: 38) these costs are out of reach of the vast 
majority of Tanzanians. 
Concerning titling of matrimonial property the Land Registration Officer of Arusha 
Municipality commented that although the Land Act provides for registration of 
property in the names of both spouses, very few certificates are issued in joint names in 
practice.  Land Officers in Arusha commented to me that often women – including 
                                               
46 VLA s.7. 
47 VLA s.21. 
48 Interview with Arusha Rural District Council Land Officer 4.1.10. 
49 Interview with Meru District Council Land Officer 5.1.10. 
50 Interview with Arusha Municipality Land Registration Officer 7.10.99. 
51 In 2010 the official Tsh-£ exchange rate was 2159 Tsh to £1. 
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women who know their rights – do not seek for their names to be included on the title 
for reasons of tradition.  Similar findings have been made elsewhere (Hughes and 
Wickeri 2011: 848-849).  The application form does not require the applicant to state 
whether the land in question is matrimonial property, and, as discussed in chapter 3, the 
statutory procedural safeguards are not always adequate to protect a spouse’s interest in 
practice.  The Land Registration Officer for Arusha Municipality suggested one solution 
might be to require all applications to be accompanied by a letter from a local 
community leader such as a mwenyekiti wa mtaa (street chairman) confirming the 
marital status of the applicant. 
Despite the political drive towards formalisation and titling, implementation of 
administrative land law reforms in Tanzania has been slow and uneven.  Pedersen 
attributes this to underfunding of the Strategic Plan for Implementation of the Land 
Laws (SPILL) and a lack of coherence in land administration structures (Pedersen 
2012).  Whilst land titling has yet to take effect in many places and is out of financial 
reach of most Tanzanians, the majority of citizens in Arusha continue to hold 
unregistered interests in land.   
2.4 Life cycles, relationships and women’s claims to land 
This section draws together observations from a range of my own fieldwork data and 
other sources to highlight some of the frequently occurring issues that are raised in 
women’s legal claims to land in Arusha.  It is important to state that legal claims to land 
involving women litigants raise a variety of issues in practice, not all of which relate to 
family life or are inherently gendered.  This is particularly the case for disputes from 
urban and peri-urban areas where landlord and tenant and boundary disputes are a 
common issue in claims brought by both men and women.  Occasional claims are 
brought by women against village authorities for taking land without compensation.  It 
is the case however, that the majority of claims involving women that I encountered 
during my research arose from family disputes.  Chapter 3 considers the protection of 
women’s land and property rights afforded by statute.  What is evident from claims to 
land held under customary tenure is that such claims are socially embedded.  Claims 
that concern land held under customary tenure tend to be closely linked to significant 
life events such as marriage, separation and divorce, or death of a husband or father. 
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Marriages and their breakdown 
According to Arusha, Meru and Chagga customary practices, it is often when a son 
marries that he is allocated a portion of his father’s land, thereby retaining land within 
the family for the next generation.  This is typically carried out by the father in the 
presence of his brothers, wife, sons, neighbours and family elders as witnesses.  
Depending on the size of the land, the son’s wife is then allocated a part of this land to 
cultivate, with the remaining land being reserved for the husband and future allocations 
(for example to subsequent wives in the case of polygamous marriages).  Polygamous 
and ‘potentially polygamous’ marriages (i.e. monogamous marriages that may become 
polygamous in the future) are recognised in Tanzanian law.
52
  In polygamous marriages 
often the first (or senior) wife will receive a larger portion of land from her husband 
than the junior wives.  This unequal division of land can lead to conflict between wives 
or between wives and the sons of other co-wives at a later stage, especially if land is 
scarce.  This issue is explored in greater detail in chapter 4 through a discussion of 
‘Elizabeth’’s claim. 
The local patrilineal rationale that land remains within the family if allocated to a son, 
but would be ‘lost’ to a daughter ‘because she will be married’ (and thereby entitled to 
use her husband’s land), is embedded in Tanzanian language and marriage traditions 
and reinforced by virilocal practices of residence near the husband’s kin.  Through 
language and social marriage practices a woman is constructed as a passive actor in the 
marital transaction between families.  The Kiswahili verb kuoa (to marry) is always 
used in its passive form olewa in relation to women, but in the active form oa in relation 
to men.  This reflects the idea that a woman is married to her husband and his family - 
and hence his land.  Practices of the woman’s family receiving bridewealth from the 
man’s family,53 and parties to ‘send off’ the woman before the marriage ceremony 
itself, reinforce this linguistic distinction between men and women as parties to a 
marriage.   
                                               
52 LMA s.10.  Only polygynous marriages are permitted within the legal definition of polygamy. 
53 For a discussion of bridewealth and conceptions of ‘women as property’ see papers by Hirschon, 
Strathern and Whitehead in Hirschon ed. (1984: ch. 1, 9 and 10).  In her paper on patrilineal marriage 
traditions in the New Guinea Highlands, Strathern argues that the women and things exchanged between 
male transactors are akin to ‘inalienable gifts’, constituting ‘wealth’ (rather than ‘property’ in a materialist 
sense, which inaccurately constructs women as objects without personhood). 
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Local patrilineal principles underpinned by male control of family land can have a 
significant impact on women’s agency over dispositions within marriage.  In a 
discussion of women, kinship and property Whitehead contends that generally kinship 
and family systems, as well as economic systems of production and exchange, serve to 
construct women as less able than men to act as subjects (Whitehead 1984: 180).  She 
specifically identifies the language and exchanges associated with marriage as one such 
significant construction.  In Tanzania, gendered inequalities embedded within patrilineal 
practices of land tenure become re-entrenched through the statutory principle of 
separate ownership of property between spouses.
54
  As discussed above, both customary 
practices and statutory provisions require family consent to be sought before a 
disposition of family land.  However, patrilineality and the gendered linguistic 
construction of a woman as olewa both serve to diminish a woman’s power to object to 
dispositions in practice.  This contention is illustrated in chapter 6 which explores the 
claims of a woman – ‘Naserian’ against sale of a family shamba without her consent. 
Gendered inequalities in the ownership of land within marriage become critical in 
circumstances of marriage breakdown.  In contexts where codified customary practices 
of land tenure are recognised, this may leave a woman without land.  For example, 
according to the CLDO Rules on the Law of Persons,
55
 when a couple divorce, both the 
house and land which has been acquired by joint efforts is retained by the husband (after 
the harvest).  The wife retains kitchen equipment, and the cattle, food and cash crops are 
divided between the spouses.
56
  The concept of joint marital property is also not 
recognised in Islamic law.  Writing on Islamic law in the Tanzanian context, 
Makaramba notes that Muslim women whose marriages were contracted according to 
Islamic rites keep their dower upon divorce and often receive a parting gift of deferred 
dower for ‘good behaviour’ during the marriage (Makaramba 2010: 281). 
The statutory property rights of all women upon divorce were strengthened by LMA 
and subsequent case law (discussed in chapter 3).  It remains the case however, that 
many women either do not seek divorce, or do not receive – or seek - a share of the 
matrimonial home in practice.  In their socio-legal study of family law in Tanzania in 
the late 1980s Rwezaura and Wanitzek found that claims to matrimonial assets were not 
                                               
54 LMA s.58 (discussed further in chapter 3). 
55 G.N. 279 of 1963 First Schedule. 
56 Rule 94. 
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often seen in practice in petitions for divorce, especially amongst peasant women.  The 
authors suggest that women petitioners who do not make such claims may be unaware 
of their legal rights or reluctant to diminish the assets of their children (Rwezaura and 
Wanitzek 1988: 16).  There is a dearth of socio-legal research to confirm the extent to 
which this position may have changed in recent years. 
In the event of marriage breakdown, unless a wife has access to other property of her 
own the most practical solution will usually be for her to return to her natal home with 
just her personal property.  If a woman’s father is deceased and his property has already 
been distributed amongst male heirs, she may have to rely on other male family 
members for a place to stay or access to family land.  For this reason there is a gradually 
growing practice of fathers allocating a small portion of land to daughters in case their 
marriages should fail.  This is a sensitive issue because it challenges the heart of 
gendered power relations and behaviour within marriage.  One Arusha laigwenani 
explained to me: 
If a father wanted to give land to his daughter in the past that would have 
been interfered with but now it can happen.  Now we say ‘haki sawa’ 
(equal rights).  You were not allowed to before because a woman would 
get land when she was married.  The problem is that ... it can make a 
woman more arrogant (kiburi) because she has the land where she came 
from and where she is now.  The woman can misbehave.  She becomes 
arrogant.  If you hit her she knows she can go back to her father’s land 
and build there ... Women had respect (heshima)
57
 for their husbands, but 
right now they don’t have any.58 
Further issues concerning women’s access to land arise in the context of the breakdown 
of polygamous marriages and other kinds of non-monogamous relationships.  One 
important legal issue for a co-wife (although not an issue that arose in my own 
fieldwork) is her inability to become a party to divorce proceedings between her 
husband and another co-wife.
59
  As Rwezaura observes, this effectively gives the 
divorcing co-wife a superior interest in the matrimonial property when a court allocates 
assets upon divorce (Rwezaura 1994-1995: 530-532). 
                                               
57 In the context of Muslim coastal Kenya Hirsch observes the critical social importance attached to 
Swahili women demonstrating heshima (translated as respect, honour and modesty) and that men secure 
their own claims to heshima through the heshima of the women in their households (Hirsch 1998: 48-49). 
58 Interview on 28.10.09 – contemporaneous translation from Kiswahili noted in English. 
59 Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v. Abood Saleh Abood Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civil Appeal No. 1 of 
1992 (Unreported), cited in Rwezaura (1994-1995: 530). 
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Islamic marriages and marriages contracted according to customary practices are 
presumed polygamous or potentially polygamous unless the contrary is proved.
60
  
Polygamy is not legally recognised for Christian marriages.
61
  Notwithstanding the legal 
restrictions on polygamous marriage within the subsistence of a monogamous marriage 
the law does not prohibit parties from converting their marriage into a polygamous one 
(except in the case of Christian marriages).
62
  LMA also provides for a rebuttable 
presumption of marriage in the case of a man and woman who have lived together for a 
minimum of two years ‘in such circumstances as to have acquired the reputation of 
being husband and wife’.63  The main rationale behind the legal presumption of 
marriage was to give women cohabitants and their children greater legal protection in 
the event of relationship breakdown (Rwezaura 1998: 191).   
A significant consequence of these provisions is that many relationships have an 
uncertain legal and social status which is open to challenge.  This in turn has 
consequences for claims to property entitlements.  For example, although Christianity 
prohibits polygamy, this may effectively happen in practice either where parties 
separate but do not divorce and then ‘remarry’ customarily, or where parties remain as a 
couple but the husband has a ‘nyumba ndogo’ (small house) as it is colloquially known, 
i.e. a relationship with another woman as his ‘concubine’.  Such relationships are not 
always conducted in secret and some couples in these circumstances may be regarded 
by their family or local community as married.  In other cases the second ‘wife’ may not 
be aware of the husband’s first relationship and, as Rwezaura observes: ‘parties remain 
ignorant of their actual legal status under state law for a long time – until one day a 
marital dispute or the death of one of the parties (especially the husband) throws a dark 
shadow on the validity of their marriage’ (Rwezaura 1998: 196).   
During my fieldwork I observed cases where, believing that she was married to her 
‘husband’, a woman had placed reliance on her marital status, for example by 
contributing cash to the purchase of property which was then registered in the husband’s 
sole name.  If a relationship ends a woman may encounter difficulties in proving her 
interest in the property if her ‘husband’ disputes the marital status of their relat ionship 
                                               
60 LMA s.10(2)(a). 
61 LMA s.11(5).   
62 LMA s.11(1) and 15(4). 
63 LMA s.160(1). 
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and she is unable to prove her financial contributions.  Moreover, as Rwezaura 
comments: ‘lack of documentary evidence often provides an incentive to the parties to 
dispute the existence of the marriage’ (1998: 204).  
Inheritance 
As described above, much of a father’s land will effectively be inherited by his children 
inter vivos.  Claims to the deceased’s unallocated estate may be customarily made at a 
mourning ceremony (matanga) that takes place in the days or weeks after his death, 
when a guardian/administrator is appointed.  In accordance with Arusha customary 
practice a guardian (mlezi) – often a brother of the deceased, is appointed at the arobaini 
(ceremony held around forty days after the death) to assume the deceased’s 
responsibility in taking care of the family.  A guardian administrator is then in a 
position to apply for letters from the ordinary courts if it is necessary to do so in order to 
administer the estate.  For Meru, often the eldest son of the deceased (if he has come of 
age) is appointed by family elders.  Occasionally a widow will be appointed as 
administrator (or co-administrator) of her deceased husband’s estate.   
In practice, administrators often have some discretion in the way that the deceased’s 
estate is distributed. According to one Meru mshili wa ukoo, in the event that there 
remains unallocated land after a husband’s death, his widow, together with the eldest 
son, may be given the authority over future divisions of the remaining land amongst her 
children.  One Arusha laigwenani explained that depending on the circumstances an 
estate could be divided between the wives, or inherited by the last born son.  The 
rationale for allocating a husband’s remaining land to the last born son is similar to the 
rationale for giving the largest share of a man’s estate to his eldest son under CLDO No. 
4 (discussed above).  With land comes responsibility.  Here the social expectation, 
which is also codified under CLDO No. 4,
64
 is that the children who inherit will care for 
their widowed mother.  As the Shivji Commission observed, among the Chagga and 
Arusha, widows are entitled to use the homes of their husbands for the rest of their lives 
acting as custodians of the share of inheritance of their sons.  When the sons take over 
their property, the widows become dependents of their sons and retain their matrimonial 
property rights for the remainder of their lives (URT 1994: 252-253).   
                                               
64 Rule 27 (discussed below). 
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Historically Meru, Arusha and Chagga daughters have enjoyed limited entitlements to 
inherit land through customary practices.  Similarly Rule 20 of CLDO No. 4 provides:  
Women can inherit except for clan land which they may receive in 
usufruct but may not sell.  However, if there is no male of that clan, 
women may inherit such land in full ownership. 
Judicial activism in the higher courts both before and after the Bill of Rights of 1984 
has sought to challenge this discriminatory provision, producing precedent which 
recognises the equal rights of females to inherit and dispose of clan land.  In 1968 Mr 
Justice Saidi allowed an appeal by a daughter to inherit Chagga clan land, stating: ‘it is 
quite clear that this traditional custom [that clan land should not be inherited by 
females] has outlived its usefulness’.65  After the coming into force of the Bill of Rights, 
in 1988 Mr Justice Mwalusanya held that Haya customary law, specifically Rule 20 of 
CLDO No. 4 was discriminatory and inconsistent with Article 13(4) of the 
Constitution.
66
   
Living customary practices of inheritance vary and unlike the CLDO Rules, they are 
responsive to social change.  Since fathers often divide up much of their estate or 
declare their wishes during their lifetime they have discretion to allocate land to their 
daughters directly.  In my conversations with Arusha elders I was told of daughters now 
being left portions of their father’s land by will, whilst one Meru mshili wa ukoo I 
interviewed told me that he had personally supervised daughters being allocated 
portions of their father’s land, especially in circumstances where daughters were taking 
care of their mothers.
67
  This latter point reflects a way in which the moral basis for 
giving land to the last born son is applied as a basis for giving land to a daughter.  As 
two ward tribunal members explain:
68
 
When we educate our daughters they are the ones who remember their 
homes and come to take care of their parents in old age, more than sons.  
                                               
65 Ndewawiosia d/o Ndeamtzo v. Imanuel s/o Malasi High Court of Tanzania at Moshi (PC) Civ. App. 
D/80/66; [1968] HCD 127, reprinted in James and Fimbo (1973: 204-209). 
66 Ephrahim v Pastory & Another High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza (PC) Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1989, 
[1990] LRC (Const.) 757.  In another Haya inheritance case Magdalena Zacharia v Daniel Zacharia High 
Court of Tanzania at Mwanza (PC) Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1989 (Unreported) Mwalusanya again upheld 
a woman’s right to inherit clan land and dispose of it without discrimination on the basis of her gender; 
both cases reprinted in Kijo-Bisimba and Peter (2005: 387-409). 
67 Interview with mshili wa ukoo 12.1.10. 
68 Contemporaneous translation from Kiswahili noted in English. 
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People have come to realise the importance of developing their 
daughters.  
- female member 
Those who have educated their daughters, when the daughters have got 
better jobs they have come to redeem their parents’ farm if there has been 
a rehani. 
- male member 
The practice of giving land to daughters is not new and has been observed elsewhere.  
In a study of the Hehe and Sangu in southern Tanzania, Odgaard found that historically 
both sons and daughters had inherited land.  More recently socio-economic change had 
meant that women were increasingly being given land by their fathers to enable them to 
take responsibility for their natal families (Odgaard 1999).   
During my fieldwork I met several older women who had been allocated portions of 
land by their fathers many years previously.  In some cases the women had been given 
the land because their father had no sons.  It is also generally accepted that a father may 
allocate land to a daughter if she remains unmarried.  However, in one case an Arusha 
woman had been allocated a portion of land alongside her brothers, which she wished to 
pass on to her own children.  This is an example of an Arusha and Chagga practice 
noted by the Shivji Commission of bequests made to daughters that are conditional on 
the land later being passed to their sons, who in turn bear the name of the benefactor 
grandfather (URT 1994: 251).  The practice therefore effectively re-establishes the 
original patrilineal connection with the land by fictive kinship.  Significantly, the legal 
claims to land brought by these women were claims against male family members who 
had in various ways challenged their ownership of the land as daughters. 
Gender discrimination against inheritance of family and clan land by widows has 
enduring legal and social force.  A widow has little control over dispositions or a right 
to inherit family or clan land under Rule 27 of CLDO No. 4:  
The widow has no share of the inheritance if the deceased left relatives of 
his own clan; her share is to be cared for by her children just as she cared 
for them.
69
   
                                               
69 In Scholastica Benedict v Martin Benedict Court of Appeal at Mwanza Civil Appeal No.26 of 1988, 
[1993] TLR 1 the Court of Appeal applied this rule and refused the widow’s claims to inherit and reside 
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In the 2005 constitutional case of Elizabeth Stephen and Salome Charles v. The 
Attorney General, the High Court, though agreeing that ‘the impugned paragraphs [of 
CLDO No.4] are discriminatory in more ways than one’, declined to declare 
unconstitutional and strike out these provisions discriminating against widows for 
violating constitutional and international rights guarantees.
70
  This decision is discussed 
further in chapter 5.   
Unless she has her own land, a widow’s access to land after the death of her husband 
will often be based on her family’s moral responsibility to care for her.  This makes her 
access to land contingent on her relations with her children and the guardian appointed 
to take care of the family and land.  James and Fimbo note that historically: ‘A widow’s 
well-being is provided for in the practice of levirate (sometimes called wife inheritance) 
... [by] a deceased’s brother or next of kin ...  But a widow may in the alternative, if she 
chooses not to remarry in the family, acquire occupational rights in the deceased’s 
property by virtue of her children’s rights therein’71 (1973: 188-9).  Although the 
practice of levirate continues in Tanzania, it appears that increasingly in Arusha the 
deceased’s brother’s role is limited to one of guardianship.   
Some women’s claims are the result of a guardian abusing this position of trust within 
the family and chasing a widow from her land.  One Arusha Rural District Land Officer 
remarked to me that there is no mechanism in place under the Land Registration Act
72
 
which prevents an administrator from registering the deceased’s property in his own 
name.  However, it may be difficult for negatively affected parties who may be ignorant 
of the law to understand the nature of the administrator’s power as trustee.  This is not a 
new problem.  Gulliver observes: ‘Almost all Arusha have a fund of stories concerning 
the alleged chicanery of guardians and, cautiously executed, there is indeed little to 
prevent it’ (Gulliver 1964: 220).  ‘Furaha’’s claim against a family guardian, discussed 
in chapter 4 provides one vivid illustration of this kind of abuse of position in practice.   
 
                                                                                                                                         
in her husband’s house on the basis that she should be supported by her children in the house they had 
inherited. 
70 High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Misc. Civil Cause 82 of 2005 (Unreported).  Electronic copy 
held by author. 
71 These practices are codified in Rules 62-66 of the CLDO on the Law of Persons.  
72 (Ordinance No. 36 of 1953) Cap. 334 R.E. 2002 s.334. 
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2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of issues arising in women’s claims to land in 
Arusha.  From this it can be deduced that the majority of legal claims to land brought by 
women result from life changes, whether following relationship breakdown or the death 
of a husband or father.  This in turn illustrates the gendered and intergenerational nature 
of many women’s claims and the fact that land tenure for both men and women is 
founded on social relations.  Power relations between a woman and other members of 
her family shift throughout her lifetime and are closely linked to a woman’s security of 
tenure over her home and/or land.  During the period of my fieldwork, in wards such as 
Upper Arusha and Arusha Urban, where population density was high and land was 
mostly unsurveyed, ward tribunals were kept busy with claims to land brought by both 
men and women. 
Three significant overarching features of women’s legal claims are apparent from this 
study.  Firstly, in circumstances of tenure insecurity and pressure on land generally, 
changes in a woman’s gendered status within the family – whether as a widow, daughter 
of a late father, or separated wife, act as a catalyst for claims to land.  Secondly, claims 
to land by men against women often represent challenges to a woman’s existing 
ownership or occupation of land.  A noticeable feature of these claims is that they are 
often brought against women who have inherited land from their father.  In contrast, 
claims to land brought by women tend to constitute a defensive response against the act 
of a male relative who may have sold or mortgaged land without consent or chased a 
woman away.  It is uncommon for women to bring claims against men in land courts for 
land that they have never used or occupied.  This appears to be the case particularly in 
well managed cash-cropping areas, such as Meru Rural ward, where social attitudes 
towards female ownership of inherited land are generally heavily patriarchal. 
Thirdly, there is a close relationship between socio-economic status and women’s legal 
claims to land.  When I began my fieldwork I had hypothesised that most women’s 
legal claims in land courts would be brought by women who knew their rights and were 
reasonably economically secure.  From my first day of courtroom observation in the 
DLHT I quickly realised that the situation is in fact quite the reverse.  Law is an 
instrument that may be used proactively or reactively.  Law tends to be used proactively 
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by those who have the knowledge and funds to secure their rights.  Hence richer women 
who have the means to acquire land through purchase may also secure their rights 
proactively through land registration.  In contrast, poorer women who lack resources to 
acquire land for themselves commonly only have access to land through their husband.  
Since most women’s legal claims in land courts appear to be made in response to land 
being alienated from them, the claim represents a defensive use of law where other 
social methods of handling the dispute have failed.  This raises issues of agency and 
power relations linked to a woman’s socio-economic position and knowledge of the 
law.    Overwhelmingly women’s legal claims to land in land courts represent a reactive 
use of the law by women as a weapon of last resort when family or clan land has been 
alienated from them. 
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3.  Women’s claims to land in legal contexts: 
Tanzania’s statutory framework 
3.0 Introduction 
In Tanzanian legal contexts land, marriage and inheritance issues tend to be treated as 
distinct categories – both in the formulation of statute and in the shaping of the court 
system.  Yet, in circumstances where claims to land are gendered and intergenerational 
these three issues become inseparable.  This chapter extends the discussion of local 
customary practices in chapter 2 to evaluate statutory provisions in Tanzanian land, 
marriage and inheritance law concerning the family and gender equality.  It also 
discusses the specialist land court system established under the Land Acts and its 
position in relation to the executive branch of government and the ordinary courts, 
which hear matrimonial and succession claims.  The chapter provides a legal and 
political contextualisation of the current statutory framework, which underpins my 
empirical analysis of women’s claims to land in chapters 4 and 5.  The three chapters 
together present a socio-legal study of how women claimants negotiate this statutory 
framework and how their claims are handled and judged by land courts in practice. 
3.1 Background to the Land Acts of 1999 
The Land Act and Village Land Act of 1999 marked the first comprehensive statutory 
reform on land matters in mainland Tanzania since the country’s independence.  The 
Acts were also an important legal landmark for gender equality, enshrining the right of 
every woman to ‘acquire, hold, use and deal with land ... to the same extent and subject 
to the same restriction ... as the right of any man’.73  This was not the first time that 
Tanzania had led the way in advancing women’s property rights in the region.  In the 
1960s although a Kenyan Commission had made recommendations for marriage law 
reform in its 1968 Report on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, it was in Tanzania that 
the Report’s proposals were first translated into legislation.  Read observes that 
Tanzania’s Law of Marriage Act (LMA) of 1971 was the first of its kind in 
Commonwealth Africa (Read 1972: 19).  Its recognition of married women’s equal 
                                               
73 LA and VLA s.3(2) (see Appendix D). 
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rights to ‘acquire, hold and dispose of property’74 was progressive and this provision of 
the LMA is clearly echoed in the Land Acts. 
The picture concerning Tanzania’s inheritance and succession laws is rather different.  
Despite long-running and widespread calls for statutory change, including a 1995 Law 
Reform Commission Report on Succession, there has been no equivalent reform in this 
area.  The Indian Succession Act of 1865 came into operation in Tanzania in 1920 
during the British colonial period and codifies English common law on succession.
75
  It 
was and still is applicable to Christians and persons of European origin in Tanzania.  
However, the Judicature and Application of Laws Act of 1961 (JALA) creates a 
statutory rebuttable presumption that customary law shall be applied in the case of 
African Christians.  The estates of Muslims may be administered according to Islamic 
law and/or local customary practices.
76
  Against this backdrop, the government’s 
National Land Policy (NLP) preceding the Land Acts did not set out to fully resolve the 
tension inherent in Tanzania’s plural legal system between the recognition of gender 
equality and customary marriage and inheritance practices that discriminate against 
women’s interests in land. 
Both LMA and the Land Acts were precipitated by significant social, economic and 
political change and crises in the legal system itself.  The LMA was enacted in the first 
decade of Tanzania’s political independence not long after the court system itself had 
been radically changed under the Magistrates Courts Act of 1963 (discussed in part two 
of this chapter).  Part of the legal agenda for reform in the immediate aftermath of the 
colonial period had been the ending of the discriminatory dual court system for 
Europeans and Africans and the establishment of a new unified court system.  Similarly, 
as Rwezaura notes, the LMA was enacted in an attempt to alleviate problems with 
conflict of laws and to remove discrimination and double standards in the 
administration of family law.  One object of the LMA was therefore to integrate the 
plurality of customary, Islamic and English common law relating to private law 
                                               
74 LMA s.56 (see Appendix D). 
75 Made applicable to Tanzania (Mainland) by the Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance of 1920 R.L. Cap. 
2. 
76 JALA s.11(1). 
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matters.
77
  A second was a reformist aim to enhance the legal position of married 
women and children (Rwezaura 1994-95).  This second aim was carried on the wave of 
African Socialist ideology from the country’s then ruling party – the Tanzanian African 
National Union (TANU), and in particular, activism from its women’s wing – Umoja 
wa Wanawake wa Tanzania (Union of Tanzanian Women (UWT)) (Read 1972: 20, 
Rakstad, Kaiser et. al. 2000: 91). 
Over twenty years later the political climate had radically shifted in response to global 
neo-liberal economic agendas notwithstanding the continuity of a socialist ruling party 
in government – now Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM – the Revolutionary Party).  
Tsikata writes that the decades leading up to the Land Acts had also been characterised 
by increasing marketisation and pressure on land, land conflicts and general 
dissatisfaction with land administration bureaucracies (Tsikata 2003: 151).  These 
contrasting domestic and international pressures for land reform were reflected in the 
distinct approaches of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on Land Matters chaired 
by Professor Issa Shivji of the University of Dar es Salaam (the Shivji Commission) and 
the Tanzanian government to addressing the issues.   
In 1991 the Shivji Commission was appointed to conduct research which would inform 
the drafting of a new national land policy and legislation on land matters.  In the 
introduction to its Report the Commission sets out the rationale behind its ‘rather 
unusual method of work’ - reversing the usual top-down process of consultation and 
beginning instead with members of the public (URT 1994: 2).  During the period of its 
research the Commission visited all but two districts of the country to listen to the 
voices of ordinary villagers (Shivji 1998: vii).  Its central recommendation was that a 
new national land policy should be ‘based on the direct participation of land users and 
the community as a whole in the management and administration of land’ (URT 1994: 
141).  The Tanzanian government however, chose not to follow this core tenet and a 
number of other conclusions of the Report in formulating its own NLP (URT 1995) and 
later hired a British legal consultant, Professor Patrick McAuslan to draft legislation 
based on its NLP. 
                                               
77 JALA was amended such that ‘the rules of customary law and rules of Islamic law shall not apply in 
regard to any matter provided for in the Law of Marriage Act’ (JALA s.11(4)). 
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Scholarly debates on the overall legal methodology behind the Land Acts and the 
provisions relating to gender became somewhat polarised.  There was considerable 
disagreement between Shivji and McAuslan on the most appropriate methodology, 
which is echoed in the titles of their respective books on the subject.  Shivji has argued 
that a ‘technocratic’ approach to law reform ‘without the people’ is ‘Not yet democracy’ 
(Shivji and Kapinga 1997, Shivji 1998: 106-110).  McAuslan favoured detailed legal 
drafting to establish clear checks and balances and some procedural and substantive 
legislative provisions on women’s rights to land thereby ‘Bringing the law back in’ 
(McAuslan 2003: 245-74, 2010) (see also Manji 2006: 89-95 and McAuslan’s 
comments thereon - McAuslan 2010: 120-122).   
Gender equality and inheritance issues account for just 9 of the 350 pages in Volume 1 
of the Shivji Commission’s Report.  The Commission justified this largely on the basis 
that gender issues were considered to be outside its main terms of reference.  The 
Report’s lack of attention to gender was criticised by feminist activists and scholars in 
the debates on the Land Bills which followed (notably Tibaijuka in the Land Tenure 
Study Group (LTG) 1995: 41 and Manji 1998; see also Shivji’s comments on the 
critiques: Shivji 1998: 83-92).  In the context of women’s interests in land the Shivji 
Commission favoured a middle-ground ‘evolutionary’ option over ‘hard law’, ‘soft law’ 
or ‘customary’ options, which were considered either unworkable or too slow in their 
extremes.  This approach recommended that laws concerning Islamic and customary 
inheritance practices that were gender discriminatory would remain unchanged but that 
other laws such as the Bill of Rights, land tenure and property law should be addressed 
in the hope that they would have an impact on inheritance laws (URT 1994: 256-7).   
The government’s position on women’s interests in land in its NLP was conservative: 
In order to enhance and guarantee women’s access to land and security 
of tenure, women will be entitled to acquire land in their own right not 
only through purchase but also through allocation.  However inheritance 
of clan or family land will continue to be governed by custom and 
tradition. 
Ownership of land between husband and wife shall not be subject to 
legislation. (URT 1995: para 4.2.6) 
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As a result of meetings between various interest groups in 1997 two civil society 
coalitions were formed, which took distinct approaches to lobbying on the Land Bills.  
One was the National Land Forum (NALAF),
78
 which made a series of 
recommendations largely supporting the Shivji Commission and focusing particularly 
on the rights of pastoralists, decentralisation and the radical title.  On the issue of 
women’s interests in land NALAF drew attention to the discriminatory provisions in the 
Bills and called for new procedures to allow for female participation and equal 
representation on bodies concerned with land issues.  As Maoulidi notes, NALAF’s 
approach to gender issues was contextualised in ‘larger questions of the 
democratisation, liberalisation and marketisation of the economy’ (Maoulidi undated: 
30, citing Shivji 1998: 86-87).  Following a consultative workshop on the Land Bills in 
March 1997, a second coalition of women’s civil society groups formed the Gender 
Land Task Force (GLTF)
79
  to specifically address issues of gender equality in the Bills.  
In summary, GLTF’s main demands were for statutory recognition of spousal co-
occupancy through the contribution of labour to the development of land, voiding of 
sale of such land by a spouse without the other’s consent, statutory provisions on land 
relations, equality of representation on land administration bodies, and separation of 
clan and family land with only the former being governed by customary law (GLTF 
1998, Tsikata 2003: 171).  In 1998 NALAF and GLTF joined together to form the Land 
Coalition, but tensions arose within it particularly concerning their lobbying positions 
on gender issues.  The development of the respective positions of NALAF and GLTF 
and tensions within the Land Coalition have been extensively discussed elsewhere 
(Manji 1998, TGNP 2000, Benschop 2002, Tsikata 2003, Maoulidi undated, Mallya 
2005, Manji 2006: 101-105). 
                                               
78 NALAF included the Land Rights Research and Resources Institute (HAKIARDHI), University of Dar 
es Salaam Academic Staff Assembly (UDASA), Sahiba Sisters’ Foundation, Pastoralists Indigenous Non-
Governmental Organizations (PINGOS) FORUM, Women’s Research and Documentation Project 
Association (WRDP), Ilaramatak Lorkonerei, Inyuat-e-Maa, Kipoc-Barbaig, Aigwanak Trust, LHRC, 
TAWLA,  Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme 
(TGNP) (Tsikata 2003, Mallya 2005). 
79 GLTF members included TAWLA, TAMWA, TGNP, WLAC, Tanzania Home Economics Association 
(TAHEA),  Shirika la Uchumi la Wanawake Tanzania (Economic Organisation of Women in Tanzania) 
(SUWATA), National Organization for Children, Welfare and Human Relief (NOCHU) and Women 
Advancement Trust (WAT) (Tsikata 2003, Mallya 2005). 
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A second study, published in 1999 was commissioned by the Ministry of Community 
Development, Women’s Affairs and Children and led by the founding member of 
TAWLA, Magdalena Rwebangira to look specifically into gender and land issues in 
five regions of Tanzania experiencing pressure on land (Kilimanjaro, Kagera, Arusha, 
Mbeya and Lindi).  Whilst agreeing with the Shivji Commission’s conclusions on 
customary law and representation of women in local structures, the study found that 
women were enthusiastic about titling and statutory courts that could hand down 
binding decisions.  It also maintained that women were demanding full land rights and 
that education and sensitisation on women’s land rights was essential (Rwebangira, 
Temu et. al. 1999; see also Tsikata 2003: 171-173, McAuslan 2010: 121).   
A number of substantial changes were made to the draft Land Bills as a result of two 
workshops held during the initial drafting period, in March and October 1996 and in 
response to wider debates and civil society lobbying during the two years that followed.  
Important for women was a considerable strengthening of key provisions concerning 
spouses’ interests in land (discussed below).  Significantly, the Land Acts did not alter 
the general statutory recognition of customary law in Tanzania’s plural legal system,80 
save to hold as void any rules of customary law that deny women lawful access to 
ownership, occupation or use of land.
81
  This effectively instituted a statutory equality 
‘trump’ over gender discriminatory customary practices of land tenure.  However, as 
Tsikata notes, this was considered unsatisfactory by TGNP and LHRC because it placed 
the onus on individuals to challenge provisions that they felt to be discriminatory 
(Tsikata 2003: 174). 
As to whether such legal rights would make any difference for women’s interests in 
land was a matter of much debate at the time the Acts were passed.  The inclusion of 
gender equality provisions in the Land Acts was celebrated by civil society members of 
GLTF
82
 and Tanzanian women MPs as a significant achievement in successful 
lobbying, advocacy and outreach by Tanzanian gender activist organisations (Tsikata 
2003, Mallya 2005).  In contrast, Shivji himself contended that they were proclamations 
with ‘some educational value’ but having ‘little meaning in the hard provisions of law’ 
                                               
80 JALA s.11. 
81 VLA s.20(2) (see Appendix D). 
82 most notably TAWLA and WAT. 
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(Shivji 1999).  Others such as TGNP saw both ‘achievements and gaps’ in the new 
legislation (TGNP 2000, discussed by Tsikata 2003: 173). Whilst the inclusion of a new 
presumption of spousal co-ownership
83
 was a significant development, other key 
sections
84
 protecting women’s property rights in essence reinforce similar provisions in 
LMA.
85
 
3.2 Statutory frameworks for the protection of women’s interests in land 
The Land Acts and LMA 
The most emblematic provision on gender equality and land in the Land Acts is the 
common section 3(2) which enshrines the right of ‘every woman’ to ‘acquire, hold, use 
and deal with land ... to the same extent and subject to the same restriction ... as the 
right of any man’.  This is similar to, but extends the equal rights provision in section 56 
of LMA: ‘A married woman shall have the same right as has a man to acquire, hold and 
dispose of property, whether moveable or immovable ...’ (italics are my emphasis).  
Hence, in contrast to LMA, the Land Acts do not contain any marital status 
qualification for women in the overarching equal rights provision.  Similarly there is no 
discrimination concerning a woman’s marital status in respect of her right as a village 
citizen to apply for a customary right of occupancy in village land under VLA.
86
  
Other key provisions protecting women’s property rights under the LMA and the Land 
Acts are largely concerned with the interests of women as spouses.  Generally, there is a 
presumption of separate ownership of property between spouses,
87
 and a rebuttable 
presumption that property acquired during the subsistence of a marriage is owned solely 
or jointly according to whether it was acquired in sole or joint names.
88
  However, in 
relation to land this position has now been modified by LA which has strengthened 
married women’s land rights by creating a presumption - rebuttable by provision to the 
contrary in a certificate of occupancy (or customary occupancy as the case may be), that 
land acquired by a spouse for the co-occupation and use of both (or all) spouses is held 
                                               
83 LA s.161 (see Appendix D). 
84 LA and VLA s.3(2), LA s.85 and s.114 (as amended) (see Appendix D). 
85 LMA s.56 and s.59 (see Appendix D). 
86 VLA s.22(1) (see Appendix D). 
87 LMA s.58; gifts between spouses are also subject to the rebuttable presumption that the gifted property 
belongs absolutely to the donee (LMA s.61) (see Appendix D). 
88 LMA s.60 (see Appendix D). 
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by the spouses as occupiers in common.
89
  Further, where land is held in the name of 
one spouse, the other spouse is deemed to have acquired an interest in the land by virtue 
of contributing their labour to the ‘productivity, upkeep and improvement’ of the land.  
The presumption of co-occupancy is perhaps the most radical step in the protection of 
women’s interests in land under the Land Acts.  As Tripp (2004) notes, Tanzania and 
South Africa led the way as the first two African countries to adopt spousal co-
occupancy clauses in their legislation. 
The Land Acts also strengthened a spouse’s right against alienation of the family home 
or land by the other spouse without their consent.  The requirement of family consent to 
a disposition of land held on family tenure is a long established customary practice 
(James and Fimbo 1973: 244) although historically there was little focus on the right of 
a wife to refuse consent to a disposition.  Documented cases from the 1950s and 1960s 
focused on ‘clan control’ (James and Fimbo 1973: 427-447).  The authority of a spouse 
to refuse consent to a disposition was given statutory force under LMA
90
 and reinforced 
by LA.
91
  VLA also provides that a village council shall disallow an assignment which 
would operate to defeat a woman’s right to occupy land.92  Both LMA and LA contain a 
number of provisions which protect a spouse’s interest in the ‘matrimonial home’ 
defined as:   
[T]he building or part of a building in which the husband and wife 
ordinarily reside together and includes –  
a. where a building and its curtilage are occupied for residential 
purposes only, that curtilage and any outbuildings thereon; 
and  
b. where a building is on or occupied in conjunction with 
agricultural land [or pastoral land], any land allocated by the 
husband or the wife, as the case may be, to his or her spouse 
for her or his exclusive use.
93
 
Importantly for women, this definition also protects a wife’s interest in family land that 
she has been given to cultivate by virtue of her marriage to her husband.  LMA prohibits 
                                               
89 LA s.161(1) and (2). 
90 LMA s.59. 
91 LA s.85, s.114 (as amended), s.161(3)(b). 
92 VLA s.30(4)(b) and (c) (see Appendix D). 
93 LMA s.2(1).  The definition was repeated in LAA s.112 (with the addition of ‘pastoral land’).  
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the sale, gift, lease or mortgage of an estate or interest in a matrimonial home by a 
spouse during the subsistence of a marriage without the other spouse’s consent.94  If a 
spouse’s interest is alienated in this way then LMA protects their right to continue to 
reside in the matrimonial home until dissolution of the marriage, decree of separation or 
order for maintenance.  This is subject to the person acquiring the estate or interest 
satisfying the court that they had ‘no notice of the interest of the other spouse and could 
not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have become aware of it.’95  A spouse can 
protect their interest in a matrimonial home against a bona fide purchaser or lender by 
registering a caveat,
96
 although in practice this appears to be uncommon in cases that 
reach the stage of litigation.
97
   
The question must be raised as to how realistic it is for a spouse who lacks legal literacy 
or agency within the family to be able to take the proactive step to register a caveat in 
her interest.  LA went further in protecting a spouse’s interest against a bona fide 
purchaser or mortgagee providing:  
... where the aforesaid spouse undertaking the disposition deliberately 
misleads the lender or, as the case may be, the assignee or transferee as to 
the answers to the inquiries made [regarding spousal consent pursuant to 
the requirements in s.59 LMA] ... the disposition shall be voidable at the 
option of the spouse or spouses who have not consented to the 
disposition.
98
 
VLA similarly provides that an assignment that inter alia defeats a woman’s right to 
occupy land ‘shall be void’.99  These provisions offer potentially powerful legal 
remedies for a wife who has not consented to a disposition, because it vests control in 
                                               
94 LMA s.59(1).  In Leons Challamila v Mayalla Edward Masunga High Court of Tanzania at Dar es 
Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1999 (Unreported) Manento J. (as he then was) held that ‘no spouse can 
dispose of the matrimonial property jointly acquired during the marriage without the consent of the other 
spouse’; quoted in Mashamba (2008: 55). 
95 LMA s.59(2). 
96 Land Registration Act (Ordinance No. 36 of 1953) Cap. 334 R.E. 2002, s.78(1). 
97 In Hadija Mwere v Ally Mbaga High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1995 
(Unreported) Lugakingira J. (as he then was) stated: ‘[A] prudent spouse would seek to protect (her) 
interest (in a matrimonial home) by actually causing a caveat to be registered ... In accordance with the 
provisions of s.33(1) of (the) Land Registration Ordinance, Cap. 334, the owner of any estate holds the 
same free from all estates and interests ... other than encumbrances (such as a caveat duly) registered ...’ 
Reasoning followed by Kalegeya J. (as he then was) in NBC Limited v M/S Konje Multi Traders Co. Ltd 
and 2 Others High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam (Commercial Division), Commercial Case No. 
284 of 2002 (Unreported) - both cases quoted in Mashamba (2008: 55-56).  For further discussion on 
protection of a spouse’s interest through a caveat see Mwaisondola (2007: 303-309). 
98 LA s.161(3) (italics are my emphasis). 
99 VLA s.30(6) (by reference to the criteria in VLA s.30(4)(b) and (c) (see Appendix D). 
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the hands of the non-consenting spouse rather than the wider family.  However, as my 
empirical research findings indicate, in practice the potential impact of these sections 
has not been realised in some legal claims made by women where dispositions have 
taken place without their consent.  
There have been further legislative attempts to address the issue of safeguarding a 
spouse’s interest in the matrimonial home since the Land Acts were passed.  LA as it 
was originally passed by Parliament provided that a mortgage of a matrimonial home 
(including a customary mortgage) would only be valid if the document creating the 
mortgage was signed (or there was other evidence of assent) by the borrower and spouse 
living in that home.
100
  In practice this was not a very effective safeguard in many cases 
since a signature could easily be forged or obtained on a false premise or under 
pressure.  The protection of a spouse’s position against mortgaging without consent was 
subsequently revised by the Land (Amendment) Act of 2004 which placed the 
responsibility on the mortgagee ‘to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the 
applicant for a mortgage has a spouse or spouses’.101  The ‘reasonable steps’ to be taken 
were elaborated upon in the Land (Mortgage) Regulations of 2005 (LMR),
102
 which 
also specified how a mortgagee should satisfy him or herself that the asset of a spouse 
was informed and genuine.
103
  The ‘reasonable steps’ were subsequently revised again 
by the Mortgage Financing (Special Provisions) Act of 2008 (MFSPA).
104
  This places a 
burden on both mortgagor and mortgagee.  Under MFSPA in the first instance it is the 
responsibility of the mortgagor to disclose his or her marital status.  The mortgagee’s 
responsibility to take ‘reasonable steps’ to verify the applicant’s marital status is 
deemed discharged if a mortgagor provides confirmation by way of a written and 
witnessed document or affidavit.
105
   
                                               
100 LA s.112(3). LA Part X (Mortgages) was repealed and replaced under LAA s.6. 
101 LA s.114(2) (as replaced by LAA). 
102 G.N. No. 43 of 2005 para. 4.  These steps included a discretionary duty on a mortgagee who was 
doubtful about a mortgagor’s declared marital status to require production of an affidavit by the applicant 
mortgagor. 
103 G.N. No. 43 of 2005 paras. 5 and 6.  The mortgagee’s duty is deemed complied with if he or she 
advises the applicant in writing that he or she should ensure his or her spouse receives independent advice 
on the terms and conditions of the mortgage, and the spouse provides a signed and witnessed document 
confirming they have received such independent advice and have understood and assented to the terms of 
the mortgage.  In the case of a customary mortgage, the mortgagee’s duty is to explain the terms and 
conditions of the mortgage to the spouse directly and in the presence of an independent person. 
104 Act No. 17 of 2008. 
105 s.114(2) as amended by MFSPA s.8. 
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Arguably, whilst compliance with the legislation serves to protect the interests of the 
mortgagee, none of the statutory requirements provide sufficient safeguards for spouses 
in practice.  Once the required documents concerning marital status and spousal consent 
have been provided there is little incentive for a suspicious mortgagee to investigate the 
marital status of the mortgagor any further or to ensure that consent has genuinely been 
obtained.  A statutory requirement for further third party evidence, such as a statement 
from the local mwenyekiti wa mtaa confirming the marital status of the applicant and 
whether spousal consent has been obtained, could offer greater protection for spouses.  
The potential consequence of failing to ensure that spousal consent has been obtained is 
much graver for the mortgagor than the mortgagee, because MFSPA makes it a criminal 
offence for the mortgagor to provide false information on marital status.
106
  As Hughes 
and Wickeri write, some Tanzanian women’s NGOs have expressed concern at the 
potential risk of eviction for spouses of husbands convicted under this section, where a 
couple is unable to meet loan repayments or a fine imposed by the criminal courts 
(Hughes and Wickeri 2011: 828).   
In contrast to the provisions against unilateral sale or mortgage of the matrimonial 
home, there is little statutory protection for the many women in Tanzania who 
experience domestic violence or forced eviction by a husband or other relative.  LMA 
protects a deserted spouse from being evicted from the matrimonial home by or at the 
instance of the other.
107
  The Act also provides for the making of a non-molestation 
injunction as between spouses during or after matrimonial proceedings.
108
  It further 
imposes a positive duty on a husband to maintain his wife (or wives) by providing 
accommodation, clothing and food
109
 and prohibits corporal punishment of a spouse.
110
  
There is no criminal sanction for breach of these provisions under the LMA, although 
the Act does give the ordinary courts jurisdiction to make orders for spousal 
maintenance both during and after a marriage.
111
     
                                               
106 s.114(4) as amended by MFSPA s.8. 
107 LMA s.59(3) (see Appendix D). 
108 LMA s.139 (see Appendix D). 
109 LMA s.63(a).  Ss.(b) also imposes a duty on a wife to provide for her husband if he is incapacitated 
from working and she has the means to do so (see Appendix D). 
110 LMA s.66 (see Appendix D). 
111 LMA s.115. 
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Significantly however, the legislation does not enable a woman who is abused or denied 
access to the matrimonial home or land, or has been forced to leave or chased away 
during a subsisting marriage to seek an injunction enabling her to return safely to the 
matrimonial property.  As Mashamba (2008) notes, this lacuna was observed by the 
High Court in Paulo Abdullah v Mohamed Bin Abdullah: 
The whole of the Law of Marriage Act seems to assume that the husband 
and wife will be sharing a matrimonial home; there is no specific 
provision, which provides for an order for injunction against one of the 
spouses in respect of the occupation of the matrimonial home.
112
 
This is in contrast to the position in England for example, where in circumstances of 
domestic abuse family courts regularly exercise their power under the Family Law Act 
of 1996 to grant a spouse or other ‘associated person’ a non-molestation order and/or an 
occupation order enforcing their entitlement to remain in occupation of the home, 
potentially to the exclusion of the respondent.
113
  In Tanzania however, save for claims 
for spousal maintenance and voiding of dispositions without consent, neither the land 
courts nor the ordinary courts have jurisdiction to hear claims to land and other 
matrimonial property brought between spouses outside the context of matrimonial 
proceedings.  Consequently wives who are abused and/or denied access to land but who 
- for a variety of reasons - do not seek a legal separation or divorce, find themselves 
without any potential legal remedies.  Similarly there is lack of such legal protection 
against other relatives who may abuse or force a woman to leave her home or land.   
As discussed in chapter 2, in practice this means that the only option for many wives in 
this situation is to return to live with their parents or another relative.  However, this 
step carries serious implications for a wife’s property interests.  Unless the couple 
reconciles and the wife returns to her husband, the usual consequence is that she will be 
deemed to have lost her interest in the matrimonial home.  Adopting a law similar to the 
English Family Law Act could theoretically offer an emergency legal remedy to address 
this issue.  However, in social contexts where patrilineal customary practices of 
marriage and land tenure endure it is questionable whether such legislation would have 
                                               
112 High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1999 (Unreported) quoted in 
Mashamba (2008: 56). 
113 Family Law Act of 1996 Part IV (as amended).  An ‘associated person’ includes current or former 
spouses, civil partners, cohabitants, engaged couples, parents of a child, relatives – widely defined, parties 
to the same family proceedings, and persons who have shared a household. 
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much impact in practice.  For example, LMA gives married women the legal 
entitlement to claim a share of the matrimonial assets upon divorce.  However, the 
limited impact of LMA amongst some groups of women (discussed in chapter 2) 
demonstrates that the existence of a legal remedy does not necessarily mean that it will 
be effectively used in practice - particularly where people are not aware of their 
statutory rights or where discriminatory customary practices prevail. 
In circumstances where a legal separation or divorce is sought, ordinary courts have 
jurisdiction to order a division of assets acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses 
during the marriage.  The statutory inclination towards equality of division is subject to 
‘the custom of the community to which the parties belong’, the extent of the parties’ 
contributions towards acquisition, any debts owing which were contracted for their joint 
benefit, and the needs of infant children of the marriage.
114
  For courts adjudicating 
claims to property in matrimonial proceedings the most controversial legal issue has 
been the question of spousal contributions entitling wives to a share of the property.  As 
Rwezaura and Wanitzek discuss, the approach of the courts to this issue has not been 
uniform, with higher courts much more likely than the lower courts to apply fully the 
provisions of LMA (1988: 17). 
There has been further inconsistency between the Court of Appeal and High Court in 
the interpretation of ‘contributions’.  The Court of Appeal in the seminal 1983 case of 
Bi Hawa Mohamed v. Ally Sefu
115
 held that a wife’s domestic services were a 
‘contribution’ within the meaning of section 114 LMA.  As Rwebangira notes however, 
the courts below this have tended to require litigants to prove their ‘tangible’ 
contribution, with particular weight being given to economic contributions that wives in 
many cases may be unable to show or substantiate with documentary evidence 
                                               
114 LMA s.114 (see Appendix D).  Courts also have power to divide assets upon cessation of cohabitation 
based on the presumption of marriage in s.160 (Letisia Buguma v Thadeo Magoma and Another High 
Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1989 (Unreported) Mwalusanya J - judgment 
reproduced in Kijo-Bisimba and Peter (2005: 410-417); Joseph Sindo v Pasaka Mkondola High Court 
Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1991 (Unreported) – discussed in Rwezaura (1994-1995: 529-30). 
115 Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1983, [1983] TLR 32.  Prior to Bi 
Hawa Mohamed the more conservative approach of the High Court to the meaning of ‘contribution’ had 
been restricted to economic contributions (Zawadi Abdallah v Ibrahim Iddi High Court of Tanzania at 
Dar es Salaam Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1980, [1981] TLR 311).  See Mtengeti-Migiro (1990) for a more 
detailed discussion of these two cases. 
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(Rwebangira 1996: 16).
116
  It should be noted that much of the research on 
implementation of the LMA and cases in the lower courts is now of some age and it 
would be useful to conduct new empirical studies on matrimonial proceedings in 
primary and district courts to evaluate recent developments in the law in practice.
117
   
The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania has noted the need for reform of section 114 
to clarify the position on ‘contributions’ and take into account social change and 
developments in human rights law.  Its 1994 Report on the Law of Marriage Act 
proposes removing ‘the custom of the community’ as a factor in the exercise of judicial 
discretion and recognising the duties of a housewife ‘as contribution enough to entitle 
her to a share of the family assets when the marriage breaks down’ (Law Reform 
Commission of Tanzania 1994: 12).  These recommendations, if adopted, would do 
much to bring statute in line with the most gender progressive case law and strengthen 
women’s legal position to a share of matrimonial property upon divorce.  However, 
such recommendations have yet to receive legislative consideration. 
Women and inheritance law 
Notwithstanding significant legislative change in the areas of marriage and land tenure 
law, there have been no equivalent reforms in Tanzania’s statutory laws of succession.  
The Indian Succession Act of 1865 came into operation in Tanzania in 1920 during the 
British colonial period.  It is applicable to Tanzanian Christians subject to the ‘manner 
of life’ test in JALA section 11(1).  This creates a presumption that customary law shall 
apply unless it is apparent from the deceased’s manner of life that another law should 
apply.  The Shivji Commission notes that in practice the Indian Succession Act is rarely 
applied to the estates of African Christians (URT 1994: 250).
118
  This is also said to be 
                                               
116 Mikidadi v. Mwanaisha Hashim (PC) Matrimonial Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1980 (Wife in employment - 
equal division), Bahari Binti Rajabu v. Juma Abdallah High Court of Tanzania (PC) Matrimonial Civil 
Appeal No. 8 of 1984 (Unreported) (No financial contribution from wife – Primary Court order for equal 
division reversed on appeal), Hamida Abdul v. Ramadhani Mwakaje High Court of Tanzania at Dar es 
Salaam (PC) Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1988 (Unreported) (Domestic services as main contribution does not 
entitle a wife to an equal share of the assets), Zakia Haji v. Hamisi High Court of Tanzania at Dar es 
Salaam Matrimonial Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1983 (Unreported) (Appeal dismissed for absence of proof of 
‘tangible’ contribution).  See Rwebangira (1996: 16-21) for a detailed discussion of these and other cases. 
117 One more recent empirical study by Magoke-Mhoja (2008), based largely on in-depth interviews, 
offers a useful insight into the experiences of child wives and widows in Shinyanga, Morogoro and Mara 
regions of Tanzania in divorce and inheritance cases. 
118 Contrast Re Innocent Mbilinyi [1971] HCD No. 283 in which the High Court applied statutory law 
having found that the deceased, an urban Christian woman, had abandoned a customary way of life. 
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the case for the Hindu Wills Act of 1870,
119
 which is in principle applicable to the 
Tanzanian Hindu Community (Law Reform Commission of Tanzania 1995: 24).   
The inheritance position of Muslims may be determined by local customary practices 
and/or Islamic law.  This is subject to the deceased having made a ‘written or oral 
declaration’ that Islamic succession law should apply.120  In a 2011 study on religion 
and women’s land rights in Tanzania, legal activist interviewees commented from their 
own experience that Muslim leaders do not always follow Islamic law in their handling 
of inheritance disputes (Killian 2011: 42).  This mixing of Islamic and customary 
practices of inheritance is reflected in statute.  As Makaramba observes, the Probate and 
Administration of Estates Act provides that the estate of a deceased Muslim may be 
administered either ‘wholly or in part’ according to Islamic law.  This recognises the 
reality that customary practices may also apply in the distribution of the estate of a 
deceased Muslim, effectively subsuming Islamic law into customary law (Makaramba 
2010: 288-289). 
In its 1995 Report on Tanzanian Law of Succession, the Law Reform Commission of 
Tanzania gave consideration to the ways in which current customary and Islamic 
inheritance law discriminates against widows and daughters in practice.  In particular, 
the Commission noted the contrast between the statutory protection in LMA of a wife’s 
property interests over jointly acquired marital property upon divorce, and the lack of 
such equivalent protection in practice for a widow in estates matters (Law Reform 
Commission of Tanzania 1995: 7).  The Commission’s overarching recommendation 
was for a uniform law of succession, which recognises but moderates tribal, customary 
and religious differences according to principles of justice and equity (1995: 62-70).  
With respect to women’s property rights the Commission proposed a law consistent 
with Tanzania’s human rights commitments and LMA, which recognises women’s 
rights to inherit property, including the immovable property of a spouse for life in trust 
for their children.   
                                               
119 (Act XXI of 1870) imported to Tanzania (Mainland) through the Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance 
of 1920. 
120 Probate and Administration of Estates Act Cap 352 R.E. 2002 s.88(1)(a) incorporating the 
Administration (Small Estates) (Amendment) Ordinance R.L. Cap. 30 s.19(1)(a). 
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Many of the Commission’s proposals have been echoed by gender activist Tanzanian 
NGOs, advocates and scholars, who have also pressed for change through constitutional 
test case litigation
121
 and an NGO-proposed new Succession Bill (reproduced in Ezer 
2006: 652-662).  However, despite the fact that Tanzania has been at the forefront of 
gender progressive legal reform on marriage and land tenure law in Africa, as Ezer 
notes, it lags behind other countries (including African countries such as Ghana and 
Zambia) in reforming its succession law to promote gender equality (Ezer 2006: 643).  
As such, the Law Reform Commission’s proposals, and other recommendations for 
legal protection of women’s property interests against ‘property grabbing’ after the 
death of a husband or father have yet to receive legislative attention in Tanzania.   
Legislation which gives effect to equal rights enshrines a state’s commitment to gender 
equality.  However, as many matrimonial cases in the Tanzanian lower courts 
demonstrate, legislative change is not in itself sufficient to bring about changes in 
society or the law in practice.  Despite the fact that under LMA women are entitled to a 
share of matrimonial assets by virtue of their contribution to acquisition, social and 
legal research has shown that in many divorce cases it is customary practices and a 
restrictive interpretation of the legal meaning of ‘contribution’ that has often prevailed.  
To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to go beyond the face of the 
legislation and examine legal processes as being part of a semi-autonomous social field.  
It is this approach, rather than proposals for legislative change, which forms the focus of 
my analysis of women’s claims to land in this thesis. 
3.3 Statutory land dispute resolution: a fusion of executive and judicial powers 
A specialist land court system  
The Land Acts
122
 and Land Disputes Courts Act of 2002 (LDCA) introduced 
Tanzania’s contemporary specialist land court system - a five-tier hierarchy comprising 
Village Land Council, Ward Tribunal, District Land and Housing Tribunal (DLHT), 
High Court Land Division and Court of Appeal.   Just as land tenure systems had been 
considered in urgent need of reform, equally the state of land dispute resolution had 
                                               
121 Elizabeth Stephen & Salome Charles v. The Attorney General (High Court of Tanzania at Dar es 
Salaam Misc. Civil Cause 82 of 2005 (Unreported) (discussed further in chapter 5). 
122 LA s.167 and VLA s.60-62. 
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been a key area of concern for the Tanzanian government prior to the Land Acts.  The 
need for a new system for hearing land disputes was identified by the government in its 
terms of reference for the Shivji Commission.  These expressly included the task of 
recommending machinery and procedures for settling land disputes as well as 
‘identifying any deficiencies and problems of overlapping of powers [in the settlement 
of land disputes] and to recommend clear demarcation of the jurisdiction of the existing 
organs’ (URT 1994: 1).   
The ‘new’ mechanism that was ultimately established under the Land Acts created a 
separate court system with exclusive jurisdiction for the determination of land disputes 
alongside – and to a certain extent overlapping with - the ordinary court system (Figure 
1).
123
  However, with the exception of the Village Land Council, it will be contended 
that there is little about the institutions themselves which is actually new.  Save for the 
Village Land Council and Court of Appeal the original jurisdiction of each land court is 
now determined by the pecuniary value of the land in question.  Yet in the case of the 
Ward Tribunal, in Arusha the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction are not always 
observed in practice.   
Sharp increases in the market value of land in Arusha has meant that many small family 
shambas are today worth considerably more than the 3 million Tsh limit of the Ward 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  Despite this, ward tribunals during my period of fieldwork 
routinely heard cases concerning unregistered family plots that were generally 
acknowledged to be worth more than this.  Since such plots had not been officially 
valued, ward tribunals appeared to take a broad practical view that small family 
shambas - whatever their market value - fell within their jurisdiction whereas larger 
shambas did not. 
My second contention is that the task of resolving problems in the overlapping of 
powers in the system has also not been fully realised in practice.  This section examines 
the distinctive approach to land dispute resolution fora that has been taken by successive 
colonial and post-colonial administrations in Tanzania, and the strong fusion of 
executive and judicial powers that has endured from the German colonial period to the 
present day.   
                                               
123 LA s.167 and LDCA s.3-4. 
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Figure 1 – Statutory framework for property disputes in Tanzania 
 
 
Court of Appeal 
Established (Est.) under 1977 Constitution Art. 108.  
Located in Dar es Salaam. 
High Court of Tanzania 
Est. under Constitution Art. 107.   
Court of unlimited original jurisdiction 
for all civil and criminal matters except 
land, commercial and industrial cases, for 
which there are specialist divisions. 
High Court Land Division 
Est. under Land Act 1999 s.167 and LDCA 
s.37. 
Original pecuniary jurisdiction for land cases 
exceeding 50 million Tsh. (possession cases) 
or 40 million Tsh in other cases (LDCA 
s.37). 
Supervisory and revisional powers over 
proceedings determined in the DLHT 
(LDCA s.43). 
Resident Magistrates’ Court  
and District Court 
Est. under Magistrates’ Courts Acts 1963 
and 1984.  
Civil and criminal jurisdiction of Resident 
Magistrates’ Court comprises and extends 
that of the District Court (s.41 and Sch. 2 
to the 1984 Act).   
Only the District Court has jurisdiction to 
receive and hear appeals and revise cases 
from the Primary Court. 
District Land and Housing Tribunal 
Est. under Land Act 1999 s.167 and 
LDCA s.22. 
Original pecuniary jurisdiction for land 
cases not exceeding 50 million Tsh 
(possession cases) or 40 million Tsh in 
other cases (LDCA s.33).   
Appellate and revisional jurisdiction 
over ward tribunal decisions (LDCA 
ss.35-36). 
Primary Court 
Est. under Magistrates’ Courts Acts 1963 
and 1984. Exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of marriage, guardianship and 
inheritance matters under customary and 
Islamic law (MCA 1963 s.63).   
Hears appeals from the ward tribunal on 
matters not relating to land. 
Ward Tribunal 
Est. under Ward Tribunals Act 1985.   
Jurisdiction as a marriage conciliatory 
board (LMA 1971 s.102). 
Jurisdiction as a land court (LA s.167 and 
LDCA s.10) with a pecuniary jurisdiction 
in land cases limited to 3 million Tsh 
(LDCA s.15). 
 
Village Land Council 
Est. as a land court under LA s.167 and VLA Part V. 
Unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. 
Functions as a mediating body.  Litigants may choose 
to commence their claim at a higher level of court. 
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Drawing upon historical analyses and local government studies, it is contended that the 
fusion of executive and judicial branches of government at the most local level of court 
has had - and will continue to have - significant implications for the power dynamics of 
land dispute resolution in Tanzania.  In subsequent chapters this contention is illustrated 
through fieldwork examples which highlight the significance of executive control at the 
local level for women’s access to justice in land cases today. 
Political and jurisdictional developments in statutory dispute resolution  
Moore has observed that developments in dispute resolution systems in Tanzania have 
been closely connected to its changing political structure (Moore 1986: 148).  
Reflecting on these aids firstly, an understanding of why the current separate ordinary 
and land court systems have been adopted and the enduring executive influence over 
judicial organs at the local level.  Secondly, it is relevant for contextualising the 
significance of customary practices as a source of law, the position and background of 
actors adjudicating or mediating land disputes, their values and sense of justice.  In 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis I discuss this second set of issues in the context of my 
own empirical research findings. 
The fusion of powers between executive and judiciary began under the period of 
German colonial rule (1884-1916) and continued under the British
124
 with the 
establishment of a dual discriminatory legal system – one for foreigners, another for 
‘natives’.  German law was applied to cases concerning the European population, while 
the indigenous population had their disputes heard by local leaders who also exercised 
executive functions and were accountable to colonial executive authority (Bierwagen 
and Peter 1989).  Cases in the native courts were decided in accordance with local law 
(i.e. local customary practices), having regard to the ‘legal practice of the natives insofar 
as this is not – from the point of view of civilised nations – contrary to healthy common 
sense and good morals.’125   
Over time, the strong fusion of powers in the native courts system became watered 
down and gradually the chief’s judicial functions were replaced by magistrates assisted 
                                               
124 Courts Ordinance (No. 6 of 1920) R.L. Cap. 3 and Native Courts Ordinance (No. 5 of 1929) R.L. Cap. 
73. 
125 German Foreign Office Decree of 15.1.1907 in the translation given by Moffett (quoted in Bierwagen 
and Peter 1989: 397). 
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by assessors – a practice that continues today.  The Native Courts Ordinance was 
repealed
126
 and native courts were renamed ‘local courts’ with appeal lying to a local 
court of appeal and the Central Court of Appeal, presided over by a judge of the High 
Court.
127
  This marked the first step towards a unified court system (Bierwagen and 
Peter 1989), although significantly, in the case of land matters, proceedings affecting 
the title to or any interest in land registered under the Land Registration Ordinance were 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the local courts
128
 (Cotran 1970).  This reinforced the 
dualist system of land tenure (discussed in chapter 2) by channelling land matters 
through two separate processes of dispute resolution. 
Tanganyika became independent from Britain in 1961.
129
  This, as Bierwagen and Peter 
note, led to three important steps in the unification of the court system through the 
ending of the system of appeals to the Crown,
130
 the fusion of executive and judicial 
powers of local administrators,
131
 and the dual court system that had been based on 
racial discrimination
132
 (Bierwagen and Peter 1989: 400).  However, despite Tanzania’s 
new drive for independence and national unity spearheaded by President Julius Nyerere, 
as Cotran notes, in common with other East African countries, the court system in the 
process of unification retained much of its English common law heritage.
133
 
The Magistrates Courts Act of 1963 introduced the present unified court system 
comprising Primary, District and High Court, which was subsequently retained by the 
Magistrates Courts Act of 1984.
134
  Whilst the system continues to this day, its 
jurisdiction over civil land disputes was removed by the Land Acts.  Primary courts 
continue to have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of marriage, guardianship and 
inheritance matters under customary law and magistrates sit with lay assessors.  As 
Moore notes, this restored a practice which had prevailed throughout the colonial period 
                                               
126 Local Courts Ordinance (No. 14 of 1951) R.L. Cap. 299. 
127 The Central Court of Appeal was abolished before independence and its functions exercised by High 
Court judges sitting with assessors. 
128 Local Courts Ordinance 1951 s.13. 
129 Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council of 1961. 
130 See Cole and Denison (1964: 90) for further discussion. 
131 Local Courts (Minister for Justice and Regional Local Courts Officers) Act (Act No. 16 of 1962) 
(Cotran 1970). 
132 Magistrates Courts Act (Act No. 55 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 537. 
133 See Cotran’s discussion on ‘Anglicising’ of the East African court systems at independence (Cotran 
1969). 
134 (Act No. 2 of 1984) Cap. 11 R.E. 2002. 
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where chiefs had been assisted by elders or assessors in their decision-making (Moore 
1986: 172). 
A further later key development in the reform of matrimonial dispute resolution was the 
creation under LMA of the present system of marriage conciliatory boards, with a 
central objective of reconciling parties experiencing matrimonial difficulties (Figure 
1).
135
  LMA makes it a statutory requirement that all parties seeking a decree for legal 
separation or divorce in the ordinary courts must have referred their matrimonial 
difficulty to a board (whether a religious board or their local ward tribunal), which has 
certified that it has failed to reconcile the parties.
136
  The socially embedded nature of 
marriage conciliatory boards and the implications for women seeking to make legal 
claims to land will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
In many fertile parts of the country by the 1960s land had become increasingly scarce 
and a better framework was needed for resolving customary land disputes.  One specific 
piece of legislation
137
 was passed in 1963 to deal administratively with disputes on land 
that had been alienated to settlers and foreign holders without consultation with ‘native 
authorities’ (URT 1994: 101).  Further legislation providing for the establishment of 
customary land tribunals was passed in 1968, initially to deal with disputes in Kagera 
region.
138
  In places where these tribunals operated, they exercised concurrent 
jurisdiction over land cases with the primary courts.  Cases were heard by a panel of 
five paid members (including one lawyer) appointed by the ruling TANU party and the 
Minister for Land and Settlement (Moore 1986: 167).  Appeal was to the Minister for 
Land and Settlement, although courts were sometimes asked to enforce judgments 
(James and Fimbo 1973: 189).   
The creation of customary land tribunals in the late 1960s re-established once again the 
link between executive and judiciary in land cases, even at a time when the new unified 
ordinary court system had separated judicial from executive powers.  In 1992 the 
                                               
135 LMA s.101-2. 
136 LMA s.101. 
137 Land (Settlement of Disputes) Act (Act No. 25 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 524.  This set up machinery for 
intervention under the Minister and a number of orders were made concerning lands in Tanga and 
Lushoto (URT 1994: 102). 
138 Nyarubanja Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act (Act No. 1 of 1965); subsequently repealed by the 
Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act (Act No. 47 of 1968) Cap. 377 R.E. 2002, which extended 
the scope and geographical coverage of the Act beyond Kagera to Pare, Moshi and Tukuyu regions (URT 
1994: 102). 
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system of customary land tribunals was extended to other parts of Tanzania to deal with 
land disputes which had arisen as a consequence of Operation Vijiji and more 
generally.
139
  The current DLHT established under the Land Acts has effectively 
replaced the customary land tribunal with similarly constituted personnel of legally 
qualified chairperson and lay assessors accountable to the same department of 
government, although not political appointees.
140
 
A year after the establishment of customary land tribunals, in 1969 a parallel system of 
arbitration tribunals was created to deal with civil and matrimonial matters, which were 
to blur the boundaries between judiciary and executive once more.
141
  These were to be 
the precursor to the current system of ward tribunals.  As Moore notes, these were 
informal courts run by local party laymen whose purpose was to dispose of family and 
other small-scale disputes through reconciliation before they had reached the primary 
court stage (Moore 1986).  Arbitration tribunals consisted of five lay persons appointed 
by the TANU Branch Committee having jurisdiction over the ward.  Moore has noted 
that proceedings were informal, and that despite lack of an official power to impose any 
fine or punishment, in practice the tribunals ‘rather freely interpreted their powers and 
[did] not always restrain themselves as officially directed’ (Moore 1986: 164).  No law 
or procedure was specified as to how to bring about amicable settlement between the 
parties.  This remains the case for present day ward tribunals, which operate with little 
statutory or regulatory frameworks on procedure and rules of evidence. 
Today’s ward tribunals were brought in under the Ward Tribunals Act of 1985 (WTA) 
against a backdrop of renewal in local government in 1984.  The period since 
independence had seen a gradual erosion of local government as politics became 
increasingly centralised under the TANU socialist government.  District councils were 
abolished in 1969, followed by urban local authorities in 1972 on the recommendation 
of the American consultancy firm, McKinsey and Co.  Regional and district 
                                               
139 Customary Land Tribunals and Customary Land Appeals Tribunals were deemed to have been 
established under sections 8 and 13 of the 1968 Act pursuant to sections 6 and 9 of the Regulation of 
Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act (Act No. 22 of 1992) Cap. 267 R.E. 2002.  S.3 of the 1992 Act 
also extinguished the customary rights of occupancy of persons who had previously used or occupied land 
in villages as a result of Operation Vijiji.   
140 The Customary Land Tribunal and Customary Land Appeals Tribunal were disestablished under 
LDCA s.53 (a) and (c).   
141 Magistrates Courts (Amendment) Act (Act No. 18 of 1969) adding s.15A to the parent Act; 
Arbitration Tribunals Regulations (G.N. 219 of 1969). 
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development committees were substituted in their place, the stated aim being greater 
efficiency and distribution of resources (Liviga 1992: 213).  However the project failed 
and in the face of economic decline and pressure from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), local government was reintroduced through a package of new 
legislation.
142
  The new local government system was officially explained as aiming at 
enhancing popular participation in development efforts (Meshack 1987: 6, quoted in 
Lawi 2003), and it is therefore politically significant that ward tribunals were brought in 
under the auspices of local government rather than the judicial system at this time. 
Msekwa (1977) notes that the Presidential Commission, which recommended the 
establishment of ward tribunals, envisaged that they would be ‘reconciliatory, flexible, 
informal, and sensitive to local culture in their functioning’ (quoted in Lawi 2003).  
These aims are reflected in WTA,
143
 which explicitly sets out their social as well as 
judicial functions: 
The primary function of each Tribunal shall be to secure peace and 
harmony in the area for which it is established by mediating and 
endeavouring to obtain just and amicable settlement of disputes.  
As Mswekwa and Farmer note, the ward tribunals represent a modification of the 
customary courts that existed during the period of colonial rule, tasked with ‘controlling 
ordinary social strife at the local community level for the purpose of keeping peace and 
tranquillity by the cheapest possible means’ (Msekwa 1977: iii, Farmer 1974: xi - 
quoted in Lawi 2003).  This emphasis on pacification and reconciliation goes beyond 
positivist approaches to justice conventionally employed in English common law 
dispute resolution and is significant in explaining the way in which land cases are being 
decided by ward tribunals today.   
The location of ward tribunals within the framework of local government also has 
consequences for the extent to which other arms of local government influence dispute 
settlement.  Lawi, in his study of ward tribunals in Babati district suggests that the ward 
as an administrative unit presents some degree of conformity to the modern ideal of 
                                               
142 Local Government (District Authorities) Act (Act No. 7 of 1982) Cap. 287 R.E. 2002, Local 
Government (Urban Authorities) Act (Act No. 8 of 1982) Cap. 288 R.E. 2002, Local Government 
Finances Act (Act No. 9 of 1982) Cap. 290 R.E. 2002, Local Government Service Act (Act No. 10 of 
1982), Local Government Negotiating Machinery Act (Act No. 11 of 1982).  See also Liviga (1992). 
143 s.8(1). 
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separation of powers in governance: between ward tribunals operating as judicial organs 
of the ward committees
144
 which, together with village governments, exercise 
legislative functions under the direction of district councils.  However, my contention is 
that the Land Acts have muddied separation of powers in the adjudication of land 
disputes at the ward level.  Prior to the Land Acts it was the primary court, rather than 
local government, that exercised supervisory jurisdiction over the ward tribunals.  
Today, this supervisory jurisdiction has not been fully transferred to the DLHT, 
although it has the power to revise the proceedings of a ward tribunal in addition to 
powers conferred upon it in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
145
   
Under the present system, there is significant executive control of the Ward Tribunal 
embodied in the position of the Ward Executive Officer.  In an executive capacity the 
WEO acts as Secretary to the Ward Development Committee, which appoints the 
members of the Ward Tribunal.  The WEO also acts as a mediator in disputes involving 
local people both before legal action and in order to implement ward tribunal 
judgments.  The role extends to the maintenance of security in the ward as well as 
enforcement of ward by-laws, and includes powers of arrest and detention.  Further, the 
WEO supervises Village Executive Officers (VEO) and Mtaa Executive Officers and 
coordinates development projects in the ward as well as election processes.
146
  The VEO 
has a similar role at the village level.
147
  The range of powers of the WEO means that he 
or she has the potential to become a pivotal actor – for good or ill - in the handling of 
land cases in the Ward Tribunal.  As my empirical research illustrates, where an 
individual WEO abuses their position of power, they can exert considerable undue 
influence on the process of justice in the Ward Tribunal. 
The Shivji Commission and dispute resolution under the Land Acts 
Customary land tribunals had come under heavy criticism, and Shivji argued strongly 
that they lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the public and undermined the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers (Shivji 1998: 65).  The Shivji Commission noted the 
                                               
144 WTA s.24(3). 
145 LDCA ss. 35-36. 
146 The functions of the WEO are prescribed by the Local Government (District Authorities) Act s.30A 
and Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act s.15A (inserted by the Local Government Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (Act No. 13 of 2006) s.4 and s.16. 
147 See Grawert (2009: 364) for further discussion of the roles of local government officers in Tanzania. 
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heavy involvement of the executive – from village to Ministry – in land dispute 
settlement and considerable confusion caused by overlapping jurisdiction and long 
delays in the resolution of disputes (URT 1994: 102-5).  The Commission was clear that 
a specialist system of land courts was needed to deal with the specialised nature of land 
matters, but that any dispute settlement machinery should not be located in the 
executive branch.  The fusion of executive and judicial authorities handling land 
disputes had been shown to be a recipe for arbitrariness, confusion and corruption.  It 
was argued that decentralisation and popular participation was needed to enhance the 
authority and legitimacy of the courts (URT 1994: 197-202). 
The Shivji Commission’s proposals were based on fundamental principles of popular 
participation, separation of powers and physical proximity to the people.  The proposed 
system comprised a hierarchy of an elders’ tribunal (baraza la wazee) at village level, a 
Circuit Land Court, which would travel to hear disputes in situ, and a High Court Land 
Division - all located in the judicial branch of government.  Elders were to have a 
stronger input in decision-making than had previously been the case in the use of court 
assessors in the Tanzanian legal system.  Their role at every level of court was aimed at 
allowing for fuller community participation in the process of land dispute resolution and 
to expose professional personnel to the ‘values of justice and fairness of the community’ 
(Shivji 2002: 206).  In this way, the Commission hoped that a body of Tanzanian 
common (land) law could develop which would be sensitive to the community’s sense 
of justice and fairness.  The Commission’s proposals reflected a conscious attempt to 
move away from, what Shivji describes as ‘the Western positivist bias for professional 
dispensers of justice’ (Shivji 2002: 205).   
In fact, little of the spirit of the Shivji Commission’s proposals in respect of dispute 
settlement was taken forward in the Land Acts.  In the early drafts of the Land Bills, the 
only change to the ordinary court system was provision for village mediation.  The final 
outcome was the creation of a specialist land tribunal system, but one which did not 
fully embrace the principles of separation of powers and popular participation that the 
Commission had espoused.  As Coldham notes it was ‘surely optimistic to expect the 
Government to reverse a 30-year old policy of interventionism and to ‘restore’ powers 
of land administration to panels of elders; but also, more controversially, that the new 
system reflected a continued commitment to settle land disputes by means of quasi-
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judicial bodies’ (Coldham 1995: 234).  Shivji is highly critical of what he describes as a 
‘bias for Western positivism and legal justice, and resurrection of the colonial divisions 
between received law and customary law’ in the Land Acts.  As Shivji puts it, the Act: 
‘adopts the terminology of the Commission’s report in setting up the dispute settlement 
machinery, while stripping it of all its principles and perspectives on justice, community 
participation and development of a more legitimate Tanzanian common law’ (Shivji 
2002: 207). 
By contrast, McAuslan in his ‘more law’ approach argued that the Shivji Commission’s 
proposals were either naive or based on ‘path dependency’ - driven by long-standing 
Tanzanian (colonial) legal traditions.  McAuslan’s main criticism centred on drafting 
style: ‘... with a few broad strokes of the legal pen giving vast powers to legally 
unqualified people and relying on their innate common-sense and sense of justice to get 
things done – just like Operation Vijiji in fact’ (McAuslan 2003: 253).  Preferring the 
South African approach to drafting new land law reforms, McAuslan maintains that 
more detail in legislation will ‘facilitate radical action rather than hinder it’ and that 
legal rules and checks and balances are needed to replace ‘reliance on administrative 
and political action based on goodwill and common sense’ (McAuslan 2003: 254).  
McAuslan’s critical approach to ‘goodwill and common sense’, and Shivji’s concern to 
promote ‘the community’s’ values of ‘justice and fairness’ both point to approaches to 
justice taken in local courts which are beyond the realm of professional legal training.  
In chapter 5 I analyse how these socially embedded understandings of justice work in 
practice in the way claims are handled and judged by land tribunals and their 
implications for decision-making concerning women’s claims to land. 
3.4 Contemporary land court personnel 
Ultimately, neither the Shivji Commission’s nor McAuslan’s approaches to separation 
of powers and checks and balances were adopted for the local level of land court.  Both 
village and ward tribunals remain accountable to local district councils under the 
President’s Office Regional Administration and Local Government (TAMISEMI).  This 
therefore continues the historical fusion of judiciary with executive at the local levels of 
land dispute resolution.  Each of the five ward tribunals I visited was convened within 
the small ward office, thereby physically situating it in the same building as the office 
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of the ward executive officer and other executive officials.  Ward tribunal members are 
nominated by their villages and appointed by the ward committee.
148
  In the five ward 
tribunals I visited it was common for the members to have held previous political roles, 
such as balozi (ten-cell leader)
149
 or village council member.  Some had worked as 
primary court assessors.  Some female members had been secretaries for UWT.  CCM 
affiliation was common and arguably continues a degree of the politicisation that 
existed in arbitration tribunals in the past. 
Whilst district councils are responsible for supervising, training and remunerating ward 
tribunal members as well as providing funding for the tribunals themselves, in practice 
none of the ward tribunals or their members received funding or remuneration from 
their local district council, and members had received quite limited training for their 
role.  The tribunals typically sat once or twice a week, depending on the workload of the 
tribunal and availability of members.  Lack of remuneration was a common complaint 
from members of all the ward tribunals I visited, which they felt was made worse by the 
statutory disqualification of civil servants from ward tribunal membership.
150
  Whilst 
this restriction serves to preserve separation of executive and judicial powers in the 
office of the ward tribunal member, some members considered that this unfairly 
penalised them from seeking employment in the public sector when they were not being 
paid for their tribunal work.   
In contrast to regulations which provide for fixed court fees in the DLHT
151
 there are no 
equivalent national regulations for ward tribunals to charge fees in relation to 
proceedings under the Land Acts.  As such, it was common practice for ward tribunals 
to set their own fees to charge litigants.  In 2009 5,000 Tsh appeared to be a standard 
figure for file opening.  One woman I met listed to me the total costs she had incurred in 
her Ward Tribunal claim: a 5,000 Tsh file opening fee, 35,000 Tsh for 7 witness 
summonses, 70,000 Tsh for the site visits and 20,000 Tsh for copies of the file to take to 
the DLHT.  Other claimants quoted similar figures for their own cases.  Site visits were 
usually the single highest cost in Ward Tribunal proceedings.  In one case I observed 
                                               
148 WTA s.4(1)(a). 
149 The role of the balozi is discussed in chapter 4. 
150 WTA s.5(1)(c). 
151 Land Disputes Courts (District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations (G.N. No. 174 of 2003) 
(DLHT Regulations) para. 3(1) and First Schedule.  
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both parties were required to pay 110,000 Tsh each for the site visit.  In addition to the 
fees that tribunals set for the conduct of a case some tribunals imposed fines on parties 
who failed to attend (typically 20-50,000 Tsh) or showed disrespect to the tribunal 
during proceedings (60,000 Tsh).  At one tribunal which normally heard cases on a 
Saturday, litigants would be charged an additional fee if they wanted their case to be 
heard on a weekday.   
The ethics of ward tribunals charging fees in this way is not a straightforward issue.  
Given the lack of local government funding, members can only meet their 
administration costs and pay themselves by charging the litigants who appear before 
them.  In their 2009 study of customary dispute resolution processes in Kisii, Kenya 
Henrysson and Joireman similarly found that litigants in land tribunals were expected to 
pay unofficial transport costs and lunch for officials because salaries were insufficient.  
Whatever the justification for charging these fees the high costs of bringing a claim 
represents a significant hurdle for claimants who lack access to funds.  Moreover, the 
fees are considerably higher than the fixed fees set by regulations in the DLHT.  For 
example, in 2009 the statutory fee to issue an application for execution in the DLHT 
was 2,500 Tsh.  It is therefore somewhat ironic that ward tribunals, which are intended 
to be accessible to local people, are financially speaking the least accessible level of 
dispute settlement in the land tribunal system. 
The DLHT is also an underfunded institution.  However, unlike ward tribunal members 
DLHT chairpersons are salaried law graduates, appointed by the Ministry of Lands and 
Human Settlements Development – the department responsible for this particular level 
of the tribunal hierarchy.  They are assisted by remunerated lay assessors, with a role 
similar to assessors in the primary court.  As Moore has noted, the presence of elders in 
the contemporary legal system echoes the pre-colonial role of headmen (washili) in 
local dispute settlement (Moore 1986: 148).  In the context of the DLHT - and appeal 
hearings in the High Court Land Division that originate from the ward
152
 - their place 
alongside legally qualified chairpersons and judiciary appears intended to underscore 
the place of local customary practices and community conceptions of justice in 
Tanzania’s plural legal system.  In practice the majority of Arusha’s DLHT assessors 
whom I met were not originally from Arusha and had held former careers as army 
                                               
152 LDCA s.39. 
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officers, business people, union and public sector workers.  They explained to me that 
their knowledge of local customary practices (as the Regulations require them to 
have)
153
 came from living amongst the local Arusha population for many years.   
The establishment of a specialist High Court Land Division reflects the significance of 
land issues and volume of land disputes in Tanzania.  The High Court (and Court of 
Appeal above it) is located exclusively in the judicial branch of government; however, 
since its creation under the Land Acts the High Court Land Division has suffered from a 
severe shortage of judges and underfunding from the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs 
and Justice.  During my fieldwork year there were just four High Court Land Division 
judges for the whole of Tanzania.  Based in Dar es Salaam, the four judges travel to 
regional sub-registries throughout the country to hear cases.  This means that judges are 
not locally resident in most of the areas they visit and they spend very limited time in 
each place.  A judge would visit Arusha two or three times a year for approximately a 
two-week period, funding permitting.  This has significant implications for how 
professionally qualified judges seek to understand and apply local customary practices, 
in contrast to the approach of tribunals operating at the village and ward level, which are 
staffed by local elders from the communities they serve.  I explore these differences 
further in chapter 5.  
A matter upon which NALAF and GLTF were agreed was the importance of female 
representation in land dispute resolution.  There is today a significant female presence in 
the Tanzanian judiciary, including the Court of Appeal and High Court,
154
 although 
gender equality at all levels of court has yet to be achieved.  During my fieldwork year 
the personnel of Arusha’s DLHT comprised one male and one female chairperson, and 
two out of the six assessors were women.  Statute requires that ward tribunals must 
comprise not less than four or more than eight members, of whom three shall be 
women.
155
  VLA also stipulates that three out of seven village land council members 
must be women.
156
  In the wards I visited however, none of the tribunals were attended 
by all the appointed members and none had more than two active female members.  It 
                                               
153 DLHT Regulations para. 33(1)(a). 
154 As at April 2012, 26 out of 68 High Court judges and 4 out of 15 Court of Appeal judges in Tanzania 
were women (Source: www.judiciary.go.tz – accessed July 2012). 
155 LDCA s.11 and WTA s.4. 
156 VLA s.60(2). 
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was quite common for ward tribunals to proceed to hear cases without a proper quorum 
of half the total members, rendering their decisions liable to being held void on appeal.  
Some female members expressed to me that the unpaid two days a week commitment 
was particularly onerous as they had small businesses, dependent relatives and other 
household responsibilities to attend to.   
Despite these problems, the call for greater participation by women at all levels of the 
court system is actively being addressed in Tanzania and female presence amongst the 
judiciary compares favourably with many other countries.  My impression from 
observing ward and DLHT proceedings in Arusha was that women tribunal members 
were respected by their male tribunal colleagues and were active participants in the 
adjudication process.  Two female members I met held the position of chairperson on 
their village land council and ward tribunal respectively.  It is difficult to make a social-
scientific assessment of the impact of greater female representation on substantive 
decision-making in land matters or on women’s access to justice.  However, from my 
informal conversations with female ward tribunal members and litigants at the ward 
level, it appeared that the presence of female members made some women litigants feel 
more comfortable in approaching these local levels of tribunal for assistance. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Land Acts of 1999 were an important landmark in the progressive realisation of 
women’s property rights in Tanzanian law.  However, my contention is that they also 
represent a missed opportunity for a more fundamental reconfiguration of the way in 
which gender and land tenure relations are constructed through statute.  In chapters 2 
and 3 I have focused on the gendered and intergenerational aspects of customary 
practices and statutory laws on land tenure, matrimonial property and inheritance in 
order to highlight the inseparability of these three areas of law in family contexts.  Yet, 
with the passing of the Land Acts these three areas of law have not been consolidated 
and are now glaringly inconsistent on issues of gender equality.  There have been 
gender progressive developments concerning spousal land rights under LMA and the 
Land Acts.  However, laws of succession remain unchanged and most cases are 
determined according to ‘customary law’.  This means that customary practices of land 
tenure which discriminate against female inheritance remain recognised in estates 
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matters heard in the ordinary courts, whilst land courts have jurisdiction to ‘trump’ 
discriminatory customary practices to give effect to women’s equal rights to land in 
disputes heard under the Land Acts. 
The creation of a separate system of land courts was an important priority for both the 
Tanzanian government and the Shivji Commission to remedy a number of deficiencies 
in the administration of justice in land cases.  However, this has also served to amplify 
the fragmented statutory approach to land in family contexts.  Since matters concerning 
the division of matrimonial property and succession remain under the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary courts, the notion that land courts have exclusive jurisdiction in land disputes 
is something of a misnomer.  As my fieldwork findings illustrate in the chapters to 
follow, this is shown to be a recipe for confusion and delay where claims to land 
between spouses are made to a court that lacks the relevant jurisdiction.  It also 
highlights a substantial legal lacuna in statutory protection of a wife and her interests in 
land within a subsisting marriage. 
Lastly, the concentration of power over land ownership and dispute resolution in the 
hands of the executive by successive administrations in Tanzania has proved to be a 
highly effective way of retaining political power and social control over land matters 
and a recipe for corruption.  This executive power has been retained and to some degree 
strengthened at the local level of village and ward tribunal under the current land court 
system and the concentration of power in the position of the WEO in particular.  As will 
be discussed, this location of the ward tribunal within local government carries 
significant implications for the power dynamics of local land disputes.  Where such 
power is abused, it also raises challenges for access to justice if executive and judicial 
spheres become further enmeshed with social power relations in the family and 
community. 
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4. Making legal claims to land: 
Agency and power relations in legal processes 
4.0 Introduction 
Understanding why women’s legal claims to land succeed or fail in practice requires an 
approach to the study of law which goes beyond its statutory framework.  This chapter 
takes two women’s experiences of making legal claims to land in Arusha as the starting 
point for an analysis of the significance of power relations and agency
157
 within legal 
processes of land dispute resolution.  The analysis is informed by the work of 
Yngvesson (1993), Hirsch (1998) and Manji (2000).  For these scholars, disputes are 
not only structured by rules, ideologies and power relations, but may also be contested 
and reconfigured by actors engaged in active processes of negotiation and resistance.  
Accordingly, understanding processes of disputing requires observation of structures 
and individual agency, as well as a broadly Foucauldian approach to studying power 
relations. 
The chapter extends the institutional analysis of ward tribunals within local government 
in chapter 3 to consider how other local actors engaged in disputing processes interact 
with the tribunal and shape the course of disputes.  The women’s claims progress from 
the Ward Tribunal into other fora beyond the local community, including district and 
NGO offices and higher levels of court.  The chapter considers how the introduction of 
professionals into the dispute reconfigures power relations between existing social 
actors.  Drawing upon recent policy-oriented literature on access to justice and legal aid, 
it then reflects upon ways in which the women’s experiences of making legal claims 
may usefully inform contemporary policy debates on legal services provision and 
women’s access to justice. 
4.1 Two women’s experiences 
The two women’s stories which follow are in many ways characteristic of the types of 
claims to land made by women in rural and peri-urban areas of Arumeru District.  In 
                                               
157 I use Ortner’s conceptualisation of ‘agency’ in the context of questions of power: ‘agency is that which 
is made or denied, expanded or contracted, in the exercise of power ... the (sense of) authority to act, or 
lack of authority and lack of empowerment ... that dimension of power that is located in the actor’s 
subjective sense of authorization, control, effectiveness in the world’ (Ortner 1997: 146). 
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each case the woman’s claim was made in response to being forcibly ousted from her 
land by a male relative.  Both claims were made by women whose land problems began 
at a stage in their lives when they had very limited power within their own families.  In 
each case the woman brought her claim against a male family member – the first against 
a guardian in-law, the second against a husband.  The cases offer individual personal 
insights into how power struggles over land in family contexts escalate and shape the 
dynamics of a dispute and their outcome in statutory legal fora.  They also demonstrate 
strategies that women in relatively weak positions of power adopt in attempting to 
secure the return of their land. 
In the first of the two cases we hear the voice of ‘Furaha’,158 an Arusha widow in her 
late forties giving evidence in her local ward tribunal.  She brought her claim against her 
shemeji (brother-in-law) ‘Godluck’ - her late husband’s older brother - who had been 
appointed as guardian of the family after her husband’s death.  The second case is that 
of ‘Elizabeth’, a Meru woman in her fifties who shared with me the story of her claim to 
land against her husband ‘Anaeli’ in a fieldwork interview. 
Barbed wire 
Furaha had been in the fortunate position of having acquired two shambas during her 
lifetime.  Both shambas were located in the same Arusha village on the peri-urban 
lower slopes of Mount Meru.  Furaha had no brothers and had been given the first 
shamba by her father when she was still a young woman.  The second shamba had been 
apportioned to Furaha and her husband as family land by her husband’s family when 
they married.   Furaha and her husband had used the two plots to cultivate bananas, 
maize, beans and vegetables.  Furaha said that her problems with Godluck began after 
the deaths of her father and husband. 
In her evidence to the Ward Tribunal Furaha described how Godluck had forced her 
away from her late husband’s shamba.  Godluck subsequently sold that shamba without 
her consent and several houses were built on it by the purchasers.  At the time of the 
Ward Tribunal proceedings Furaha was living in a mud house on the shamba that she 
had inherited from her father.  Furaha recounted how Godluck had fenced off her house 
                                               
158 Names have been changed in the interests of protecting the identities of informants and third parties. 
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from the rest of the plot and built a second house right next to it for his son.  This left 
her with no remaining land to cultivate. 
The Ward Tribunal where Furaha made her claim was some fifteen minutes walk from 
her home in the village.  On the day she gave her evidence Furaha sat alone in the 
middle of the front bench directly facing the four tribunal members hearing the case.  
There were two male and two female members in attendance that day, in addition to the 
tribunal secretary, who sat behind a large table taking a careful note of the proceedings.  
Furaha’s manner was calm and measured as she gave her evidence, pausing after each 
sentence for the tribunal secretary to finish writing down what she had just said.  At first 
she spoke in her vernacular language of Kimaasai before being prompted to speak in 
Kiswahili.  She was allowed to speak with very little interruption from the members.  
When Furaha had finished giving her evidence the secretary motioned to her to come 
forward and add her thumbprint to his notes.  Furaha, like many other litigants and 
witnesses and every third woman and every fifth man in Tanzania was illiterate.
159
  This 
is a translated extract from her evidence as recorded by the tribunal secretary:
160
 
I am claiming my shamba which I was given by my father.  This shamba, 
after my father died and my husband died, my brother-in-law whom we 
made a guardian came to sell it.
161
  He left a small portion, where my 
house was and then he built in the same shamba.
 162
  He brought wire and 
fenced that area.  He built a timber house outside my place. He obstructed 
me from the toilet area.  He brought thorns and put them there.  That was 
one shamba.  The second shamba was my husband’s.163  In that shamba 
there was a time when we lacked money to farm it because we used to farm 
it using a tractor.  He said this shamba cannot be left in this state I’ll go 
and farm it.
164
  We had not agreed but he used force to go and farm it.  
After farming, the crops were ready for harvesting.  I fell ill the second 
year and I wasn’t able to farm.  Then I was well, the shamba produced 
                                               
159
 Literacy is defined as the percentage of persons aged 15 or over who can read and write.  The 2007 
Tanzanian Household Budget Survey reports a national literacy rate of 72.5% (80% men, 66.1% women) 
(REPOA 2009).  This is higher than average within Africa: 63.4% (72.6% men, 54.5% women) 2005-
2008 (Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics http://stats.uis.unesco.org  (accessed July 2012). 
160 Translated from Kiswahili by Miriam Matinda.  See Appendix E for the original Kiswahili version of 
Furaha’s evidence. 
161 Here it appears that Furaha is stating that the shamba that she inherited from her father was sold.  In 
fact it was her husband’s family shamba that was sold. 
162 Here Furaha is referring to the shamba that she inherited from her father where she was living at the 
time of her Ward Tribunal claim. 
163 This is the shamba that was sold. 
164 This occurred sometime after the death of Furaha’s husband. 
87 
 
 
crops, I went and told him that I now wanted to farm my shamba.  He told 
me I won’t give it to you. ... So he continued to be the one using that 
shamba. ...   
The day before yesterday he asked me why did you bring a summons 
against me?  Do you claim anything here?  I will just kill you and no one 
is going to claim anything from me.  He found my son ... he wanted to beat 
the child.  I asked him why he hit him.  He turned on me and told me I 
want you, he pulled me against the barbed wire fence it cut me and then he 
kicked me.  He pushed me to the ground, held my neck and picked up a 
machete turned it and hit me with it.  After people cried out he let me go, I 
got up and went to the police station.  I was given officers to come with me 
and bring him and when we arrived we found him with the mwenyekiti wa 
kitongoji [local village leader] ...  The mwenyekiti said we had come to talk 
but since you [officers] have come you will have to go.  He was taken to 
the station. ... Before he went into custody he said I know the thief who 
stole from me and who caused me to fight with this woman. ... He pointed 
at my son. ... They arrested him, both were kept in custody.  The 
mwenyekiti said that since he is a student and they are relatives we ask 
that this matter does not go to court [word not clear] they will go to talk 
about it at home. ...   
The meeting was held, they talked and found that the child was not a thief. 
...  The elders said [to me] that your claim should proceed by summons. 
In questions from the tribunal members Furaha was asked whether she had gone 
anywhere else before making her complaint to the tribunal.  She replied: 
I started at home with the clan elders.  It was unsuccessful.  I brought it to 
the village office.  It was unsuccessful.  We took it again to the police 
station.  It was sent back to go to TAWLA ...  The clan elders asked, they 
said we will go and finish it at home.  The meeting was held.  That man 
[Godluck] disturbed it and refused. 
Furaha had also complained to her local balozi and mwenyekiti wa kitongoji (local 
community leaders - see 4.2 below) but all attempts to resolve the dispute had failed.  
Eventually the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji wrote to the WEO.  It was he who finally 
directed that the matter should go to the Ward Tribunal. 
Godluck did not attend any of the hearings, and the tribunal members therefore decided 
to hear the case in his absence.  Furaha was a woman without a husband or father to 
protect her.  Few of Furaha’s family members attended to support her in the 
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proceedings.  However, on the day that the tribunal conducted a site visit to her shamba, 
both her local mwenyekiti wa kitongoji and balozi were present and confirmed her claim 
to the land.  The Ward Tribunal gave judgment in Furaha’s favour: 
The first shamba: ‘... ni mali ya Mama [Furaha] aliyepewa na baba yake.  
(It’s the property of Mama Furaha who was given it by her father.) 
The second shamba: ‘... ni mali ya Mama [Furaha] pamoja na watoto 
wake shamba hili ni urithi kutoka kwa ... (marehemu) mume wanahaki ya 
kuridishiwa mara moja.’  (It’s the property of Mama Furaha together with 
her children this is the inheritance from the ... (deceased) husband they 
have the right to be given it back at once.) 
A blanket 
Like Furaha, Elizabeth’s experience of making a legal claim was beset with violence 
and intimidation from members of her own family.  When I met her she had already 
pursued a claim against her husband, Anaeli through the Ward Tribunal and DLHT 
without success.  After her case had failed in the land courts she went through the 
process of marriage conciliation and petitioned for divorce in the District Court.   
Elizabeth was the second of her husband’s three co-wives, married in accordance with 
Meru customary practice.  The land dispute concerned a family coffee shamba in a rural 
Meru village, which she claimed had been given to her by her husband Anaeli when she 
was married.  She described to me how the eldest son of her senior co-wife - ‘Michael’, 
who was also the local WEO, was now occupying the coffee shamba.  It was not 
disputed that Anaeli - by this time an old man - had allocated a portion of the coffee 
shamba to the eldest of Elizabeth’s sons – ‘Samwel’, who had built a house on it.  
Anaeli had also given each of his three wives shamba plots for growing maize. 
Elizabeth described years of marital problems and domestic violence:
165
 
The big problems were when he [Anaeli] started beating me until I lost, 
well, my teeth.  There was this time he began ... this day I went back to my 
[parents’] place.  I stayed for two years.  When I returned I found that he 
had chased away my sons but it wasn’t him.  He is telling his son 
[Michael] from the other [wife].  [Michael] called them [my sons] to his 
                                               
165 Translated from Kiswahili by Miriam Matinda and Helen Dancer.  Extracts from the original Kiswahili 
interview recording were transcribed by Cecilia Kimani.  See Appendix E for the original Kiswahili 
version. 
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place, yes, he called them to his place, he told them every day at six in the 
morning come.  He beat those children; he beat them until they left.  Then 
he beat those children with a faru.
166
  Every day at six in the morning he 
beat the children with that faru.  For example, this one [Samwel] has his 
house and now he [Michael] has destroyed the house that he [Samwel] 
built in those two acres and chased them away. 
She also stated that her husband had sold their cows and goats without her consent and 
killed her chickens.  Anaeli had sent church leaders and family elders to her parents’ 
home to bring about reconciliation, but on each occasion that she returned to her 
husband there were further problems.  On one occasion Elizabeth found herself arrested 
on the basis of a complaint made by Michael to the local police.  She was later released 
without charge and sent letters of complaint to the District Commissioner and the 
District Police Officer about the arrest but the problems continued.  Over the years she 
had sought help within the family, as well as from village and district officers, the 
police and the local social welfare office but with no long-term resolution.   
The Ward Tribunal rejected Elizabeth’s claim to the coffee shamba - apart from the 
small portion given to her own son, Samwel - and further rejected all her claims of 
harassment.  Elizabeth recalled that after the Ward Tribunal’s decision Michael, 
together with his own brothers invaded Elizabeth’s remaining maize shamba and 
planted masale (dracaena - boundary plants), thereby staking their claim to the land.  
She went on to describe the part that she believed Michael had played in the family 
conflict and her land claim: 
Now, this Michael is the elder son of the household, his father [Anaeli] 
told him this: “I am giving you my blanket167 as you are the elder son”.  
Then he [Michael] said now I am the elder son no one can complain.  He 
disturbed me until I went to complain to the tribunal, and when he went 
no one listened to me.  And that child, the thing is he was walking around 
with his father’s blanket and saying “I am the elder son, now I’m the 
ward executive officer, now what are you going to do?” 
Occupying twin positions of authority – as WEO and the elder son - Michael held 
seemingly unfettered power over the dispute in both the Ward Tribunal and at home.  
Elizabeth had no way of knowing or proving the extent to which the Ward Tribunal’s 
                                               
166 A piece of rubber used in beatings.  The word ‘faru’ refers to the rhinoceros tail that was once used to 
beat slaves and prisoners. 
167 A symbol of leadership within the family. 
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decision had been influenced by Michael as WEO.  However, his role in the family 
conflict more generally was noted by the marriage conciliatory board that was later 
convened in a different ward tribunal. 
On appeal the DLHT set aside the Ward Tribunal’s judgment but declined to give a 
substantive judgment of its own.  This was on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to 
decide questions of ownership of matrimonial property within a subsisting marriage.  
With no apparent legal remedy to gain access to the land, homeless and landless, 
Elizabeth decided to petition for divorce.  There were further attempts by family elders 
to reconcile the couple before Elizabeth’s claim finally progressed to the marriage 
conciliatory board.  Elizabeth went on to explain what she wanted to happen in the 
divorce case: 
Me the thing that I want to happen is for him to give me my right.  All 
those [years] I have lived in his house for all those years; he [should] give 
me my right.  If a person stays with a person as a worker won’t they get a 
salary?  
I asked Elizabeth to clarify how she wanted the court to divide the land:   
I want him to give me my right for all those years that I lived at his place.  
Now, when a person keeps involving you in cases instead of helping you.  
I want the costs for this case, and for caring for his children.  The court 
can help me to ask that man [Anaeli] to help me, all those years that I 
lived at his place and cared for the children, and where is his land?  They 
[the court] can ask him: Those children of this woman do you know what 
they eat?  What do they wear?  I want to have a share of that land.  Now 
those three women [wives], doesn’t each of them have their own [land]?  
Now the one that’s mine [i.e. the land], where will it go?  Isn’t it mine and 
my children’s?  My children where will they go?  I want my right, for all 
those years that I have lived at his place.  
Elizabeth very clearly based her claim to a share of her husband’s inherited family land 
on her contribution to the marriage as a wife who had brought up her husband’s 
children.  References to ‘his place’ and ‘his children’ in her account emphasise the 
patrilineal dimension of her claim, where both her own children and the land that she 
had cultivated would have been regarded as ultimately belonging to her husband’s 
lineage.  Elizabeth’s case also demonstrates the intergenerational nature of a dispute 
over family land.  Hers is a good example of how some land disputes arise between 
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younger family members with vested interests, who may influence - or even cause - the 
dispute but do not become parties to the legal claim themselves.  At the Ward Tribunal, 
both Elizabeth and Anaeli as the legal parties appeared relatively powerless actors in 
their own dispute, which intensified through the actions of Michael and his brothers 
physically staking their claims to the land through conflict, destruction and cultivation 
outside the legal forum.  The more unusual and extreme feature of Elizabeth’s case was 
that one of the third party actors also held a pivotal executive role as the local WEO, 
with supervisory power over the proceedings in the Ward Tribunal.   
Both Furaha and Elizabeth’s stories reveal the high stakes faced by many women who 
make legal claims to land.  For both women, acts of intimidation and violence had been 
ongoing but things escalated after they made their legal claims.  In Furaha’s case it was 
after she issued her legal claim that the worst acts of intimidation and violence occurred.  
Elizabeth was ousted from her remaining maize shamba.  As these and other women’s 
stories told in this thesis convey, violence, harassment, threats, malicious arrest, cursing 
and constructing barriers are all tactics used to intimidate and discourage women 
claimants – and those who support them - from pursuing their case in court.  Despite 
these risks, land courts have no jurisdiction to make non-molestation orders to protect 
those who make claims to land.   
4.2 The Ward Tribunal as a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ 
Furaha and Elizabeth’s experiences offer important insights into how women making 
legal claims must negotiate their position with Ward Tribunal actors effectively 
operating in a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ (Moore 1973: 720).  In Elizabeth’s case 
this is exemplified in the concentration of executive, legal and familial authority in the 
hands of Michael as WEO and head of the family.  This concentration of power served 
to thwart Elizabeth’s attempts to secure her land through her local Ward Tribunal.  For 
Furaha however, the actions of elders, local political leaders and tribunal members made 
it possible for her to successfully make and win her land claim despite the violence and 
intimidation she had suffered from her family guardian. 
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Peacemakers and gatekeepers 
Both women’s cases show that where claims occur between relatives considerable 
attempt is made to resolve the dispute within the family or community before 
proceeding to court.  In this way elders and community leaders effectively act as social 
gatekeepers to statutory fora.  Both claims follow similar trajectories – commencing 
with family elders before progressing to village officers, the police, district officials and 
NGOs.  This reflects conventional social pathways of dispute resolution and social 
norms which favour peaceful processes of mediation and reconciliation.  Going straight 
to court without the consent of certain key family members is strongly discouraged, as a 
number of scholars writing on African dispute settlement have noted elsewhere 
(Bohannan 1957, Gulliver 1963: 220-21, Lowy 1978, Griffiths 1997, Hirsch 1998:93, 
the WLSA series 1999-2000, Nyamu 2000, Nyamu-Musembi 2002, 2003, Tsanga 
2007:448-9, Magoke-Mhoja 2008, Henrysson and Joireman 2009). 
Gaining the support of key family and community actors as mediators or witnesses in a 
dispute often involves considerable expense.  One woman claimant recounted to me all 
the expenses she had incurred in bringing her claim to a family shamba.  The costs 
began when she had to cook food for everyone who attended an initial meeting at her 
home – some 35,000 Tsh.  At the village she paid the VEO money as a ‘thank you’ for 
the Village Land Council meeting.  She also gave the witnesses 60,000 Tsh as a thank 
you for their assistance in the proceedings.  This was in addition to the substantial costs 
incurred in Ward Tribunal fees (discussed in chapter 3).  Whilst some of these costs 
appear discretionary, others have the appearance of a bribe.  From the perspective of the 
woman claimant she had found them all to be necessary for pursuing her claim.  
Henrysson and Joireman describe a similar ‘monetisation’ of elders in their study of 
women’s property rights in Kisii, Kenya (2009).  The practice reflects not only the 
asymmetric power relations between the claimant, family elders and local officials, but 
also the importance of such actors for pursuing and winning a legal claim.  Such costs 
represent a significant obstacle to justice for the poorest litigants. 
Moore observes that the balozi’s role in dispute resolution varies between mediation, 
spectating and ‘arrogating decision-making powers to himself’ (Moore 1986: 165).  The 
balozi is the most local of political positions – an office which dates back to the mid-
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1960s when it was instituted by the ruling party – TANU ‘as a source of continuous 
political vigilance’ following an attempted coup in 1964 (Moore 1986: 372).  Each 
group of ten houses elects a balozi as leader of the ‘ten-cell’, with a range of 
administrative and dispute resolution duties.  At this very local level the balozi is able to 
acquire a detailed knowledge of the people living within the ten-cell and is a natural 
first port of call for many disputants.  That a local political figure is called upon to 
mediate in quite sensitive family issues blurs any divide between ‘public’ and ‘private’, 
‘political’ and ‘personal’ in the context of family and land matters.  Arguably, this has 
helped to maintain a level of party political social control within the local community.  
The balozi reports to the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji (chairperson of a locality within a 
village) or mwenyekiti wa mtaa (the urban equivalent - literally a ‘street chairperson’).  
He or she is elected by the citizens living within their kitongoji/mtaa and is expected to 
know every person by name and appearance.  One mwenyekiti wa kitongoji I came to 
know took me on walks around his kitongoji during the course of my fieldwork.  On the 
walks we exchanged personal greetings with every person we encountered walking past 
or working on the land.  He told me that he personally knew everyone and the 
boundaries of every plot within his kitongoji.  In the context of a small rural kitongoji, 
this did not seem unlikely since the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji – like the balozi is often 
called upon to be present at family dispute resolution and is generally made aware of 
dispositions of land within their area.   
The mwenyekiti wa kitongoji may also take on a more active role in the resolution of 
land disputes even after a claim has been issued in the Ward Tribunal.  The social 
importance of resolving disputes ‘at home’ (nyumbani) permeates the forum of the 
Ward Tribunal giving rise to dynamic negotiations between litigants, family elders, 
local political leaders and tribunal members on the direction of the dispute.  This can 
result in a collective favouring of disputes being sent home for settlement.  As one 
Arusha laigwenani (see chapter 2) explained to me, if there is a fight involving a person 
in his clan and the case is taken to court, his work is to convince people to take the case 
out of the court to find a solution at home.  In terms of power relations, one 
consequence of sending cases back home from the tribunal is to fortify the power of 
elders such as the laigwenani or mshili wa ukoo as authority figures within family 
kinship structures.   
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The power of family and political actors and norms that favour sending cases back 
home from the court is strengthened and encouraged by statute.  It is within the 
jurisdiction of the Ward Tribunal to ‘adjourn any proceedings relating to a dispute in 
which it is exercising jurisdiction if it thinks that by so doing a just and amicable 
settlement of the dispute may be reached’.168  The fact that statute positively encourages 
ward tribunals to send cases back home in this way directly challenges legal centralist 
models of law as an autonomous field from the social.  Rather, as Griffiths contends in 
her study of Kwena family disputes in Botswana, claims are pursued ‘in interconnected 
social and legal worlds’ (Griffiths 1997: 32, 2001). 
Sometimes a mwenyekiti wa kitongoji will attend a tribunal hearing as the local leader 
of the parties to a dispute and the matter will be sent away or adjourned for him or her 
to go and reconcile the parties.  In one case that I observed, the Ward Tribunal members 
explained to me that they had given permission for the matter to be solved at home for 
“utu” (humanity) because when the law is followed “ikaumiza” (it might hurt).  The 
woman claimant, whose farm had been trespassed upon by local herders grazing their 
cattle, had taken her claim to the tribunal after the respondents had failed to meet with 
the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji to resolve it.  Following service of witness summonses a 
clan elder went to the Ward Tribunal and asked for the case to go back home.  The elder 
brought one of the respondents to the woman’s home with a kilogram of sugar (seeking 
forgiveness) and 20,000 Tsh by way of compensation, but another respondent did not 
attend.  The mwenyekiti wa kitongoji asked for the case to go back home but the tribunal 
refused this request until the remaining respondent had been brought before them.  On 
the next occasion the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji brought the remaining respondent and 
asked for the case to be returned home.  Negotiating her position to keep the matter in 
court, the woman claimant asked that her file remain open at the tribunal stating 
“Siwaamini” (I don’t trust them).  The tribunal granted this request, gave a deadline for 
payment of compensation and the matter was adjourned once again, the mwenyekiti wa 
kitongoji being instructed to “Endelea weka amani” (Go and make peace).  Eventually 
the dispute was settled away from the tribunal to the woman’s satisfaction and the 
parties later returned to confirm that the matter had concluded. 
                                               
168 LDCA s.13(4). 
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In that case it appeared that by publicly delegating their mediatory role to the 
mwenyekiti wa kitongoji, the Ward Tribunal strengthened his authority to bring about 
reconciliation.  The tribunal members continued to flex their own authority by 
maintaining supervisory control over the process in two ways.  Firstly, they refused the 
matter to be dealt with at home without the respondents attending the tribunal; secondly, 
they kept a watch on the progress of dispute resolution through adjournments.  The 
woman claimant appeared to have more confidence that she would secure compensation 
through the Ward Tribunal having tried and failed with the assistance of the mwenyekiti 
wa kitongoji previously, and was therefore reluctant for the case to be sent back home 
unchecked.  Everyone else it seemed wanted to settle the dispute back home.   
The case illustrates how the outcome of dispute resolution ‘at home’ may be influenced 
by the Ward Tribunal acting as an accountability mechanism in the process.  Here, 
maintaining a degree of statutory supervision served to mediate the balance of power 
between social and political actors in a dispute that was sent home for settlement.  
Nader and other scholars (Singer 1979, Merry 1982, Abel 1982, Auerbach 1983, 
Hofrichter 1987) in their critiques of ADR, point to the way ‘harmony ideology’ is used 
coercively by more powerful actors in processes of ‘pacification’ (Nader 1993: 4).  
However, as Davidheiser argues, ‘mediation and conflict resolution processes can also 
be employed against social stratification [if problems of power and inequality are taken 
into account]’ (Davidheiser 2006: 294).   
When a claim is made to the Ward Tribunal the complexity of social relations between 
family, executive, political and legal actors may serve to modify or reinforce pre-
existing power relations between litigants, depending on how the tribunal handles the 
dispute.   In a case where violence or intimidation by a powerful actor is a feature there 
is a real risk that sending a case back home will serve to disempower an individual who 
has sought justice in a statutory forum.  More generally, I would contend that the very 
uncertainty surrounding the power dynamics of disputing means that tribunals should be 
most reluctant to favour returning a case home solely at the request of authority figures 
occupying more powerful positions within a family or community.  This course of 
action is likely to reinforce rather than redress social power inequalities and therefore be 
to the detriment of litigants with the least power in the wider social context of the 
dispute. 
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4.3 ADR, legal aid and ‘capacity-building’ 
Securing help from individuals and institutions, such as district officials and NGOs who 
are not embedded in the local community may represent an opportunity for claimants to 
renegotiate the social dynamics and normative framework of a dispute.  However, both 
district officials and NGO legal officers I interviewed commented that in many cases, 
by the time people come to see them the dispute has reached a stage where it may 
already be too late for them to effectively intervene.   
In Arusha’s district councils both district lawyers and land officers receive a steady 
stream of people seeking help despite the fact that they now have no official role in 
resolving individual land disputes unless a district council is itself a party.  One district 
land officer explained to me that nowadays they attempt to informally assist people who 
seek their help, particularly women: 
We do a kind of arbitration.  We talk to both sides and explain and try to 
solve the problem. ... Women come here when it’s too late, after they’ve 
done all the procedures and formalities of inheritance and probate.  They 
have decided that the deceased’s brother will supervise the properties of 
the late deceased.  They don’t supervise - they go further and take or sell 
it.  They come when it’s already in the name of another person or sold.  
They are not much aware of their rights from the beginning. ...  In that 
situation the only thing we can do is advise the person to go to court.  
Anything else and you may be wasting their time. ... On average two 
women a week come to see us.
169
   
Reconciliation has been an important part of the service of Tanzanian legal NGOs
170
  
since their legal aid clinics were established in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  As 
Kuenyehia writes, conciliatory approaches have enabled NGO legal aid clinics to gain 
social ‘acceptability’ with their clients (Kuenyehia 1990).  In the reconciliation 
appointments I observed at LHRC’s Arusha clinic, legal officers would listen to the 
parties’ accounts, controlling the dynamics of the discussion before putting forward 
their own opinion on what should be done.   In cases where the reconciliation was 
successful the legal officer would draft a memorandum of understanding which all the 
parties would then sign.  In the sessions that I observed the parties usually presented as 
                                               
169 Interview with Arusha Rural District Land Officer 6.1.10. 
170 These include Tanganyika Law Society (TLS), the Legal Aid Committee of the University of Dar es 
Salaam, WLAC, LHRC, TAWLA, TAMWA and NOLA. 
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very respectful towards the (generally young) legal officer, even if the disputants were 
significantly older and occupied a high social status within their own family and 
community.  This may be indicative of a reconfiguration of power relations within the 
confines of the legal aid clinic as a trained lawyer – with all the status that accompanies 
his or her position – takes control over the dynamics of the dispute.   
The legal officer’s position and his or her ability to shape the dynamics and outcome of 
the reconciliation carries the same potential for coercive ‘harmony ideology’ as 
reconciliation by family elders and community leaders ‘at home’.  However, legal 
officers as trained lawyers bring an alternative normative perspective to the dispute, 
which may result in a different outcome by comparison with a dispute which is 
mediated ‘at home’ on the basis of customary practices or religious norms.  In her 
ethnographic study of legal aid clinic reconciliations in Dar es Salaam, Bourdon (2009) 
observes that NGO lawyers not only invoke legal rights in reconciliations, but are 
prepared to go beyond the bounds of law blending legal, religious and customary 
notions of rights in order to arrive at what they consider to be a just conclusion.  In the 
case of child support claims for example, this approach will often tend to favour 
women, since NGO lawyers seek to arrive at an amount of maintenance on the basis of 
what they feel the father can and will pay, rather than simply what the law specifies 
(Bourdon 2009: 284-285).  Bourdon therefore contends that ‘dispute resolution within 
the NGOs has potentially transformative effects as NGO lawyers translate their notions 
of rights and gendered justice through their legal manoeuvres’ (2009: 234). 
As well as reconciliation, LHRC and TAWLA’s legal aid clinics in Arusha prepare their 
clients for court by offering free legal advice and document-drafting services (after 
payment of a nominal file opening fee).  According to legal officers at these clinics most 
of their clients in land disputes seek legal advice at the DLHT stage of a claim.  
Generally therefore, save for higher value land claims which commence at the level of 
DLHT, this is after the claim has been substantively determined in the Ward Tribunal 
and the judgment has been appealed or requires execution.  This is perhaps unsurprising 
given the social pathways to justice in family claims described above, and because 
advocates are themselves prohibited from appearing or acting for a party in the Ward 
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Tribunal.
171
  In Furaha’s case although she won her legal claim and Godluck did not 
appeal, in order to physically reclaim her land she had to apply to the DLHT in town for 
execution of the Ward Tribunal’s judgment.  After the time limit for an appeal had 
passed, the Ward Tribunal members advised Furaha to go to an NGO in town for 
assistance in pursuing her claim in the DLHT.
172
  Elizabeth sought advice from a legal 
NGO after her claim had failed in the Ward Tribunal.  The NGO drafted grounds of 
appeal to the DLHT, but her appeal was unsuccessful. 
Due to limited financial resources and a shortage of legal officers who are qualified to 
practise as advocates, legal aid NGOs do not usually represent their clients in court, 
save in the most exceptional cases.  During the period 2007-2009 just 14 of LHRC 
Arusha’s 7604 clients were represented by an advocate.  4 of these were land cases.173  
For the vast majority, ‘capacity-building’ (a phrase adopted by legal aid NGOs from 
development discourse) takes the form of document drafting and a ‘client coaching’ 
appointment in the legal aid clinic prior to a hearing date.  The aim of client coaching is 
to equip people with the skills and knowledge to represent themselves in court.  To 
supplement the advice that clients are given in their coaching appointment LHRC also 
produces ‘self-help kit’ booklets which give a basic practical guide to the law on 
various topics including giving evidence in court.   
For many people, the central urban location and presence of professional lawyers at the 
DLHT and higher courts is an intimidating prospect.  Knowing where to go for legal 
help often depends on the knowledge of family members or local leaders and their 
willingness to assist.  In my observation of legal aid clinic sessions, it was not unusual 
for women clients to be accompanied by a male family member or community leader, 
who would remain throughout their conference with the legal officer.  Clients may find 
it reassuring or helpful to have someone else present to assist them with their claim and 
provide moral support.  However, power dynamics between legal officer, client and 
those who accompany them to the clinic can have a significant impact on the client 
coaching process itself.  In the case of female clients this may also reinforce social 
                                               
171 LDCA s.18(1). 
172 Furaha issued her application to the DLHT and was waiting for a hearing date when I left Tanzania at 
the end of my fieldwork.  
173 LHRC Arusha Operational Plan Report 2007-2009. 
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norms that a guardian or eldest son should be present to represent her interests and/or 
speak on her behalf.   
During my observations of these sessions I noted that sometimes if a client was nervous 
or unused to speaking about her case much of the discussion would take place between 
the legal officer and the male family member who had accompanied her to the clinic.  
This occurred in Elizabeth’s client coaching session where much of the interaction 
happened between the legal officer and her brother whom she had brought with her.  
This was also a challenge that I experienced in conducting my own interviews where 
male family members were present (see appendix A for further discussion of this issue).  
In this scenario there is a risk that if the third party has a vested interest in the outcome 
of the case - for example a relative with their own interest in the land - he becomes 
privy to advice and discussions that he could use to his own advantage.   
I would argue that it is vital that both lawyers and researchers are sensitive to any 
potential vested interests and the pre-existing social power dynamics which are brought 
into a conference or interview, since these may serve to undermine a woman’s 
ownership of her legal claim.  If a lawyer (or researcher) takes the initiative for ensuring 
that an interview is conducted without third parties present they create a confidential 
space away from the vested interests of a person’s entourage and an opportunity for that 
person to engage directly in the discussion and thereby take greater ownership of their 
case (or story).  However, the very nature of power inequalities, social expectations and 
cultural differences (whether stemming from differences in nationality, class, age, race, 
gender, religion or tribe) means that this is something which is often much easier to say 
than to do in practice. 
4.4 Litigants in person and representation in the DLHT and High Court 
As a barrister in England and a researcher at the DLHT and High Court in Arusha, I 
have often been struck by the way in which court dress serves to overtly differentiate 
actors in legal proceedings.  Symbolically court dress confers authority on the legal 
establishment and aligns lawyers with judges and the state, rather than with the clients 
they represent.  This visual contrast between lawyers and laypersons is immediately 
apparent in the higher levels of Tanzanian court.  On most weekday mornings, the 
corridor outside the DLHT’s two hearing rooms in Arusha’s Regional Commissioner’s 
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building is crowded with advocates, litigants and their witnesses.  Advocates’ black 
suits, white shirts, waistcoats and ties or white collar bands are a sharp contrast to the 
red shuka (blanket) often worn by male elders, and brightly coloured kanga and kitenge 
fabrics worn by many women.  In Arusha’s High Court, located in a leafy part of 
Uzunguni, the cramped corridor outside the judges’ chambers presents a similarly 
distinctive social picture. 
As Furaha’s and Elizabeth’s cases illustrate, in the Ward Tribunal power relations and 
case outcomes are substantially affected by family, community and executive actors.  
Legal representation there is prohibited.
174
  The situation in the DLHT and higher courts 
is very different.  Legal professionals, technical legal procedures, Kiswahili and English 
predominate in the functioning of the court.  Accordingly, in these higher levels of 
court, legal actors, their status, professional knowledge and language serves to contest 
pre-existing social power relations between disputants and reconfigures the power 
dynamics of the dispute.  Applying Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1977), the 
institutional standing of the advocate and his or her ability to speak legal language 
represents discursive power in the presentation of a claim.  This has obvious 
consequences either for enhancing access to justice, or alternatively, amplifying social 
power inequalities where legal aid is unavailable for the poorest litigants. 
The right to legal representation, often recognised as a key feature of effective access to 
justice, is incorporated in the right to a fair hearing under Article 13(6)(a) of the 
Tanzanian Constitution.  This right has been held to include publicly funded 
representation for poor citizens prosecuted for serious or complex criminal matters.
175
  
However, in practice legal aid is only provided by the state in capital criminal cases 
(Peter 1997: 338).  There is no state-sponsored legal aid for civil matters.  There is 
reported to be a national shortage of advocates in Tanzania
176
 and pro bono or NGO-
funded legal representation in land courts is extremely limited.  Under these 
                                               
174 LDCA s.18 
175 Khasim Hamisi Manywele v Republic High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma, Criminal Appeal No. 39 of 
1990 (Unreported) (reproduced in Peter 1997: 348-370). 
176 As at December 2011 there were approximately 2,315 advocates in Tanzania [including deceased and 
retired advocates] with most being based in urban areas.  The number of advocates has increased 
significantly in the last two years.  603 of this total number were registered in 2011 alone.  Source: ‘CJ: 
Advocates are too few’ The Citizen (Tanzania) 15.12.11.  This recent increase is the result of efforts to 
reduce the administrative backlog of Law graduates who had been waiting for years to take the Bar 
examination, and the establishment of the new Law School of Tanzania. 
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circumstances client coaching and drafting legal documents for self-representation is 
currently the only practical way for (mostly foreign-funded) legal NGOs to assist a large 
number of poorer litigants to access justice in the higher courts.  Some advocates also 
offer a similar preparatory service for clients who may be unable to afford the full cost 
of representation in court.  For the majority of the poorest litigants however, the cost of 
representation by an advocate is prohibitively expensive.  Courage, determination and 
the support of family members or local leaders invariably proved necessary for them to 
pursue their claim unrepresented through the slow and uncertain court process. 
A ‘representation premium’?  
Many litigants I met during the course of my fieldwork were fearful of the court process 
and wanted an advocate to represent them in these higher courts.  Although there is a 
clear demand for representation in the higher courts from many litigants, there is a 
dearth of quantitative empirical research on the impact of legal representation in the 
Tanzanian court system.  Courts do not collect their own statistical data on this issue 
and court records and filing systems are not organised in a way that makes this type of 
research easy to conduct.  The role and value of legal representation as compared with 
legal help outside of court has come under close scrutiny in recent policy debates on 
legal aid as governments in a number of countries (particularly the U.K., U.S.A. and 
Australia) have sought to reduce their publicly funded legal aid budgets.  Findings of 
research on litigants in person and legal representation conducted in these countries are 
context-specific.  However, they may usefully inform debates on legal aid provision 
elsewhere.  This section surveys the recent policy-oriented literature and my own 
empirical research findings to reflect on the importance of legal representation for 
women’s access to justice in Tanzania. 
In a recent literature review of litigants in person conducted on behalf of the U.K. 
Ministry of Justice, Williams notes a general consensus across the majority of studies 
that lack of representation has an adverse impact on case outcomes, with lawyers 
obtaining significantly better results than unrepresented litigants (known as a 
‘representation premium’) across a range of case types (Genn and Genn 1989, Seron, 
Frankel et. al. 2001, Hannaford-Agor and Mott 2003, Law Council of Australia 2004, 
Genn and Gray 2005, Moorhead and Sefton 2005, Genn, Lever et. al. 2006, Lederman 
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and Hrung 2006, Citizens Advice 2009, Engler 2010, Sandefur 2011 – all cited in 
Williams 2011).   
As Williams notes, studies that argue the existence of a representation premium often 
explain it in terms of the skills and expertise that lawyers bring to a case (Williams 
2011: 6).  More specifically however, a recent study by Sandefur (2011), cited by 
Williams concluded that whilst representation has a powerful impact on case outcomes 
the difference in ‘win rates’ between lawyers and expert non-lawyers is much smaller.  
Sandefur’s suggestion is that procedural familiarity is key; therefore representation by 
lay experts may be as effective as lawyers in influencing case outcomes.  This 
conclusion also reflects findings in Genn and Genn’s 1989 landmark U.K. study (see 
Williams 2011: 7).  
The general consensus on a ‘representation premium’ is questioned by Adler (2008) in 
his research on the effect of representation on case outcomes in five different types of 
tribunal in the U.K.
177
  Adler acknowledges that complex cases benefit from 
representation, that those who were represented said that they valued this for a variety 
of reasons, and that a significant minority of those unrepresented said that they would 
have preferred to be represented.  However, his overall finding from the tribunals 
studied was that good pre-hearing advice was just as likely to achieve a favourable 
outcome as representation in the tribunal itself.  He suggests that this is due to the 
manner in which the tribunals studied perform their functions, adopting an inquisitorial 
as opposed to an adversarial approach - whether or not the parties are legally 
represented (Adler 2008: 25).  This principle contention raises some important 
questions concerning judicial approaches to doing justice - an issue explored further in 
chapter 5 of this thesis.   
A subsequent 2009 study by the British legal charity - Citizens Advice questions the 
degree to which the benefits of representation can be compensated in other ways.  The 
study considers the impact of legal representation and pre-hearing legal help by a legal 
charity - the Asylum Support Appeals Project (ASAP) on appellants’ success rates in 
                                               
177 Criminal Injury Compensation Appeals Panels, Employment Tribunals, Social Security Appeals 
Tribunals, Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunals (England), and Additional Support Needs 
Tribunals (Scotland).  Data collection comprised telephone interviews with 869 applicants/appellants at 
four tribunals and observation of 64 tribunal hearings (Adler 2008: 2). 
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asylum welfare support appeals to the Asylum Support Tribunal (AST).
178
  In common 
with many litigants in Tanzanian land courts, the majority of asylum support claimants 
in the AST are socially and economically vulnerable and as foreign nationals many face 
language barriers in making claims.  79% of appellants in oral appeal hearings 
participated through an interpreter appointed by the AST.   
The study found that the effect of representation on the success rate of the U.K. Border 
Agency (UKBA) as Respondent was relatively minor (appeals were dismissed in 51.8% 
of cases in which it did not appear, and 57.4% of cases in which it did).  The 
consequence of legal representation on the success rates of appellants however, was 
markedly different.  Whereas 71.3% of appellants who were represented at the 
hearing
179
 had their appeals allowed or remitted for a fresh decision,  just 38.6% of 
those who had received no legal advice or representation were successful - a 32.7% 
‘representation premium’.  In the 50 cases where both sides were represented, the 
appellant success rate was 70%.  This increased only slightly to 72.3% when appellants 
alone were represented, but fell significantly to 33.3% when only the UKBA was 
represented at the hearing.   
Significantly, appellants who had received a brief session of pre-hearing specialist legal 
advice from ASAP on the morning of the hearing but were not represented were no 
more successful than appellants who had had no legal advice or representation 
(34.8%).
180
  The findings suggest that even in tribunals which do not adopt as formal or 
adversarial an approach as some other types of court, for litigants faced with cultural 
and language barriers, legal representation at oral hearings makes a substantial 
difference to their prospects of success and limited pre-hearing legal advice is not an 
equally effective substitute. 
                                               
178 Findings were based on an examination of the AST reasons statement in all 616 appeals lodged 
between October 2008 and March 2009 that proceeded to hearing or decision on the papers.  Of this total 
number 477 were oral appeals and 139 were paper appeals.  In oral appeals appellants were represented in 
24% of cases and UKBA as Respondent in 41% of cases.  Appellants may opt to decide to have their 
appeal decided on the papers only.  Of the 139 paper-only appeals 42.5% were allowed.  The study does 
not indicate the percentage of paper-only appellants who had received legal advice in preparing their 
appeal. 
179 In all but two cases the legal representative was from ASAP. 
180 The report author states that ‘in deciding which appeals it will provide representation at the hearing, 
the ASAP does exercise a degree of selection, on merit.  But there is no reason to believe that this limited 
degree of selection accounts for all – or even much – of the substantial representation premium ...’ 
(Citizens Advice 2009: 11).  
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The findings of these various studies are not directly comparable with the Tanzanian 
context where the legal issues, litigants’ backgrounds, language use and legal culture are 
often very different.  However, the general conclusions of the studies on the reasons for 
existence of a ‘representation premium’ serve as a useful point of departure for an 
analysis of how advocates may transform or entrench pre-existing social power relations 
between disputants when claims are reconfigured in the higher levels of court.  The 
following sections consider two important issues I identified during the course of my 
fieldwork upon which lawyers’ skills and expertise and procedural familiarity with 
tribunal functioning can affect agency and power relations – legal language and literacy, 
and technicalities and delay. 
Legal language and literacy 
In Tanzania literacy rates vary widely between generations and between urban and rural 
locations, but are lowest amongst older women.
181
  In my ward tribunal study high 
levels of illiteracy were observable in Upper Arusha and Arusha Plains ward tribunals 
where many litigants and witnesses thumb-printed the secretary’s note of their evidence.  
In contrast, at Arusha Urban, Meru Town and Meru Rural tribunals litigants more often 
used a signature.  Whereas most litigants in Adler’s study would have spoken the 
language of the court as their first language, in Tanzania vernacular languages are 
widespread and the national language of Kiswahili is not universally spoken or 
understood.  English is the official language of the Tanzanian higher courts, but it is 
generally only spoken well by Tanzanians who have received a Form IV education.
182
 
Mertz argues that legal language is ‘a crucial crossroads where social power and 
language interact’ (Mertz 1994: 441, see also Wanitzek 2002: 6).  In the context of 
Tanzania’s land courts there is considerable awkwardness in the use of multiple 
languages throughout the system and an evident tension between the exigency to use 
English in a Commonwealth ‘common law’ legal system and the reality of the 
                                               
181 The last Tanzanian population census in 2002 reported overall literacy rates of 72.5% (80% men, 
66.1% women).  Literacy rates amongst persons aged over 65 were 27.8% (42.9% men, 13.8% women).  
This compared with 78.4% amongst 15-24 year olds (80.9% men, 76.2% women).  There were also 
significant variations in literacy rates across the 5 districts within Arusha region.  The regional average 
was 67% (70% men, 63% women).  The highest was Arusha municipality: 91% (92% men, 89% women) 
followed by Arumeru: 72% (75% men, 70% women) and Karatu: 64% (66% men, 61% women).  These 
contrasted sharply with the predominantly Maasai pastoralist districts of Monduli: 39% (45% men, 34% 
women) and Ngorongoro: 27% (34% men, 21% women) (National Bureau of Statistics 2004). 
182 Equivalent to GCSE in England and Wales. 
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languages spoken by the population at large.  That tension is clearly seen through the 
hierarchy of the legal system and reveals much about where a particular level of court is 
culturally situated and the actors that dominate it.   
In the Village Land Council and Ward Tribunal, where tribunal members are lay 
adjudicators and representation by advocates is prohibited, social power associated with 
literacy and language use does not generally represent a significant barrier to justice.  
There are no application forms for claimants to complete, and the secretary will 
generally write out a person’s claim if they are unable to do it themselves.  Both Furaha 
and Elizabeth spoke their vernacular languages as their first language, a broken 
Kiswahili and no English.  Although Kiswahili is the official language of the Ward 
Tribunal and litigants and witnesses are encouraged to speak it wherever possible, in 
rural areas tribunal members generally speak the vernacular language of the 
communities they serve and there is considerable mixing of Kiswahili and vernacular 
languages in courtroom discourse and general conversation.  If evidence is given in a 
vernacular language the tribunal secretary will simultaneously translate it into Kiswahili 
for the purpose of the court record. 
In the DLHT, where advocates are permitted to appear, both Kiswahili and English are 
recognised as official languages; however, English is specified as the language of the 
court record.
183
  In practice, where one or more parties in a case are unrepresented, legal 
actors continuously negotiate the language divide between Kiswahili and English.  
Litigants in person can conduct the entirety of their case in Kiswahili including their 
written pleadings.  In contrast advocates and NGOs will generally draft their clients’ 
documents in English and some represented parties will see much of their case 
presented to the tribunal in English.  Lawyers then advise their mystified clients about 
what took place after the hearing.  Ironically, this effectively excludes a non-English 
speaking represented litigant from full participation in their case.  This creates what 
Wanitzek describes as an ‘asymmetrical discourse between court officials and parties’ 
(Wanitzek 2002: 7).   
Whatever the spoken language used in court, both the court record and judgments in the 
DLHT are written in English.  This presents practical challenges both for DLHT 
                                               
183 LDCA s.32. 
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chairpersons, who must simultaneously translate evidence into English, and for litigants, 
who upon reading the court record will find their own words interpreted into another 
language they may not understand.  The practice represents a change from the 
Customary Land Appeals Tribunal where, as High Court Land Division Judge Hon. 
Ngwala told me, judgments had previously been written in Kiswahili.  In terms of 
access to justice this appears to be a backward step.  As some ward tribunal members 
also commented to me, this was unhelpful for them as non-English speakers seeking to 
understand why a judgment they had given had been upheld or set aside on appeal. 
In the High Court and Court of Appeal the dominant language of the legal establishment 
is English.  Advocates and judges speak English, although this is usually their second 
language after Kiswahili.  I observed High Court judges to be flexible in using Kiswahili 
in cases involving litigants in person, but there was an overriding expectation that 
English would be spoken whenever possible.  Some advocates struggle to speak good 
English and the quality of English in pleadings drafted by lawyers varies considerably.   
There is a lack of qualified interpreters in Tanzania’s higher courts.  In wards where 
vernacular languages are widely spoken tribunal members from those wards are able to 
converse with litigants directly in the local language.  However, when the DLHT and 
High Court is faced with a non-Kiswahili speaker anyone present in court and 
conversant in the vernacular language may be asked to interpret.  This is also the 
practice in the ordinary court system where, as Principal District Magistrate 
Mwakajinga notes, courts place great reliance on the trustworthiness of assistant 
registrars or lay persons to act as translators, not to mislead the court or serve their own 
interests (Mwakajinga 2002: 234).  In a court system that is chronically short of funds 
lay translation may be the only practical solution, but it is an unreliable method for 
ensuring that translation is done as accurately and impartially as possible.  As such there 
is a pressing need for independent, qualified vernacular interpreters at these levels of 
court, not just to translate evidence, but to ensure that litigants are able to follow 
courtroom discourse that is conducted in English between lawyers and adjudicators.   
Socio-linguistic research on courtroom discourse can offer some insights into how the 
language of legal representatives can affect case outcomes.  Whilst some litigants in 
person in Arusha’s land courts presented as quite knowledgeable and confident and 
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appeared to be able to articulate their claims quite clearly, many struggled under 
pressure to forward their case by failing to provide evidence or arguments addressing 
the legal issues.  In their 1980s sociolinguistic study of courtroom discourse Conley and 
O’Barr observe that legal discourse tends to be ‘rule-oriented’.  Claims presented in this 
way are based on specific rules, duties and obligations; events are presented 
sequentially, cause and effect and responsible agents are identified, and evidence 
addresses directly the specific legal rule in question (Conley and O’Barr 2005: 67).  By 
contrast, ‘relational accounts’, which are more common amongst laypersons, 
particularly women, tend to be based on general rules of social conduct, personal status 
and social position; they are often non-sequential and rich in life details that the law 
usually deems irrelevant (2005: 68).   
Furaha’s evidence is an example of a relational account.  A rule-oriented version might 
have begun with an explanation of the basis upon which she claimed the shambas 
according to customary practices of land acquisition.  She might then have elaborated 
on the processes and people involved in allocating the land, supporting her account with 
oral evidence or written documentation such as family meeting minutes from other 
witnesses to the acquisition.  Taking events in chronological order she might then have 
identified the specific incidents when she was denied access to the land and how it was 
sold by Godluck without her consent.   
In contrast to adjudicators in the higher courts, ward tribunal members as laypersons are 
not legally trained to prefer evidence presented in a rule-oriented way.  However, in fora 
where adjudicators are legally qualified - and therefore trained in rule-oriented 
approaches to presentation and problem-solving - the court has to work much harder to 
effectively reconstruct the relational account within the rule-oriented legal framework it 
is used to working within.  A busy court may not have the time or patience to do this.  It 
follows that a litigant who cannot construct or express their claim in this way is at a 
natural disadvantage.  This is particularly the case where the party they face is 
represented by an articulate and methodical advocate.  Issues of evidence gathering, 
judicial approaches to doing justice and linguistic differences in litigants’ speech are 
explored in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6. 
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Technicalities and delay 
There is a widely held belief amongst Tanzanian legal professionals that the court 
system is flexible in accommodating litigants who cannot read or write, are unaware of 
their legal rights or unable to speak the official language of the court.  As one Arusha 
DLHT chairperson comments in this judgment on an appeal from the ward: 
I’ve perused the records from this file and observed that, it is true that the 
appellant had initiated his appeal by way of a letter.  I can admit that this 
style is not strange on our District Land and Housing Tribunals where 
our major clients are ordinary people, mostly illiterate and generally 
(laymen) who are “wakulima toka vijijini” [village farmers/peasants] and 
who most of them have no capacity even to hire an advocate. These 
people are strangers to the legal procedures, format and language of the 
court.  That is why our legislation is a bit humble towards them. Our 
tribunals are not strictly driven by legal technicalities and format, our 
concern is the “CONTENTS”184 of the document filled and the 
determination of the suit to the “MERITS”... 
In my observations and archival research in the DLHT I noted several examples of cases 
similar to this where the court had appeared to make allowance in favour of litigants in 
person who had, for example, filed an appeal out of time or otherwise than in 
accordance with the correct legal procedure.  Courts are often cautious of dismissing 
cases where the social consequences may be serious and a party has failed to attend 
without explanation.  Moreover, where a preliminary objection is made on a point of 
law, or other legal issues arise, the DLHT and High Court will often adjourn a case and 
permit parties to file written submissions on legal arguments.   
When Elizabeth came to petition for divorce in the District Court her husband raised a 
preliminary objection that the parties had never been lawfully married.  Neither of the 
parties was represented and the matter was adjourned for both parties to file written 
submissions on the objection.  Although Elizabeth was not represented in court the legal 
aid clinic which she attended prepared a written submission on her behalf in response to 
her husband’s.  I was later informed that her husband’s preliminary objection was 
rejected and the divorce petition was allowed to proceed.  This was just one of a number 
of cases I encountered where litigants in person had been able to overcome a technical 
                                               
184 Capitalisation in the original. 
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legal point through use of a written submission drafted by an NGO legal officer.  What 
was so striking about Elizabeth’s case was her determination in pursuing her claim 
through a significant number of family, community, executive and legal dispute 
resolution fora without giving up.  By the time she was faced with the preliminary 
objection in the District Court, she had already unsuccessfully pursued her claim 
through two levels of land court and a marriage conciliatory board.  Other claimants in a 
similar position may well have given up. 
Despite the fact that courts do make allowances for litigants in person, arguably 
advocates and adjudicators do not take a robust enough approach to ensuring that cases 
are also progressed efficiently without undue delay and avoiding taking unnecessary 
and irrelevant technical points.  Advocates, with their knowledge of the law, often 
favour legal technicalities as an efficient way of disposing of a case without substantive 
determination.  Adjournments are frequently requested by advocates and savvy litigants 
in order to make technical legal arguments.  This may well be justified – and ultimately 
shorten the case - particularly in situations where repeated claims are made between the 
same parties on issues that have already been finally determined elsewhere (res 
judicata) or claims brought outside the statutory limitation period.  Advocates also often 
seek adjournments for professional reasons, for example that the advocate is 
representing another client in the High Court at the same time.
185
  Where both parties 
are represented but an advocate is absent, there is a culture amongst the small 
community of Arusha’s advocates of ‘holding the brief’ of the other advocate and 
requesting an adjournment on their behalf.  This contrasts with the position in England 
for example, where if the regularly instructed lawyer is unavailable the case will be 
passed to a colleague to ensure that the client is fully represented in their absence.  The 
Tanzanian practice must be understood against the backdrop of a shortage of advocates 
in Tanzania, with many advocates operating as sole practitioners.  However, seen from 
the perspective of the litigant, it is the advocate who is responsible for delaying their 
case. 
One extreme example of technicalities and delay I noted was a DLHT claim brought by 
a sibling group against the administrator of their deceased mother’s estate.  Both sides 
                                               
185 The DLHT Regulations stipulate ‘... the Tribunal shall not believe any other evidence as a proof for [a 
party’s advocate] being in the superior courts other than by producing summons to the advocate and cause 
list from such courts’ (para. 13(3)).  
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were represented by advocates and the evidence did not commence until some 20 
months after the claim was issued.  In the intervening period there were over 40 
adjournments with preliminary objections made and subsequently abandoned, and 
numerous letters on file from advocates asking for adjournments due to professional 
commitments, weddings and sickness.  Ultimately, it is within the power of the 
chairperson hearing the case to manage it in order to avoid undue delay.
186
  However, in 
practice courts often adopt a fairly lenient approach to requests for adjournments.  
Twaib, writing on the Tanzanian legal profession found in a random survey of 
adjournments in two of Dar es Salaam’s Resident Magistrates’ Courts (date not 
specified) that both advocates and magistrates were responsible for a large number of 
court delays (Twaib 2001: 64-72).  As well as delaying justice for individual litigants, 
this contributes to the systemic backlog of cases in the higher courts. 
Adjournments are regularly granted to litigants and advocates who then pursue 
technicalities devoid of any real legal merit.  In these cases adjournments often appear 
to be sought precisely to invite delay, perhaps in the hope that the other side will be 
forced to concede the case or simply give up.  It is widely recognised that in the 
Tanzanian legal system as a whole courts are often complicit in delaying cases upon 
payment of a bribe (rushwa).  Litigants and lawyers I met in Arusha had many stories of 
litigants, lawyers, adjudicators and administrators in various levels of court, known or 
suspected to be involved in bribing activities.  This included instances where court files 
had gone ‘missing’ and had subsequently been ‘found’ upon payment of a bribe.  
‘Corruption’187 is officially acknowledged to be an entrenched feature of Tanzanian 
society and the justice system.
188
  In the case of court staff and adjudicators - 
particularly magistrates - this is in part a symptom of the low salaries they receive.  
From the perspective of litigants, corruption in the court system represents a kind of 
institutional power that they must either buy into or resist in order to successfully make 
                                               
186 DLHT Regulations provide: ‘Where a party’s advocate is absent for two consecutive dates without 
good cause and there is no proof that such advocate is in the High Court or Court of Appeal, the Tribunal 
may require the party to proceed himself and if he refuses without good cause to lead the evidence to 
establish his case, the Tribunal may make an order that the application be dismissed or make such other 
orders as may be appropriate’ (para. 13(2)). 
187 ‘Corruption’ is a criminal offence in Tanzania under the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act 
(Act No. 11 of 2007). 
188 The Warioba Report on Corruption (URT 1996a) concluded that corruption had become endemic in 
Tanzanian society.  A Transparency International Report (2009) positioned the Tanzanian judiciary at 4th 
on the list of the most corrupt public institutions in East Africa. 
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a claim.  Both of these approaches require agency – whether deriving from social 
position, knowledge and expertise or simply money to buy influence.  In this light, it is 
clear why so many poor litigants have little faith in the court system to deliver justice 
and equally, why in the higher levels of court so many express a wish to be represented 
by an advocate. 
Paralegals and the power of attorney 
Given the limited availability of legal aid for representation in Tanzania one potential 
solution for litigants in person who cannot afford an advocate lies in representation by 
paralegals – laypersons trained to advise and assist parties in legal disputes, whether by 
providing basic legal advice, legal literacy training, mediation services or assistance in 
preparing for court.  Elsewhere in Africa, most notably South Africa and Sierra Leone, 
paralegals have become an integral part of national systems of access to justice.  In the 
case of Sierra Leone, it is reported that community-based paralegals trained by the NGO 
- Timap for Justice have proved popular with communities in their approach to dispute 
resolution based on principles of reconciliation (Open Society Justice Initiative 2010, 
Harper 2011a: 64-66).   
Paralegals have been on the policy agenda in Tanzania for a number of years.  In 1996 
the High-Level Task Force Report on the Tanzanian Legal Sector (‘the Bomani Report’) 
drew attention to limitations in access to justice and legal services for the majority of 
Tanzanian citizens and a legal system undermined by corruption and delay (URT 
1996b).  The Tanzanian government adopted the Report and subsequently established 
the Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) Medium Term Strategy (MTS) with its 
aspiration and vision of ‘Timely Justice for All’ to implement the Report’s 
recommendations.  It included provision for Civil Society Organisations/NGOs to be 
brought within the implementation framework and supported in providing legal aid, 
training paralegals and delivering legal literacy programmes. Despite some 
achievements, the 2008 Review of the LRSP noted that: ‘the dearth of resources sapped 
the implementation of MTS in the early phase’ (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs 2008: 3) and found there had been limited progress in improving access to 
justice for the poor and disadvantaged (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
2008: 83).  
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Tanzanian legal NGOs (notably WLAC and LHRC) have been engaged in nationwide 
programmes to establish independent paralegal units in local communities; however, 
paralegal services have yet to reach most communities.  There is one small paralegal 
unit in Arusha Urban – Arusha Women’s Legal Aid and Human Rights Centre 
(AWLAHURIC) – initiated by WLAC.  In its 2007 annual report ‘Access to Justice 
through Paralegal Work’ WLAC notes that despite achievements of paralegal workers 
their role continues to receive limited recognition both in the court system and society 
generally (WLAC 2007).  Recent research by Diehl with paralegals in Morogoro region 
similarly concludes that the influence of paralegals against major problems within the 
justice sector is low and requires links with more powerful organisations and lawyers 
(Diehl 2009). 
In terms of assisting parties in court, one of the biggest challenges paralegals have faced 
is a lack of support from the legal establishment itself.  Twaib notes that the Tanganyika 
Law Society (TLS) initially opposed the introduction of paralegals out of concern to 
maintain professional standards (Twaib 2001: 144).  Legislation which enables 
paralegals (and other persons) to act for parties in courts above primary courts under a 
power of attorney has been on the statute book since 1966.
 189
  However, this right has 
been interpreted differently by the Court of Appeal and the High Court.  In the 1980 
Court of Appeal case of Naiman Moiro v Nailejiet K.J. Zablon Nyalali C.J. said obiter 
‘I am not aware of any provision of law permitting the conduct of a case by a person 
holding the power of attorney where the party concerned is also present in court’.190  
This appeared to limit representation by power of attorney to circumstances where the 
litigant was physically absent from the court.  Subsequently however, the activist judge 
Justice Mwalusanya in the unreported 1988 High Court case of National Bank of 
Commerce v Vitalis Ayemba held that since the law must be taken to intend what is 
                                               
189 Civil Procedure Code Act No. 49 of 1966, Order 3.  Rule 1 provides: ‘Any appearance by a party to a 
suit may be made or done by a party in person or by his recognised agent or by an advocate, duly 
appointed to act on his behalf’.  Rule 2 provides inter alia ‘The recognised agents of parties by whom 
such appearances, applications and acts may be made or done are (a) persons holding powers of attorney, 
authorising them to make and do such appearances, applications and acts on behalf of such parties’ (see 
Peter 1997: 340). 
190 [1980] TLR 274. 
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reasonable there was ‘no basis for treating them [i.e. a lawyer and a recognised agent 
holding power of attorney] differently because they perform the same role’.191  
As Peter argues, the decision in National Bank of Commerce suggests that at High Court 
level a recognised agent holding power of attorney may appear for a party who is also 
present in court.  As he further observes however, this is an unpopular view amongst 
many advocates who ‘jealously guard their profession and would do anything in their 
power to maintain a monopoly over it’ (Peter 1997: 341).  Despite the potential for 
trained specialist paralegals to play an important role in facilitating access to justice for 
the poor, their impact on representation in Tanzania has been very limited.  During the 
course of my fieldwork I did not become aware of any instances of paralegals acting 
under a power of attorney in Arusha’s land courts. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The act of making a legal claim may be understood as a moment of agency and - in the 
case of women like Furaha and Elizabeth - resistance against violence and the alienation 
of land.  However, as these women’s stories show, the progression of women’s claims 
often depends on the support of other pivotal actors.  In Arusha’s local communities it is 
family elders and local leaders such as the balozi and mwenyekiti wa kitongoji who 
women will often turn to in the first instance to resolve a dispute over land.  This 
reflects the socially embedded nature of pathways to justice.  It also highlights the 
importance of legal awareness programmes for these key actors as well as women 
themselves, in order that they may facilitate women’s access to justice by using their 
existing social status to open pathways.  In this way, as Koda argues, men become 
‘allies in feminist struggles’ (Koda 2000). 
The social and political power of these pivotal actors permeates the legal sphere of the 
Ward Tribunal, where legal and executive personnel may become part of the social 
power dynamics of a dispute.  Power relations between these actors are manifested in 
different ways as the dispute progresses.  In some cases – such as Furaha’s – these 
power relations can actively assist women who seek justice in local courts.  Without her 
local community leaders Furaha’s claim would have lacked sufficient supporting 
                                               
191 High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Case No. 37 of 1988 (Unreported) – reprinted in Peter 
(1997: 374-376). 
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evidence.  For others – such as Elizabeth – a concentration of power in the hands of an 
adversary can serve to thwart a woman’s claim.  These local power dynamics are 
founded on personal relations between institutional actors involved in a particular 
dispute.  This suggests that agendas for improving access to justice in local courts need 
to start from the basis of addressing the impact of local power relations on legal 
processes of disputing.   
In terms of structure, one way to reduce the concentration of executive power over ward 
tribunals would be to locate all levels of land court in the judicial branch of government 
– a proposal that was advocated by the Shivji Commission (URT 1994: 198).  Secondly, 
in terms of process, the social and legal culture of reconciliation and mediation, which 
can result in sending cases back home for settlement, needs to take into account the 
potentially disempowering consequences wherever social power inequalities exist 
between the actors involved.  Thirdly, the lack of funding for ward tribunals has 
resulted in tribunal members charging disputants high fees to hear their claims.  This 
increases the risk of members being susceptible to accepting bribes from those who can 
afford it.  The obvious solution to this problem is to regulate tribunal fees and 
remunerate members for their work.  However, it was claimed by district council 
officials I interviewed that the district councils lacked funds to do this. 
At the higher levels of court social power relations may shift according to litigants’ 
abilities to negotiate a very different institutional framework.  As fora which are socially 
disembedded from litigants’ local communities, this may represent an opportunity for 
securing justice – particularly where local actors have obstructed claims.   However, 
where litigants lack the skills, knowledge, language or procedural familiarity, these 
courts appear quite inaccessible.  In terms of power relations, legal professionals (both 
lawyers and adjudicators) possess these skills and knowledge.  Their institutional 
standing means that collectively they rule the roost in these higher levels of court.  They 
therefore have the capacity to reconfigure the power dynamics of disputing between 
parties within the court forum.  This can be transformative for those litigants who have 
very limited power within their own social sphere.  Hence, the act of engaging the 
services of an advocate is another moment of agency in the progression of a dispute.  In 
practice however, the cost of hiring an advocate and the limited availability of pro bono 
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representation means that often social power inequalities become amplified, because 
representation is generally only available to those who can afford to pay for it. 
Legal NGOs have taken a number of steps to try to make these higher courts more 
accessible to litigants in person.  NGO legal officers will also often try to avoid disputes 
going to court by offering reconciliation services at their legal aid clinics.  This is 
another effective way in which lawyers can use their social standing and legal expertise 
to affect the social power dynamics, normative framework and outcome of a dispute.  
Where disputes do progress to the higher courts, adjudicators will often adopt a flexible 
approach to the use of the official language of the court and make allowances for 
litigants’ lack of technical legal knowledge.  Adjourning a case to deal with points of 
law by way of written submission gives litigants in person the chance to present their 
legal arguments in writing and have them drafted by someone with legal knowledge.  In 
practice however, the quality of these documents varies considerably and litigants may 
not fully understand their contents.   
In order to overcome the problems of a shortage of advocates and funds for legal 
representation, NGOs provide client coaching appointments to enable litigants in person 
to represent themselves.  This can be effective for those litigants who have the 
confidence, language skills and general knowledge to be able to express themselves in a 
way that persuades the court.  However, it cannot be claimed that a client coaching 
appointment is an effective substitute for legal representation for litigants who do not 
already possess many of these skills.  Hence, for as long as the practice of higher courts 
is structured to reflect the language, skills and expertise of legal professionals, there will 
remain a pressing need for representation under legal aid schemes and independent 
interpreters to ensure that all litigants are able to fully understand and effectively 
participate in the court process. 
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5.  Doing justice in women’s claims: 
Haki and ‘equal rights’ 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter explores the process of justice and decision-making by land tribunals in 
practice.  The Tanzanian notion of justice – or ‘haki’ has evolved as a powerful social 
discourse that is closely associated with freedom and rights – both of the nation and the 
individual.  In order to contextualise legal approaches to doing justice in women’s 
claims, the chapter begins with an overview of the origins of this contemporary idea of 
justice.  In the Tanzanian legal context, normative ideas of justice also include notions 
of reconciliation and ‘natural justice’.  These concepts are reinforced through 
constitutional and statutory frameworks, which further inform adjudicators’ approaches 
to evidence-gathering and judging claims.  Using a sample of eleven cases from the 
Ward Tribunal and DLHT collected during my fieldwork, the chapter explores how 
adjudicators operating within these complex normative and procedural frameworks are 
determining women’s claims to land in practice.   
Summaries of each of the eleven cases are set out as case reports in Appendix F of this 
thesis.  The sample is small and is not purported to be necessarily a representative 
reflection of the way women’s legal claims to land are judged more generally.  
Nevertheless, important themes and practices are clearly evident in the judgments.  In 
the context of wider fieldwork data and other case analyses in the thesis, the judgments 
offer insights into the normative and procedural underpinnings of legal decision-making 
in women’s claims.  It is argued that, whilst it appears that social practices and judicial 
attitudes to female land-holding are evolving with current rights discourse, the 
judgments reveal a disconnect between these developments and an implicit male bias in 
the gathering and assessment of evidence.  It is therefore contended that the tension 
between local patrilineal customary practices and the principle of equal rights (haki 
sawa) has yet to be fully resolved in the context of women’s legal claims to land. 
5.1 Haki and ‘natural justice’ 
The power of the contemporary Tanzanian discourse of haki finds its roots both in the 
nation’s history as an African state that was politically transformed under President 
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Nyerere, and in the more recent decades of grassroots and civil society campaigning on 
rights issues.  As a moral discourse, it was powerfully expressed in Nyerere’s ‘Uhuru 
na Maendeleo’ (Freedom and Development) (Nyerere 1973): 
... For what do we mean when we talk of freedom?  First, there is 
national freedom; that is, the ability of the citizens of Tanzania to 
determine their own future, and to govern themselves without 
interference from non-Tanzanians.  Second, there is freedom from 
hunger, disease, and poverty.  And third, there is personal freedom for 
the individual; that is, his right to live in dignity and equality with all 
others,
192
 his right to freedom of speech, freedom to participate in the 
making of all decisions which affect his life, and freedom from arbitrary 
arrest because he happens to annoy someone in authority – and so on.  
All these things are aspects of freedom, and the citizens of Tanzania 
cannot be said to be truly free until all of them are assured. ...                            
In Tanzania today, haki is a widespread political and popular discourse.  For example, it 
has been incorporated into the names of several civil society rights organisations – 
Haki-Ardhi, Haki-Elimu, Haki-Kazi and Haki-Madini – campaigning on land, 
education, workers’ and mineral rights respectively.  Kiswahili sayings, such as ‘Haki 
zetu leo’ (Our rights today) are seen printed on women’s kangas.  In 2001 ‘Haki’ was 
the title of the hit song by ‘Bongo Flava’ (Tanzanian Hip-Hop) artist – Joseph Mbilinyi 
(‘Sugu’), who, in the 2010 elections, was elected to the Tanzanian Parliament as an MP 
with the leading opposition party CHADEMA (Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo). 
According to Geertz and Hirsch the socio-linguistic origins of haki lie in the Arabic 
term haqq, which in Muslim ideology has three closely related meanings.  The first 
corresponds to ‘reality, truth, actuality, fact, God’; the second to ‘right, duty, claim, 
obligation’; and the third to ‘fair, valid, proper’ (Geertz 1983: 188, Hirsch 1998: 85).  In 
the Tanzanian legal context, the Kiswahili term ‘haki’ has its own usage independent of 
Islamic law; for example: ‘haki za binadamu’ (human rights); ‘haki sawa’ (equal 
rights); ‘nataka haki zangu’ (I want my rights); ‘ana haki’ (he/she has a/the right); 
‘naomba haki itendeke’ (I ask that justice be done).  Part of the socio-linguistic 
significance of haki in the Tanzanian legal context has been its capacity to cut across 
differences between local vernacular jural norms (discussed below), thereby integrating 
                                               
192 ‘yaani haki yake ya kuishi, akiheshimika sawa na wengine wote’ (Original Kiswahili version of 
Nyerere’s speech - bold type is my emphasis). 
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Tanzanian and Kiswahili notions of ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ throughout the country’s 
statutory legal system. 
African and English concepts of ‘natural justice’ 
An important legacy of Tanzania’s social and political history is the complexity of 
normative frameworks for doing justice in its plural legal system.  In addition to haki, 
there are local African norms of reconciliation, which reflect the social values and 
approaches to dispute resolution of local communities.  As the first anthropologist to 
study disputes in an African colonial court, Gluckman argued that the approach to 
dispute settlement of Barotse judges, rooted in the social context of cooperation 
between kinsmen, amounted to an African notion of ‘natural justice’: ‘It is in this 
process of achieving reconciliation, while abiding by the law, that I believe we can see 
most clearly the doctrine of natural justice present in Africa’ (Gluckman 1992: 28, 
1955).   
Historically legal anthropologists have disagreed over the extent to which the concept of 
‘justice’ is universal or capable of translation across cultures.  Later African studies of 
disputing processes by Bohannan (1957) and Gulliver (1963) questioned the existence 
of concepts of ‘justice’ in jural systems that operated in a fundamentally different way 
from European legal systems.  For example, in the case of the Arusha, Gulliver noted 
that principles of right behaviour guided the making of claims and dispute settlement in 
local Arusha conclaves and moots in the late 1950s; however there was no word in the 
vernacular language that could be translated as ‘justice’ and no such concept existed in 
Arusha ideology (Gulliver 1963: 241-242).  Despite disagreement over the appropriate 
use of terminology and cross-cultural comparison, a common observation made across 
all these studies of African dispute resolution – and others – has been the importance of 
the restoration of peace through reconciliation.  Whilst Bohannan and Gulliver did not 
express it as a concept of ‘justice’, they each observed the significance of reconciliation 
in Tiv and Arusha dispute resolution respectively.   
In his study amongst the Arusha, Gulliver noted that reconciliation was most important 
in disputes between related persons who had an interest in maintaining or restoring a 
relationship (Gulliver 1963: 240).  In a later ethnography of the Meru, Puritt also wrote 
that the primary function of Meru traditional ‘courts’ was ‘to restore social order by 
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reconciling the disputants and not simply by punishing individuals’ (Moore and Puritt 
1977: 115).  In Arusha and Meru society today the task of effecting reconciliation 
outside the statutory court system still falls to the laigwenani and mshili wa ukoo.  
These elders also play an important role in witnessing land allocations and 
administration of estates.  As such, they are poised to play a crucial role both as 
gatekeepers to statutory fora, in circumstances where they have been unable to bring 
about reconciliation, and as witnesses in court proceedings. 
There is also the English legal concept of ‘natural justice’ imported through the 
introduction of the English common law system during the colonial period.  In contrast 
to local African norms of reconciliation, the English concept of ‘natural justice’ 
developed from seventeenth and eighteenth century state-centred Enlightenment 
theories of the social contract and natural rights.   Rawls’ modern theory of ‘justice as 
fairness’ is also based on liberal assumptions of what a rational person would consider 
just, independent of any vested interests (Rawls 1972).  In the context of English law, 
the notion of ‘natural justice’ is largely a procedural concept grounded in the principles 
of due process and the rule of law.  Both English and Tanzanian law recognise the 
central maxims of natural justice as nemo judex in causa sua potest (‘no one shall be a 
judge in their own cause’ – the rule against bias), audi alteram partem (‘hear the other 
side’) and nullum arbitrium sine rationibus (‘no decision without reasons’).193  In 
Tanzania this legal concept of natural justice is enshrined in the Constitution, which 
also requires courts to focus on doing ‘substantial justice’, rather than being bound by 
technicalities that defeat justice.
194
 
5.2 Normative and procedural approaches to doing justice in land courts 
Throughout the colonial period, dualism in the Tanzanian court system meant that 
African and English approaches to doing justice remained relatively distinct.  Cotran 
observes that the British or general courts operated according to English legal 
principles, and the British administration interfered little with African courts (Cotran 
1969: 131).  As discussed at 3.3, the unification of the Tanzanian court system was a 
gradual process which began during the British colonial period and was consolidated 
                                               
193 Article 13(6)(a).  See Peter (1997:426-480) and Kijo-Bisimba and Peter (2005:432-467) for an 
overview of the interpretation of these natural justice principles by the Tanzanian higher courts. 
194 Article 107A(2)(e). 
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after political independence through the Magistrates Courts Act of 1963.  This Act 
introduced the Primary, District and High Court structure of the present ordinary court 
system, with lay ‘assessors’ sitting alongside magistrates to inform the process of 
justice. 
The ‘assessor’ system was first introduced during the colonial period, when chiefs 
presiding over local African courts were assisted by local elders.  Moore suggests that 
the presence of assessors in Tanzanian court hearings from the mid-1920s onwards 
appeared to stem from colonial and postcolonial administrators’ concerns to ‘inhibit the 
arbitrariness or corruption of the court holder’ and keep the court ‘impartial and 
harmonious with local conceptions of justice’ (Moore 1986: 172).  In the current land 
court system established under the Land Acts assessors sit alongside the legally 
qualified chairpersons in the DLHT, and judges in the High Court Land Division in the 
case of appeals originating from the ward.  This could be seen as a ‘hybrid’ court 
structure for a plural legal system, designed with the intention of balancing professional 
English legal approaches to justice with local community notions of justice.   
In its recommendations on the structure of the new land court system the Shivji 
Commission had advocated a prominent role for elders’ participation in the proposed 
Circuit Land Court that was more akin to the role of a jury than the assessor system.  
The Commission argued that this would allow fuller participation of the community in 
the process of adjudication, ‘exposing the professional personnel ... to the values of 
justice and fairness of the community’ (Shivji 2002: 206, URT 1994: 202).  However, 
the design of the present land court system under the Land Acts from the DLHT 
upwards was weighted more towards professional English common law justice than the 
Shivji Commission’s model.  For example, in the DLHT:   
In reaching decisions the Chairman shall take into account the opinion of 
the assessors but shall not be bound by it, except that the Chairman shall 
in the judgment give reasons for differing with such opinion.
195
   
The assessors at Arusha DLHT produce written opinions in English, which are 
generally two or three pages long.  It is not uncommon for two assessors hearing a case 
to reach different opinions on the merits of a claim, or for DLHT chairpersons to differ 
                                               
195 LDCA s.24. 
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from the opinions of the assessors.  One chairperson explained to me that the assessors 
and chairperson do not discuss the case with each other prior to writing their opinions 
and judgment on it, except in the event that they need to cross-check their notes of the 
proceedings.  The assessors write their opinions first.  The chairperson then writes the 
judgment after reviewing the file and the opinions of the assessors.  In the High Court 
Land Division a judge is simply required to sit with two assessors to hear appeals from 
the DLHT that originate from the ward.
196
  The judge is not bound by the opinions of 
the assessors and there is no requirement to give reasons to depart from the assessors’ 
opinions.   
By contrast with the higher courts, the Village Land Council and Ward Tribunal are 
staffed entirely by local elders with no professional legal qualifications.  Consequently, 
their normative approach to doing justice is less legally technical than that of the higher 
courts.  One Ward Tribunal chairperson explained to me that she was afraid when she 
was appointed chairperson because she did not know the laws: 
Even now I don’t know the laws but depending on the case before you, 
you have to use your wisdom (busara) and also rely on the evidence 
provided by witnesses.  Sometimes the case would involve going to 
inspect an area.  If someone has cooked the evidence that’s where the 
truth will be revealed because when we go to that area we use the elders 
who have been living there for a long time as they must be aware of such 
land and how it was acquired and how the dispute arose.  It will come as 
a surprise to the person who provides false witnesses when we speak to 
the elders.  
I then asked her what she meant by ‘using her wisdom’.  She replied: 
If an ordinary person was presented with such facts or evidence how 
would an ordinary person come to a decision?
197
 
Unlike legally qualified adjudicators in the DLHT and higher courts, Ward Tribunal 
members take on their role without formal legal training.  As the chairwoman’s 
explanation suggests, lack of legal training means that members may adopt an approach 
to their role which relies substantially on their own ‘wisdom’ acquired through life 
experience as elders or in other respected official positions within a local community.  
                                               
196 LDCA s.39(1). 
197 Contemporaneous translation of a conversation in Kiswahili noted in English. 
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The notion of using ‘wisdom’ also arose in a focus group discussion I conducted with 
DLHT assessors.  Indeed, in Kiswahili the roles of Ward Tribunal member and DLHT 
assessor have the same term – mzee wa baraza (literally ‘tribunal elder’) – a social 
position that is synonymous with wisdom and commands respect.  For some, wisdom 
has a spiritual dimension.  At one Ward Tribunal I attended prayers were said by the 
tribunal members together before beginning each day’s work.  The chairperson there 
explained to me that they did this for God to give them wisdom (using the Kiswahili 
word hekima
198
 rather than busara) whilst they were judging.  He added that ‘dark 
forces’ (nguvu za giza) exist, so they prayed to God that those forces would not control 
their minds and cause them to make a bad decision.       
In practice I observed that Ward Tribunal members also work closely with the Ward 
Tribunal Secretary in formulating their judgments.  Secretaries are often more highly 
educated than other Ward Tribunal members, since WTA requires that a Secretary must 
be ‘sufficiently literate and educated and capable of satisfactorily discharging the duties 
of Secretary’.199  In my observation of deliberations, secretaries would generally take 
the lead in reading out or summarising the evidence recorded in the proceedings to the 
tribunal members, who would each have an opportunity to give their opinion on the 
case.  Where members disagreed on the final outcome usually a single opinion was 
produced which reflected the majority view.  In my archival research I occasionally 
noted judgments where separate opinions of each member were set out in the judgment, 
with the final decision reflecting the opinion of the majority.   
Although WTA stipulates: ‘A Secretary of the Tribunal shall attend all sittings of the 
Tribunal and record all its proceedings but shall not participate in decision making’,200 
in my observation generally secretaries were influential and active players in the 
deliberation process, even if they did not necessarily ‘vote’ on the final outcome.  Some 
secretaries wrote judgments summarising the evidence and decision in the case in the 
absence of members, who would then approve them with little or no amendment.  The 
personal opinion of a secretary may therefore be highly influential in the outcome of a 
case. 
                                               
198 Kiswahili word of Arabic origin which loosely translates as ‘wisdom’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘judgement’. 
199 WTA s.5(2). 
200 WTA s.5(3). 
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Statutory procedural frameworks for doing justice 
These variations in approaches to doing justice at different levels of court are reinforced 
by statutory frameworks for procedural justice.  This has served to preserve some 
normative differences in judicial approaches, with reconciliation most evident in the 
lower levels of land court, whilst at the higher levels of court a more legalistic approach 
to justice prevails.  There is little statutory regulation of procedural justice in the Village 
Land Council and Ward Tribunal, save a broad emphasis on mediation, reconciliation 
and observance of ‘natural justice’ principles.201  Both WTA and LDCA provide that 
the primary function of each Ward Tribunal is ‘to secure peace and harmony in the area 
for which it is established’ by mediating the parties to a dispute.202  WTA further 
provides: 
... the Tribunal shall in all proceedings seek to do justice to the parties 
and to reach a decision which will secure the peaceful and amicable 
resolution of the dispute, reconciliation of the parties and the furtherance 
of the social and economic interests of the village or ward as a whole in 
which the dispute originates.
203
 
Complementary to this provision LDCA provides: 
The Tribunal shall, in performing its function of mediation, have regard 
to – 
(a) Any customary principles of mediation; 
(b) Natural justice in so far as any customary principles of mediation 
do not apply; 
(c) Any principles and practices of mediation in which members have 
received any training.
204
 
VLA sets out a similarly worded tripartite framework for mediating disputes in the 
Village Land Council.
205
 
These statutory provisions strongly reinforce African norms of dispute resolution 
described above, and conceptualise justice as a process of peaceful reconciliation.  In 
                                               
201
 WTA s.16(2) incorporates the first two principles of natural justice outlined above. 
202 WTA s.8(1) and LDCA s.13(1). 
203 WTA s.16(1). 
204 LDCA s.13(3). 
205 VLA s.61(4). 
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practice however, after an initial exploration of the possibility of mediation, I observed 
that quite often Arusha’s ward tribunals would proceed to hear cases under their 
compulsive jurisdiction.
206
  It was less common for mediation in land cases to take place 
within the tribunals.  Some cases were sent back home for settlement.  Once the Ward 
Tribunal’s compulsive jurisdiction is invoked there are no specific regulations as to 
rules of evidence or procedure for hearings,
207
 meaning that doing justice relies 
substantially on the discretion of members of the individual tribunal. WTA provides: 
(1) The Tribunal shall not be bound by any rules of evidence or 
procedure applicable to any court. 
(2) The Tribunal shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, regulate its 
own procedure. 
(3) In the exercise of its functions under this Act the Tribunal shall have 
power to hear statements of witnesses produced by parties to a 
complaint, and to examine any relevant document produced by any 
party.
208
 
The statutory priority of reconciliation which is vested in the Village Land Council and 
Ward Tribunal is absent from provisions regulating procedure in the DLHT and the 
High Court Land Division.  These courts are subject to constitutionally enshrined 
principles of natural justice, and are additionally required to follow common law civil 
procedure.  Chipeta notes that the history of Tanzanian civil procedure law finds its 
roots in English civil procedure.
209
  Both the DLHT and High Court are bound by the 
provisions of the Evidence Act of 1967
210
 and Tanzania’s Civil Procedure Code, which 
provides a comprehensive framework for the conduct of civil litigation.
211
  However, as 
with the Ward Tribunal LDCA affords the DLHT and High Court Land Division wide 
discretion in practice in the regulation of procedure and evidence: 
                                               
206 WTA s.8(2) and LDCA s.13(4). 
207 Save that the Customary Law (Limitation of Proceedings) Rules 1964 apply to proceedings in the 
Ward Tribunal in the exercise of its compulsive jurisdiction (LDCA s.52(1)). 
208 WTA s.15. 
209 Historically this was both directly through the Reception Clause in the Tanganyika Order in Council 
1920, and circuitously via the Indian Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 5 of 1908), which was applied in 
Tanzania via the Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance of 1920 until the coming into force of the 
Tanzanian Civil Procedure Code on 1.1.67 (Chipeta 2002: xxiv). 
210 (Act No. 6 of 1967) Cap. 6 R.E. 2002. 
211 LDCA s.51.  The Law of Limitation Act (Act No. 10 of 1971) Cap. 89 R.E. 2002 also applies to 
proceedings in the DLHT and High Court (LDCA s.52(2)). 
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(a) Subject to regulations made under section 49 may accept such 
evidence as is pertinent and such proof as appears to be worthy of 
belief, according to the value thereof and notwithstanding any other 
law relating to the adduction and reception of evidence; 
(b) Shall not be required to comply or conform with the provisions of 
any rule of practice or procedure otherwise generally applicable in 
proceedings in the appellate or revisional court, but may apply any 
such rule where it considers the application thereof would be 
advantageous to the exercise of such jurisdiction ...
212
 
Specific procedures for DLHT hearings are contained in both LDCA and the DLHT 
Regulations of 2003.  These include hearing cases in the absence of a party and/or their 
advocate,
213
 and some very brief provisions on the conduct of hearings themselves.
214
  
So far as procedural justice is concerned then, statute affords land courts – particularly 
the lower levels of land court – quite broad discretion as to the conduct of hearings, 
admission and evaluation of evidence.  These broad procedural frameworks exist within 
overarching normative frameworks of reconciliation and common law approaches to 
justice.  For cases heard in the Ward Tribunal, such broad discretion makes it difficult 
for litigants to successfully challenge a tribunal’s approach to procedural justice on 
appeal, except in cases where it can be shown that the principles of natural justice 
enshrined in the Constitution and WTA have not been followed.   
5.3 Gathering evidence 
In practice, evidence-gathering at the substantive hearing stage in both the Ward 
Tribunal and DLHT is typically of three kinds: witness testimony, documentary 
evidence and a site visit.  This section explores the principles that appear to underlie and 
inform the courts’ approaches to these various kinds of evidence-gathering and the 
implications this may have for women’s claims to land. 
Witness testimony 
Both the Ward Tribunal and DLHT attach significant importance to the oral evidence of 
witnesses, particularly in cases involving unregistered land where there is no 
                                               
212 LDCA  s.51(1). 
213 DLHT Regulations paras. 11 and 13. 
214 DLHT Regulations paras. 12 and 14. 
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documentary evidence of title.  This appears to stem from the fact that customary 
practices of allocation and disposition of land usually involve a number of family 
members and neighbours as witnesses.  As one Ward Tribunal member put it: ‘Because 
we are dealing with land issues and things which are seen, an oral claim for the 
claimant is not enough.  There must be another witness.’215  The choice of witnesses is a 
matter for the parties; although in land disputes involving family or neighbours parties 
would typically rely on the evidence of family and clan elders as key witnesses at the 
tribunal hearing itself.  In some cases I observed that Ward Tribunal members would 
also call further witnesses to the tribunal of their own motion where it appeared that 
having heard the evidence of both parties’ witnesses, material issues remained 
unresolved.   
In the Ward Tribunal there are no statutory rules concerning how evidence must be 
heard - beyond the constitutionally enshrined natural justice principle of audi alteram 
partem.  Generally ward tribunals allow parties to give their own oral narrative account, 
largely uninterrupted, and call witnesses to give evidence and be asked questions by all 
parties and tribunal members.  However sometimes ward tribunals use their discretion 
to impose restrictions on oral testimony and cross-examination.  In one case where a 
female claimant had written a simple one sentence letter in support of her claim, I 
observed the Ward Tribunal members proceed to hear a full narrative from the 
respondent, but refuse to allow the claimant to expand on her written claim in oral 
evidence.  Instead they told her that what she had written in her letter was her claim and 
that what she wanted to say could be said through her witnesses.   
At another Ward Tribunal, in one case members restricted questions in cross-
examination by each of the parties to two questions per witness, in what appeared to be 
an attempt to focus the parties’ questioning on the issues to be determined.  At a third 
tribunal, in a full day of oral evidence neither party was invited to ask questions after 
each witness had given evidence, with only the tribunal members asking clarifying 
questions.  However, during the respondent’s case the claimant asserted his right to 
cross-examine the respondent’s witnesses: ‘nafikiri ninahaki’ (‘I think I have the right’), 
to the dismay of the respondent, who, it appeared had not been aware that he had also 
had a right to cross-examine the claimant’s witnesses.   
                                               
215 Contemporaneous translation from Kiswahili noted in English. 
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Complaints about the fairness of procedures for hearing evidence are a common ground 
of appeal to the DLHT.  However, due to the wide procedural discretion afforded to 
ward tribunals the DLHT will consider whether the complaining party’s case was heard 
fairly in quite general terms.  In a focus group discussion
216
 I explored DLHT assessors’ 
approaches to questioning and evaluating witness evidence.  One assessor explained: 
Assessor 1 (female): If a case comes from the Ward Tribunal and one 
side complains that they were not given time to be listened to and the 
other side says he or she was given time then we look at the evidence to 
see were there witnesses on the other side or not?  If there were we 
decide that the other side is stating wrong.  If it is true that he or she 
wasn’t given time to be listened to then the tribunal has a big opportunity 
to say that this kind of case must be re-heard at the Ward Tribunal.  
During my observations at the DLHT hearings I noted that each party was routinely 
given the right to give oral evidence, call witnesses, cross-examine and be cross-
examined.  Where parties were represented, advocates would tend to take their client 
and witnesses through their evidence-in-chief by asking a series of questions, rather 
than leaving the witnesses to give unrestricted narrative accounts.  Many litigants in 
person struggled to frame or ask many questions of witnesses.  One chairperson’s 
approach in this situation would be to hold up a piece of paper with a large question 
mark on it and tell the person to ‘liza swali!’ (ask a question!).  Two assessors described 
their own methods for questioning witnesses and assessing the credibility of their 
evidence:   
Assessor 2 (male): If there are two witnesses on each side and we hear 
the witness of A, we weigh what they have said and compare what they 
have said with what A says in submission.  That’s where we have to be 
careful.  A might say something but [their] witness might not talk about 
it.  In cross-examination they might stammer and not be sure.  That’s 
where we have doubt and might give the benefit to the other side.  Some 
witnesses are trained in what to say.  Sometimes we try to ask tricky 
questions to confuse them and sometimes they enter into the trap. 
Assessor 3 (male): When you are cross-examining any of the witnesses 
you look directly at their eyes and ask questions.  If they are telling the 
truth they’ll look directly at you and won’t tremble, but if she’s giving 
false information at times she’ll tremble and avoid your face. 
                                               
216 The focus group discussion was conducted and noted in English. 
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Since courts often attach significance to confident and corroborated oral testimony there 
are evident risks of injustice for litigants in person who struggle to ask questions and 
establish their case through adversarial legal processes.  This may be made worse where 
adjudicators do not take the time to explore witness testimony through their own 
questions, intimidate witnesses (whether intentionally or inadvertently) or actively 
restrict parties from giving evidence or asking questions.  This compounds the 
challenges already faced by litigants who may be afraid or ignorant of court procedures, 
from articulating their case or asking important, relevant questions.  Consequently, there 
is a real possibility that a party’s oral evidence may be left incomplete or lacking in 
aspects that adjudicators consider important for proving a case, such as corroboration of 
particular facts by witnesses.   
Women who are unused to speaking for themselves and making claims in fora 
dominated by male elders or professionals are at an obvious disadvantage in this 
respect.  Male domination in ward tribunals was most noticeable at the rural ward 
tribunals of Meru Rural and Arusha Plains.  The hearing room at Meru Rural was 
arranged with benches lining three of the four walls of the room.  Tribunal members sat 
behind a desk on the fourth side of the room and parties and witnesses were required to 
stand in the centre of the room facing towards the tribunal members.  On any hearing 
day the benches would be filled with around twenty or so men – whether parties, 
witnesses or general observers.  It was rare to see another woman inside the tribunal 
apart from the sole woman tribunal member and myself, and land claims brought by 
women were also uncommon.  During the two months that I spent at Meru Rural, there 
were no women claimants in land cases and only one female witness appeared before 
the tribunal – a mother in a land dispute between brothers. 
At Arusha Plains Ward Tribunal there were more cases involving women litigants and 
witnesses.  At this tribunal parties and witnesses were also required to stand in the 
centre of the much smaller hearing room to give their evidence.  The gendered divide 
between male and female court users was most noticeable outside the building.  Women 
claimants would often sit some distance away with their heads covered waiting for their 
cases to be called, whilst male parties and witnesses tended to wait much closer to the 
tribunal building.  Both my male and female research assistants at Arusha Plains (who 
were themselves Arusha and Maasai) commented to me that the women claimants and 
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witnesses we observed often struggled in the way they gave evidence and asked 
questions. 
Documentation 
Documents such as minutes of clan meetings, land registration documents or sale 
contracts are often produced in land tribunals either on the initiative of a party or at the 
request of the tribunal.  In disputes concerning unregistered land, minutes of clan 
meetings are considered particularly significant, since they may be the only written 
record of allocation of a piece of land.  One DLHT assessor explained: 
Assessor 2 (male): We normally insist or ask them: was there any clan 
meeting to say that things should be done like this?  We look at clan 
meeting minutes taking that into consideration.  Clan meetings are very 
important in helping us to decide especially when the claimant and 
respondent are blood brothers. 
One potential problem for women claimants is that clan meeting minutes, sale contracts 
and land registration documents are typically produced through processes which have a 
strong male gender bias.  Clan meetings are attended and discussions dominated by 
male elders.  Buying, selling and titling of land have traditionally been regarded as male 
activities.  One Arusha District Land Officer explained to me that in his experience, 
registration of customary rights of occupancy in the name of a woman was very rare in a 
patrilineal society where families wanted the name to be maintained with the land.  He 
had found registration in joint names of spouses more common for granted rights of 
occupancy, but it was not unusual for an educated woman to attend his offices and for 
traditional reasons be prepared to leave the decision on title up to her husband. 
Despite this implicit male gender bias, occasionally women do produce evidence of title 
in support of their claims.  In one such case at the DLHT a woman successfully claimed 
against a village council that had taken several acres of her land for road-building 
without paying her compensation.  The woman proved that her land had been 
encroached upon by producing village meeting minutes and a certificate of ownership 
and registration of title.  The significance attached to documentation may equally 
however, create particular difficulties for women claimants in the context of personal 
relationships where money, land and personal property transactions are conducted on 
the basis of trust. 
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Litigants sometimes attempt to rely upon forged documents or poor quality photocopies 
of documents produced in evidence by a person other than the maker of the document.  
Advocates are alert to this practice and are invariably quick to object to such documents 
being admitted as evidence in the DLHT and High Court.  However, in practice a 
DLHT chairperson will often admit such a document onto the court record ‘for 
identification purposes’ only.  Unbound by formal rules of procedure on evidence, ward 
tribunals have discretion to admit or refuse such evidence as they think appropriate.  
Authenticity or evidential weight to be attached to documents will then be considered in 
the final assessment of all the evidence. 
Tribunals are alert to the issue of forgeries; however, documents of questionable 
authenticity are sometimes given evidential weight by tribunals.  In one DLHT case 
concerning breach of a sale agreement, the claimant’s case relied substantially on a 
photocopy of clan meeting minutes tendered by the claimant together with a copy of the 
sale agreement itself.  The case was heard ex parte and the documentary evidence was 
therefore left unchallenged.  No one from the clan meeting gave evidence at the hearing 
to confirm the authenticity of the minutes.  When I later examined the minutes and sale 
agreement there appeared to be several inconsistencies in the signatures and 
thumbprints of persons whose names appeared in both documents.  Despite initially 
admitting the clan meeting minutes ‘for identification purposes only’ the chairperson 
gave conclusive weight to the minutes as evidence of clan consent to the sale in the 
judgment.   
In the execution proceedings which followed the tribunal ordered forceful eviction of 
the respondent and demolition of the houses on the land.  After the judgment had been 
executed it subsequently transpired that the land was occupied by a woman who had 
been oblivious to the fact that the respondent – who was in fact the family guardian – 
had sold her land.  The sale had taken place without her knowledge or consent.  Indeed, 
the woman’s name appeared on neither the meeting minutes nor the sale agreement.  
The meeting minutes stated that the woman had been occupying the land and therefore 
the respondent had been ordered by the clan to build another house for her on an 
alternative plot.  Despite this, an order for demolition of the houses was made. 
 
131 
 
 
Site visits   
Ward tribunals routinely conduct site visits to the disputed land.  Such visits are often 
essential in rural and unplanned urban areas where land is unregistered and so claimed 
boundaries to the land must be verified by those who witnessed allocations and 
dispositions in the past.  A site visit typically begins with tribunal members identifying 
the names of occupiers of neighbouring plots and any physical markers defining the 
boundaries to the land.  The site is then paced out by the tribunal members, usually 
accompanied by the local balozi or mwenyekiti wa kitongoji and any permanent crops 
and buildings are noted.  I observed the dynamics of a Ward Tribunal site visit to be 
quite informal, with tribunal members discussing the case with local leaders and elders 
who were present at the scene.  The local mwenyekiti wa kitongoji or balozi would play 
a collaborative role in the fact-finding process.  On some visits I attended, these 
discussions were recorded as evidence in the record of the proceedings.  In other cases 
such discussions would be informal and left off the tribunal record.   
The following extract from my field diary describes one Ward Tribunal site visit I 
attended and illustrates the roles played by the various actors present at the scene.  The 
mwenyekiti wa kitongoji in this case was a familiar face at the Ward Tribunal, in this 
and other cases involving parties living within his kitongoji: 
It’s a hot day for a site visit.  The secretary tells me that the tribunal 
members are going there because they want to find out the size and 
boundaries of the land.  The tribunal charters a daladala and the tribunal 
members, parties and others interested in the case all pile in.  The land in 
question is in the next village.  On the way to the site we stop at a local 
bar for everyone to get sodas.  The daladala then winds its way over 
rough and dusty ground to the site.  It’s at the foot of one of the small 
hills that characterise the landscape in this area.  The land is dry with 
little vegetation save for some thorn trees.  Further up the hill and just on 
the other side of the boundary of the plot are some mud houses partially 
obscured by trees - a flat roofed house and a round house.  Passersby on 
foot and on bicycles stop to look at the scene.  At one point I count 
around 18 people at the site and I ask the secretary who they all are.  
Apart from the parties and witnesses from their family, I am told there is 
the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji and the rest are neighbours and villagers 
who have taken an interest. 
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The plot is large and as the tribunal chairperson, secretary and 
mwenyekiti wa kitongoji begin to pace it out one of the witnesses – a 
family elder - tries to interfere.  The Ward Tribunal chairperson tells him 
to keep quiet - the law is dealing with this now.  Stop trying to interfere 
with this mama. 
It’s the heat of the day and whilst waiting for the chairperson, secretary 
and mwenyekiti wa kitongoji to return from their pacing out of the land 
everyone else struggles to get a bit of shade sitting and chatting under the 
thorn trees.  Eventually they return and the neighbours present are asked 
to confirm whether the boundaries identified are correct.  Before we 
leave the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji and chairperson address everyone 
about the importance of maintaining peace while the proceedings in the 
tribunal are ongoing. 
The DLHT also conducts site visits to the disputed land if it is considered necessary in 
order to determine factual issues in a case.  Unlike Ward Tribunal site visits however, 
when the DLHT goes on location it will be to a community and amongst local people 
whom the tribunal members are unlikely to know.  This raises challenges in terms of 
knowing which neighbours, elders or other witnesses attending the scene would be able 
to assist rather than mislead the tribunal.  One assessor explained to me that in order to 
overcome this problem when they go on a site visit they ask three or four neighbours 
‘Who here is prepared to tell us the truth?’  The tribunal members then talk privately 
with those who are willing, in order to find out about the land, who bought it and from 
whom.  I observed this to be the case on a site visit to an urban plot in an unplanned 
area of Arusha Municipality: 
At 10 a.m. we set off in a land cruiser on our site visit.  The driver and 
DLHT chairperson sit in the front.  I sit in the seats behind them with one 
assessor and the clerk – equipped with tape measure for measuring the 
plot.  In the back of the land cruiser sit the parties directly involved in 
today’s cases. 
The property that we visit is situated in an unplanned area of Arusha 
Municipality, along unsurfaced side roads.  We stand outside the 
property amongst the small crowd of people that have gathered there.  
The chairperson makes introductions and asks me, the clerk and assessor 
to do the same.  I notice two men in particular - the appellant and 
respondent in the case.  We are invited in to look at the property and the 
assessor draws a sketch map, which will later be placed on the record as 
an official drawing of the property.  The houses in this road are of rough 
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brick and cement construction with corrugated iron roofs, just a few 
metres in length and width and tightly packed.  The plots are not much 
bigger than the houses that they stand on.  There is a small yard on one 
side of the house where there are a few sugar cane plants growing, 
buckets of water and a small charcoal stove that is lit, with beans in an 
ungo basket ready for cooking.   
At the front of the house quite a crowd is gathering and the chairperson 
and assessor sit on a stone step opposite the property in question to 
decide who is going to give witness evidence.  The chairperson selects 
them quickly.  Then one by one the witnesses are taken through to the 
small yard to give their evidence out of earshot.  The tribunal clerk takes 
an oath from the first witness.  There are just the five of us present.  The 
first witness is a balozi, who says that he has held that position from 1982 
to date.  He speaks in a very low voice which is barely audible over the 
rustling of sugar cane and cockerel crowing nearby.  We are all standing 
except for the chairperson who is sat on the step taking notes.  A second 
witness gives evidence. 
I count up the number of people who have gathered outside the property 
– about 22 including nine women.  None of them are asked to give 
evidence, although the appellant seems to want a woman seated nearby in 
a green kanga to be asked questions.  The chairperson and assessor are 
reluctant but ask her a couple of questions in front of everyone, which 
they do not make notes on.  They do not consider that the personal 
information the appellant seems to want the tribunal to ask her about is 
relevant to the issues in the case.  Then we all get into the land cruiser to 
leave.  The appellant starts to get angry shouting through the driver’s 
window across to the respondent on the other side.  We leave. 
As both field diary extracts illustrate, whilst there are differences in approach to site 
visits of the ward tribunals and DLHT, in each case the balozi or mwenyekiti wa 
kitongoji is often present in their capacity as a local leader claiming knowledge of the 
dispute.  In some cases, such as Furaha’s case explored in chapter 4, the evidence of 
local leaders present at the site visit may prove determinative in a tribunal’s assessment 
of a claim.   
It is readily apparent that all three types of evidence – oral testimony, documentation, 
and information gathering at site visits – are produced substantially through male 
dominated social processes and by male authority figures within a family and 
community.  In the case of inherited family land, family elders and local leaders are 
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pivotal actors in the production of evidence for proving allocation of land.  Litigants 
who lack documentation in support of their claims must find allies amongst these elders 
and local leaders as witnesses.  For women, this means that any gender barriers to 
recognition of their interests in land must be overcome with these key actors, if they are 
to gain their support as witnesses. 
5.4 Negotiating customary law and equal rights 
The land disputes explored in this thesis clearly demonstrate the social significance of 
local patrilineal customary practices in the context of inheritance and marriage.  Under 
Tanzania’s legal centralist model of normative pluralism, the Land Acts require land 
courts to apply customary law,
217
 with the caveat that any rules of customary law 
denying women lawful access to ownership, occupation or use of land be held as 
void.
218
  This section analyses how land courts are negotiating customary law and equal 
rights in judging women’s claims to land in practice. 
LA specifies that, in addition to the Constitution and relevant statute, all courts 
determining land disputes are required to apply the ‘customary laws of Tanzania’ and 
the substance of the common law and doctrines of equity from other Commonwealth 
countries which appear relevant to the circumstances of Tanzania.
219
  The obligation to 
apply customary law is reiterated in LDCA: 
(1) In exercise of its Customary Law jurisdiction, a Ward Tribunal shall 
apply the Customary Law prevailing within its local jurisdiction ... 
(2) In the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, the High Court and the 
District Land and Housing Tribunals shall not refuse to recognize any 
rule of Customary Law on the grounds that it has not been established 
by evidence but may accept any statement thereof which appears to it 
to be worthy of belief which is contained in the record of proceedings 
or from any other source which appears to be credible or may take 
judicial notice thereof.
220
 
These statutes taken together give land courts wide discretion both as to the sources of 
customary law they may use in decision-making, and their interpretation of the 
                                               
217 LA s.180(1), LDCA s.50. 
218 VLA s.20(2). 
219 LA s.180(1). 
220 LDCA s.50. 
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substantive content of customary law itself.  Such discretion is subject to observing 
constitutional principles, statutory requirements in the Land Acts and the fundamental 
principles of the Land Policy.  So far as women’s claims to land are concerned, the 
Land Acts have effectively set the courts an agenda to interpret customary law 
purposively in a way which is progressive in recognising women’s equal land rights. 
LA also sets the courts a clear objective to develop a body of Tanzanian common law 
on land matters: 
... it shall be the duty of all courts in interpreting and applying this Act 
and all other laws relating to land in Tanzania to use their best 
endeavours to create a common law of Tanzania applicable in equal 
measure to all land and to this end the courts shall apply a purposive 
interpretation to this Act and shall at all times be guided by the 
fundamental principles of land policy set out in section 3.
221
 
To date, this is an objective yet to be realised at the level of High Court Land Division 
and Court of Appeal, where few judgments interpreting the Land Acts have been 
produced since the establishment of the land court system.  Those that have been 
produced are not systematically disseminated or reported.  As at January 2010 the 
Tanganyika Law Reports – described by Peter as ‘a good example of poor and almost 
useless law reporting if not digesting’ (Peter and Kijo-Bisimba 2007: 253) was up-to-
date to the 1999 volume, which predates the coming into force of the Land Acts in May 
2001.  As at 2012 the Law Reports had been brought up to date to the 2006 volume, 
although I am told that many Tanzanian advocates do not have ready access to the more 
recent volumes.  During my fieldwork year, lawyers and DLHT chairpersons seeking to 
make use of case law were relying either on decisions which predated the Land Acts or 
unreported Tanzanian decisions that they had been able to obtain through professional 
networks.  As a consequence of the problems with law reporting and the case backlog in 
the High Court Land Division, a body of reported higher court precedent on the Land 
Acts has yet to develop.   
Cases from the Court of Appeal and High Court pre-dating the Land Acts demonstrate 
the higher courts’ approach to interpreting and giving effect to customary law in land 
and inheritance matters.  In a series of cases noted by Peter, the Court of Appeal 
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adopted a conservative approach, which recognises customary law, including gender 
discriminatory customary law, in its decision-making.  In a 1984 case the Court of 
Appeal held: ‘The customary laws of this country have the same status in our courts as 
any other law, subject to the Constitution and to any statutory law that may provide to 
the contrary’.222  In an analysis of decisions on customary land tenure predating the 
Land Acts, Fimbo observes that the Court of Appeal has relied heavily on printed texts 
(Cory and Hartnoll 1945 (Haya law),
223
 Anderson 1955 (Islamic law),
224
 Cory 1955 
(Nyamwezi law),
225
 James and Fimbo 1973 (Customary land law)
226) ‘as if they were 
legislation’ in finding various aspects of customary law (Fimbo 2007).  Save for James 
and Fimbo, these texts were written by Europeans during the colonial period and reflect 
the authors’ understandings of customary and Islamic law at that time.  This approach to 
finding and interpreting customary law presents an interesting contrast with the South 
African Constitutional Court,
227
 which sees living customary law as intrinsically 
adaptable and capable of evolving under the new constitutional legal order.  
The High Court’s approach to negotiating customary law and equality provisions in the 
Constitution has been mixed.  As discussed at 2.4 of this thesis, in the leading 1989 case 
of Ephrahim v Pastory and Another, the activist judge Mwalusanya declared Rule 20 of 
CLDO No. 4 on Inheritance to be discriminatory and inconsistent with Article 13(4) of 
the Constitution.   However, more recently the High Court has refused to strike out 
other discriminatory provisions of the CLDOs on constitutional grounds.  In the 2005 
test case of Elizabeth Stephen and Salome Charles
228
 initiated by a group of Tanzanian 
activist lawyers, two widows of customary marriages had each been denied by their 
                                               
222 Maagwi Kimito v Gibeno Werema Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1984 
(Unreported).  See also Rukuba Nteme v Bi. Jalia Hassan and Another Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil 
Case No. 19 of 1986 (Unreported); Haji Athumani Issa v Rweutama Mituta Court of Appeal of Tanzania, 
Civil Application No. 9 of 1988 (Unreported) - all cited in Peter (1997: 382-383). 
223 Boniface Muhigi v Philemon Muhigi [1967] HCD No. 231; Deocras Lutabana v Deus Kashaga Court 
of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1981, [1981] TLR 122. 
224 Matei Kijuu v Omari Salehe [1961] Dig. 206. 
225 Shija Kadasa v Mahuyi Kadasa [1961] Dig. 208. 
226 Maagwi Kimito v Gibeno Werema Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1984, [1985] 
TLR 132; Deocras Lutabana v Deus Kashaga. 
227 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253; Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa 
and Other 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC); Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 
10.  For a discussion of the South African Constitutional Court’s recognition of living customary law see 
Himonga (2011). 
228 Elizabeth Stephen & Salome Charles v The Attorney General High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam 
Misc. Civil Cause 82 of 2005 (Unreported).  Electronic copy held by author. 
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husbands’ relatives the right to inherit their husbands’ properties according to 
customary law.  The High Court declined to declare or strike out as unconstitutional 
discriminatory paragraphs of CLDO No. 4 on Rules of Inheritance.  Its reasoning is 
significant in illuminating the High Court’s approach to customary law and gender 
equality: 
After agreeing that the impugned paragraphs are discriminatory in more 
ways than one we have thought whether it will be in the best interest to 
give the orders prayed for.  In reaching our decision, we are guided by a 
number of factors.  We are aware that what the Order did was to declare 
and recognize some of the customs of the people which were there for 
many years before.  These customs evolve and change with time, a 
process that does not end, nor can it be ended. 
In some matrilineal societies today, uncles are running away from 
schooling their sister’s children in favour of the children’s biological 
fathers.  In the Wasukuma tribe fifteen years ago the daughter of your 
aunt was called aunt number two.  Now, she is called a cousin like in 
other tribes.  There are tribes where at one time, cousins could marry, a 
custom now dead and buried.  The wave of inter-marriages between 
tribes and races has dealt a serious blow to some and in fact, many, of 
our customs.  A good number of these are dead and others are dying. 
What we are saying is this.  It is impossible to effect customary change by 
judicial pronouncements.  A legal decision must be able to take 
immediate effect, unless overturned by a higher court.  For customs and 
customary law, it would be dangerous and may create chaos if courts 
were to make judicial pronouncements on their Constitutionality.  This 
will be opening the Pandora's box, with all seemingly discriminative 
customs from our 120 tribes plus following the same path. 
The legislature saw this danger and in its wisdom, came up with section 
12 of the Judicature and Application of Laws Act [cap. 358 R.E. 2002] … 
[judgment cites the section, which provides a formal mechanism for the 
declaration and modification of customary law by District Councils.] 
We are of the considered opinion that the provisions of the foregoing 
section would provide the best avenue to remedy the situation now 
complained of.  The advantage of this avenue is that it will start from the 
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grass roots where any custom is felt and a decision will be acceptable 
and implementable by the majority.
229
 
The judgment recognises that customary practices are living and evolving and sees the 
task of changing the codified CLDOs as a matter for local councils, rather than the 
judiciary.  This appears to assume that the mechanism under JALA is effective for 
harmonising the codified CLDO Rules with social change.  In recent years the Law 
Reform Commission of Tanzania has been engaged in a process of reviewing the 
CLDOs.   The Commission has noted that in practice none of the district councils of 
Tanzania have used the provisions in JALA to conduct periodic studies of customary 
laws within their respective areas (Law Reform Commission of Tanzania undated).  
This suggests that there is a lack of momentum from ‘the grassroots majority’ to change 
the CLDOs.  It is therefore arguable that the current system under JALA serves to 
reinforce the status quo, since it does nothing to address social power relations that 
militate against amending local laws to promote gender equality.  It also calls into 
question the extent to which the CLDOs and other texts on customary law are reliable 
source materials for ascertaining contemporary customary practices in the higher courts. 
Fimbo (2007) notes that, by contrast with the higher courts, the primary courts make 
little use of texts and tend to rely on assessors in establishing the content of customary 
law.  In my own fieldwork I found little evidence to suggest that land courts in Arusha 
referred to texts or the CLDOs in their interpretation of customary practices either.  
Instead, Ward Tribunal members and DLHT chairpersons and assessors relied on their 
own knowledge of unwritten living customary practices as members of the local 
community.  I explored the issue of giving effect to ‘customary law’ and principles of 
gender equality in various conversations and interviews with adjudicators during the 
course of my fieldwork.  What follows are some of the most notable opinions which 
were expressed to me on the subject:
230
   
High Court Judge (female): I don’t consider complexity of laws is a real 
issue.  If you unpack customary law per se it is not there.  There is living 
                                               
229 The claimants appealed.  In December 2010 The Court of Appeal struck out the appeal as incompetent 
for being accompanied by a defective drawn order which was wrongly dated (‘Court of Appeal rejects 
widows’ appeal’ – Daily News (Tanzania) 28.12.10). 
230 Conversations with the High Court judge and DLHT members were in English.  The comments of 
Ward Tribunal members are a contemporaneous English translation from Kiswahili unless otherwise 
stated. 
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customary law or day to day practice under the name of customary law.  
[On using the CLDOs in her judgments]: There are a lot of things that 
influence decision-makers, including customs.  In our decisions currently 
we don’t really depend on Customary Law Declaration Orders.  I don’t 
know if I have ever used them.  I have reversed decisions that are 
discriminatory.  When considering the justice of the case in most cases I 
refer to cases decided in the locality and what I think is the justice of the 
case. 
DLHT chairperson (female): Customary law is used in the distribution of 
land but if customary law is repugnant to natural justice we don’t follow 
it.  We resort to normal laws.  Women did not have access to land but as 
time went on that slowly started to change.  A lot of people now are 
raising that women have a right to own land.  Sometimes we’ll uphold 
tradition if it’s not repugnant to natural justice.  After taking the 
evidence, the assessors will tell you what the custom says.  If you depart 
from it you have to say why, for example because it is departing from the 
law.  If you don’t have any case law then you use commonsense. 
DLHT assessor (male): We consider customary law.  Some tribes like 
Maasai are really strict on customary law and regulations which are 
recognised by the government and judiciary system of Tanzania.  Two 
brothers might be quarrelling over a piece of land.  According to 
tradition who is supposed to inherit?  The last born boy inherits the house 
and surrounding land.  That also helps us to reach an assessment. 
Ward Tribunal secretary (male):  You can find it [i.e. customary law] in 
the village... [Customary law] is not a written thing.  People in rural 
areas that is their stand... Customary law, tradition, custom – it’s the 
same... These customary laws have no chance in this world.  I hate that 
law because according to the Constitution everyone has rights to possess 
the land.  Women are our mothers.  Without them we couldn’t be here... 
In our judgment [refers to a case in which the Ward Tribunal upheld a 
woman’s right to land] we quoted words from the Law of Marriage Act.231 
Ward Tribunal member (female) (from the same tribunal as the secretary 
above):  When reflecting on her own personal experience she expressed 
to me with great anger that customary law ‘oppresses’ (kugandamiza) 
women. 
Ward Tribunal member (male): What we mostly do first is reconcile or 
mediate the parties.  At the end there will still be love.  If that fails that’s 
when we’ll use the laws. 
                                               
231 Conversation in English. 
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Ward Tribunal member (female): Using traditions and customs might not 
always be right and since the tribunal is there to bring people to settle 
disputes it might not be doing justice to some parties if it uses traditions 
and customs always.  Now there are rights of women to land.  Right now 
women have got equal rights to land as men but if you have such a case 
before you of a woman claiming rights to land if you use such traditions 
and customs you will deny some rights. 
Ward Tribunal secretary (male) [on his understanding of ‘customary 
law’]:  The rules or laws that are laid down by our ancestors on how land 
will be distributed for that clan – maybe from father to son.  Before the 
customary law did not give any right to women to own land but now the 
laws require a woman to be given such right and even favour women’s 
rights to land... The customary law about women being able to inherit 
land has itself changed.  Even though that’s the reality now there are still 
some elders who are old fashioned and don’t want to adapt so there are 
still some disputes. 
Ward Tribunal member (female):  It’s the land laws that have brought 
about the change because there are still some to date who have a 
patrilineal mode of life who claim women can’t own land.  Now it’s the 
law which binds them. 
Ward Tribunal member (female):  We rely on customary law but when we 
reach a point and find it’s difficult to rely on it we use land law... Mostly 
if it’s discriminatory to the claimant we’ll use the land laws. 
The most striking feature of these opinions is the consensus of approach across different 
levels of court to customary law and equal rights in practice.  Expressing views which 
perhaps have more in common with the South African Constitutional Court than the 
Tanzanian higher courts in general, they indicate a willingness to reinterpret or 
disregard customary practices that are perceived as gender discriminatory.  One Village 
Land Council chairwoman explained to me that attitudes to patrilineal inheritance 
practices were changing in Arusha: ‘Serikali imepitisha haki sawa ... Haki sawa kwa 
jinsia zote ... Watoto wa kiume na wa kike haki sawa’ (The government has passed 
equal rights [law] ... Everyone has equal rights ... Sons and daughters have equal rights).   
This equality and ‘equal rights’ (haki sawa) discourse appears in many judgments 
concerning female inheritance of land.  There are several examples in Appendix F of 
this thesis.  For example, in case 1 the Ward Tribunal refers to gender equality 
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principles in the Land Acts in upholding a daughter’s claim to inherit her father’s 
shamba and redeem the rehani on it: 
All the members of the tribunal have unanimously decided that in 
accordance with the Land Laws of 1999-2001 the wife and husband have 
equal RIGHTS (HAKI sawa)
232
 to own (kumiliki) land ... 
In case 2, both the Ward Tribunal and DLHT on appeal applied statutory equality 
provisions as the basis of their reasoning for restoring land to daughters that had been 
alienated from them by other members of the family: 
Considering that these are orphans without their father.  Also considering 
that they are girls who are now recognized by the laws and the Nation in 
general as the same as boys.  The tribunal disclaim all the statements by 
[the respondent’s] children that girls do not have inheritance.  (Ward 
Tribunal judgment)
233
 
... the appellant and his allies who want to grab the land from [the 
respondents] are still overwhelmed by old age concept when to many 
societies.  It was believed that a woman has no right to inherit a land, But 
to date things have changed, even our laws have been changed to 
consider the women’s rights of ownership over land is equally the same 
as that of the men, Vide The Land Act 1999 No 4, on s.3(2).  (DLHT 
judgment) 
There are further examples of equality and rights discourse in cases 3 and 4 where the 
women claimants also made successful claims concerning inherited land.  At first 
glance, these judgments appear quite transformative in restoring land to women which 
other family members had tried to deny them.  However, in all four of these cases, the 
women had the support of key family or community leaders in bringing their legal 
claims.  In cases 1 and 2, land had been given to daughters because the deceased father 
had no sons.  This was also the situation in Furaha’s claim, discussed in chapter 4, and 
is a recognised customary practice within Arusha’s local patrilineal tribes.  In cases 3 
and 4 the family elders had supported parental discretion in allocating land to daughters 
as well as sons.  Therefore in fact, whilst these equality statements may indeed reflect 
the tribunals’ normative standpoint, the judgments as a whole reaffirm the decisions of 
                                               
232 Capitalisation is the tribunal’s own. 
233 See Appendix F for the original Kiswahili version. 
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important social actors involved in the dispute.  Seen in this light, the judgments do not 
really challenge the existing social status quo, but rather uphold it. 
Further support for this contention is to be found in the way tribunals approach claims 
between spouses concerning inherited family land.  In these cases discourses of equal 
rights are much less evident.  One explanation for this may be that in local patrilineal 
systems wives and daughters are seen as having different kinds of interests in inherited 
land, and wider family members must customarily be consulted on dispositions.  The 
role of family elders and women’s agency in objecting to dispositions of inherited 
family land is explored in detail in the extended case study in chapter 6.  A comparison 
of cases 7 and 8 in Appendix F neatly illustrates the distinction that is often made 
between inherited and self-acquired land and the implications this may have for 
women’s agency.  Both cases were decided by the same DLHT chairperson.  The wife 
in case 7 was unsuccessful in her claim, which concerned a plot of inherited family 
land.  By contrast, the wife in case 8 was successful in both the Ward Tribunal and 
DLHT, where the land in question had been purchased during the marriage.   
In case 7 an inherited family shamba was mortgaged without the wife’s consent.  The 
husband was unable to repay the mortgage and the wife sought an injunction to declare 
the mortgage void and to prevent the shamba being forfeited to the mortgagee.  Under 
LA the wife had an interest in the shamba as a co-occupant who had contributed her 
labour to the ‘productivity, upkeep and improvement’ of the land.  She was therefore 
statutorily entitled to object to the mortgaging of the shamba and – in the event that it 
was proved that her husband had deliberately misled the mortgagee that she had 
consented – have the disposition declared void.234  However, the chairperson found that 
the inherited family shamba in question was not ‘purely a matrimonial property’ and did 
not apply this statutory provision in the wife’s favour.  Instead the assessors and the 
chairperson were persuaded by the efforts made by the family elders to settle the matter.  
The chairperson considered that the mortgagee had acted in good faith and was entitled 
to be repaid his money through an order for sale: 
... it is my humble belief that [the mortgagee] gave that money to [the 
husband] on good faith and belief that [the husband] had the blessing of 
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his family, as he came with somebody ... who was identified as a son of 
[the husband] ...   
The chairperson also:  
... positively not[ed] efforts made by clan elders meeting of both sides 
which resolved that in order to keep peace and harmony among the 
parties and two bomas (i.e. families) it is prudent and for the interest of 
justice that [the mortgagee] be given his money.   
In case 8, where land had been purchased by the claimant’s husband during the course 
of their marriage, the DLHT took a different approach to the sale without consent.  The 
chairperson and one of the assessors found in the wife’s favour, concluding that the land 
was ‘matrimonial property’ which the wife had been using for over 10 years: ‘... any 
move to dispose of the same then consent of [the wife] be sought first’. 
The DLHT file for case 7 indicated that the wife intended to appeal to the High Court 
Land Division.  Whether or not the DLHT chairperson’s decision was correct in law, 
the two cases clearly demonstrate the distinction that is made in reality between 
inherited and purchased land that is acquired by a married couple.  The cases illustrate 
the difference in wider family members’ interests in land acquired in these two different 
ways, and the implications of this for a wife’s agency to object to dispositions in 
practice.  This conceptual distinction at a social level may permeate the legal sphere of 
judicial decision-making.  
5.5 Using wisdom and commonsense 
The notion that judges can and do in practice make their decisions purely on legal 
grounds has been heavily contested by feminist legal scholars.  Reflecting on her own 
experience of judging, Baroness Hale, the U.K.’s only female Supreme Court judge 
points out: 
[T]he business of judging, especially in the hard cases, often involves a 
choice between different conclusions, any of which it may be possible to 
reach by respectable legal reasoning.  The choice made is likely to be 
motivated at a far deeper level by the judge’s own approach to the law, to 
the problem under discussion and to ideas of what makes a just result. ... 
an important part of feminist jurisprudence has been to explode the myth 
of the disinterested, disengaged, and distant judge.  (Hale 2008: 319-320, 
cited in Hunter 2010: 31). 
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The Ward Tribunal chairwoman’s explanation earlier in this chapter, of her approach to 
adjudication based on using wisdom and local elders, provides one example of how 
social norms influence the decision-making processes of individual adjudicators.  In a 
patriarchal society, where land is allocated according to patrilineal principles, this is 
highly significant for women’s legal claims to land. 
As discussed at 5.3 I found many examples in my fieldwork of cases where women had 
successfully made claims to inherited family land.  However, these claims were 
successful because women had the support of key family elders or community leaders, 
who provided evidence in support of their claims in the tribunal.  Where land is 
unregistered, which is often the case in rural and unplanned urban areas, in order to 
prove an interest in inherited land women must rely on the oral evidence of family 
members who witnessed the allocation and/or their minutes of family meetings.  In 
cases 1-4 in Appendix F each of the women’s claims relied on this kind of evidence; 
and each were successful to the extent that they were supported by elders’ evidence.  
Equally, case 6, which concerned a female orphan’s claim to land, was unsuccessful for 
lack of this kind of evidence in support.  The importance of elders’ evidence also 
extends to spousal disputes concerning dispositions of inherited land.  For example, in 
case 7 the DLHT placed weight on the evidence of elders in reaching its final decision. 
In contrast with these cases, an interesting feature of case 5 is that the Ward Tribunal 
did not fully uphold the woman’s claim to her shamba despite acknowledging the 
evidence from family elders that she had been given the shamba by her father.  The 
judgment states that discussions had taken place between family elders and the tribunal 
members in the latter stage of the legal dispute.  The content of these discussions is not 
disclosed in the Ward Tribunal’s judgment.  However, the judgment indicates that after 
meeting with family elders the decision was made by the tribunal to divide the land 
between the parties – who were patrilateral cousins – ‘to bring peace in the boma’ 
(kuleta amani katika boma) as they were relatives.  It therefore appears that family 
elders nonetheless played an important part in the final outcome.   
Claims between spouses raise different evidential issues which can often introduce 
wider scope for individual judicial discretion.  Claims to land in the context of divorce
145 
 
 
and separation fall to be determined in matrimonial proceedings under the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts.  In land tribunals, claims between spouses often concern disputes 
over dispositions without spousal consent, and contribution claims where the 
relationship does not have a clearly recognised legal status.  This second kind of claim 
can turn on evidential issues concerning the status of the relationship, whether the land 
is considered ‘matrimonial property’ and whether contributions can be proved.  Where 
family elders and local leaders are not witnesses to these matters, tribunals and litigants 
must look to other kinds of evidence to verify claims. 
2.4 of this thesis discussed the ambiguous social and legal status of certain kinds of 
polygamous relationships, including second marriages by Christian husbands, and 
‘concubinage’.  Claims between couples in this kind of relationship often concern 
disputed financial contributions to property that has been purchased in the name of one 
party (usually the man).  Women in this situation do not have the same statutory interest 
in the man’s land as a legal spouse.  Consequently, the status of the parties’ relationship 
often becomes a material issue in the legal claim.  These relationships cannot be proved 
by a marriage certificate; so litigants must rely on other kinds of evidence to prove the 
nature of their relationship and financial contributions.  This may be extremely difficult 
where a relationship has been conducted in secret or where financial contributions to the 
property have been made in cash. 
Cases 10 and 11 both concern financial contributions made by women towards 
properties that had been purchased in a relationship of ‘concubinage’.  The women had 
no documentary proof that they had made the financial contributions.  In both cases the 
men disputed the women’s claimed contributions.  The nature of the parties’ 
relationships was also a contested issue.  In case 10 the chairperson dismissed the 
woman’s claim for lack of evidence: whereas the man had provided a sale agreement in 
support of his claim, the woman could provide no documentary or other proof of her 
cash contribution.   
In case 11 another chairperson took a different approach to assessing the evidence.  The 
man had claimed that the woman was his tenant and owed him unpaid rent.  The woman 
claimed that the parties were in a relationship and she had financially contributed to the 
purchase and development of the disputed plot.  Neither party produced documentary 
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evidence in support of their claims.  The man called the seller of the property, his uncle 
and a workman as witnesses in support of his claim.  The woman called her son, whom 
she claimed to be the son of the claimant, and another workman as witnesses.  She also 
produced a photograph of the parties together.  Although there was no documentary 
proof of the woman’s financial contribution, the chairperson concluded from the 
evidence as a whole that the woman was a ‘concubine’ and went on to infer that she had 
contributed to the development of the land.   
The different outcomes in these two cases illustrate the scope for judicial discretion in 
evaluating evidence where it is difficult for parties to prove the status of their 
relationship and financial contributions.  There is an implicit gendered dimension to the 
approaches adjudicators take to assessing the evidence in these kinds of claims, where 
the woman’s cash contributions are given on the basis of trust and land is very often 
registered in the sole name of the man.  Feminist legal theorists have stressed the 
importance of ‘asking the woman question’ (Bartlett 1990); ‘noticing the gender 
implications of apparently neutral rules and practices’, and paying attention to the 
individuals before the court and the reality of their lived experiences (Hunter 2010: 35).  
In the present context, this calls for adjudicators to pay close attention to the gender 
dimensions of land acquisition within relationships. 
5.6 Conclusion  
The sample of cases discussed in this chapter illustrate that there is considerable overlap 
in the three normative approaches to justice in Tanzania’s plural legal system at 
different levels of land court.  All levels of court are bound by the English and 
Tanzanian common law principles of natural justice and are flexible in the procedures 
they adopt in adjudicating individual claims.  Whilst legal technicality is more evident 
in the DLHT and High Court Land Division than in the Ward Tribunal, ward tribunals 
also use statutory provisions in judging claims (for example cases 1 and 4).  Ward 
tribunals place more emphasis on reconciliation and peace (amani) than the higher 
courts; yet the importance of restoring peace can also be influential in the outcome of 
claims in the DLHT (for example case 7). 
The Kiswahili concepts of haki (justice) and haki sawa (equal rights) are widely used in 
both social and legal contexts.  As the sample of cases and quotations from adjudicators 
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(and elders elsewhere in this thesis) illustrates, the discourse of haki sawa appears to be 
making an impact in social and legal contexts concerning women’s claims to land.  The 
case studies illustrate that paternal discretion to give land to daughters is not necessarily 
new and is not necessarily based on the principle of gender equality.  What is new 
however is that members of ward tribunals and the DLHT in Arusha view the equality 
provisions in the Land Acts as a basis for departing from customary practices where 
they deem it necessary, in order to safeguard women’s interests in land.  This appears to 
reflect a legal centralist approach to normative pluralism in Tanzania’s legal system.  
In practice however, normative pluralism in this context is not quite so straightforward.  
Since most legal disputes turn on their facts rather than points of law, cutting across 
these various normative approaches to justice is the crucial question of how evidence is 
obtained and weighed in practice: what, or rather, whose evidence counts?  The 
discussion of evidence-gathering by tribunals at 5.2 demonstrated the pivotal role of 
family elders and local leaders as witnesses in the tribunal and on site visits, as well as 
in the production of documentation such as family meeting minutes and sale contracts.  
Where land is unregistered, litigants in cases concerning inherited land in particular 
must find allies in these key actors if they are to be successful in their legal claim.  As 
discussed in chapter 4, as well as acting as witnesses, these actors are also gatekeepers 
to legal processes.  This may help to explain why many claims to inherited land by 
women that reach the stage of a legal claim are ultimately successful.  It is not that 
tribunals are radically challenging patrilineal processes of land allocation.  In effect, 
social processes determine which women’s claims will be supported through the legal 
process, and tribunals endorse these social decisions.  
In the context of claims between parties in relationships that are not legally recognised, 
different evidential issues are raised. Yet, the way adjudicators assess these claims is 
also implicitly gendered.  This is because gender dynamics often underpin processes of 
making sales contracts and registering land titles in a man’s sole name; and women 
typically do not ask for receipts from their partners for their financial contributions 
because their relationship is based on trust.  If adjudicators attach greater weight to 
documentation than to other kinds of more circumstantial evidence, they adopt an 
approach to assessing evidence which effectively tends to favour male claimants.   
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These gendered biases in evidence-gathering and assessment in inheritance and spousal 
disputes illustrate the patriarchal nature of law in the context of women’s claims to land.  
This is underscored by the male dominated environment of some tribunals and the 
social challenges facing some women who are very unused to speaking for themselves 
in male dominated fora.  The legislative pen has enshrined women’s equal rights to land 
in statute, and adjudicators in Arusha’s land tribunals appear ready and willing to 
reinterpret customary practices to give effect to women’s land rights.  However, if 
tribunals are to do justice to women’s claims to land in practice, adjudicators must be 
alert to the gendered evidential challenges that women face in proving their claims.  
Whilst there are problems for adjudicators in basing their judgments on testimony 
which may have little or no corroboration, at present it appears that tribunals are also at 
times too quick to reach a decision based on quite scanty documentary evidence. 
Whether adjudicators use ‘wisdom’ or ‘commonsense’, I would contend that for 
substantial justice to be done in women’s claims to land it is necessary for tribunals to 
‘ask the woman question’ as an integral part of the process of gathering and assessing 
evidence. 
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6. ‘Shamba ni langu’ (the shamba is mine): 
A case study of gender, power and law in action 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter returns to the shamba on the slopes of Mount Meru where this thesis 
began, to develop further the major themes discussed in chapters 2 - 5 through a single 
extended case study.
235
  The case study is both typical and exceptional as an example of 
women’s claims to land in Arusha.  The substantive issue - that family land was sold by 
a husband without his wife’s consent - is a common cause of land disputes between 
spouses in Arusha.  The case is also exceptional - as an example of a claim that was 
pursued from Ward Tribunal to High Court.  Although relatively few claims by women 
villagers make it as far as the High Court, analysing the process of the dispute from 
family and community through the hierarchy of the courts offers important insight into 
the way in which women’s claims to land are constructed, progressed, transformed, and 
adjudicated upon.   
Chapter 4 of this thesis explored issues of agency and power dynamics in legal 
disputing processes, whilst chapter 5 considered procedural and substantive aspects of 
doing justice through an analysis of a number of judgments.  This chapter goes further, 
bringing together these issues with an analysis of how actors construct and pursue their 
legal claims through courtroom discourse.  Taking a transcript of court proceedings as a 
primary data source, the analysis pays particular attention to gendered subjectivity and 
the role of customary practices in the construction and contestation of legal claims.  The 
analysis is supported by further data collected on visits to the shamba in question as 
well as interviews with a number of actors involved in the dispute.   
The analysis is particularly informed by Hirsch’s (1998) methodological approach to 
studying gendered discourses of disputing in Kenyan Kadhi courts.  This in turn applies 
Butler’s (1993) theory that gendered subjectivity is constructed through performance by 
subjects engaged in social life.  Hirsch’s socio-linguistic study focuses on ‘how power 
operates discursively to constitute categories of persons, often using gendered terms, 
and how people positioned through local and global discourses enact and (sometimes) 
                                               
235 In order to preserve the anonymity of individuals, pseudonyms are used throughout and some changes 
have been brought to the exact circumstances and identifying features of the dispute. 
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contest their construction as gendered subjects’ (Hirsch 1998: 18-19).  This present 
legal study of the law in action re-orientates Hirsch’s socio-linguistic approach to 
consider how gendered subjectivity is used to substantively make legal claims to land 
and in turn constructs gendered power relations between those who lay claims to the 
land.  Further, I consider how discursive construction of gendered relations to land 
impacts upon the adjudication of claims by tribunals.     
6.1 Origins of the dispute and the framing of claims 
The shamba in dispute is quite a typical Arusha family shamba, approximately one acre 
in size, in a rural village on the slopes of Mount Meru.  Over time, claims to the shamba 
have been visibly staked through the cultivation of crops and other marks made by 
people on the land.  The boundaries of the shamba are demarcated partly by hedgerows 
and partly by grass, and the plot has been divided by a narrow mud pathway.  On it 
grow mature banana trees – permanent crops planted by previous generations, as well as 
young maize, beans and some young non-native trees, which were planted by the buyer 
of the land after he thought the seller – ‘Paulo’, had won the case.  There is a notice 
nailed to a tree on the land – a temporary High Court injunction granted in favour of the 
claimant – ‘Naserian’ – entitling her to use the land to cultivate non-permanent crops, at 
least for the time being.  Naserian is the wife of Paulo.  Their family, like many other 
families in this rural village, rely on the land, both to produce crops as a source of 
household income and as a place to raise their children and keep livestock.   
The dispute began in 2005 when the shamba was sold without Naserian’s consent.  Her 
claim to the shamba stemmed from her marriage into the boma to Paulo in 1999.  
According to Arusha tradition, generally a son can expect to be allocated a portion of 
his father’s land upon marriage.  In this case the land in question had been Paulo’s 
father’s and his father’s before him.  When Paulo’s father – ‘Babu’ passed away, his 
brother ‘Leleyo’ was appointed as guardian for the family.  This left the shamba in the 
hands of Naserian’s mother-in-law – ‘Bibi’ by virtue of her own marriage into the 
boma.  For Naserian’s marriage the shamba had been pledged to another family 
member in exchange for cows to use as her bridewealth.  Whilst the shamba had 
remained pledged under rehani the pledgee himself had been cultivating it.  
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Naserian wanted to be shown the shamba that she would be tilling and went to see Bibi.  
One source told me that shortly before the legal dispute began, the pledgee as a family 
member had given permission at a boma meeting to allow Naserian to build a house on 
the land and make a living by cultivating the shamba.  However, no evidence to this 
effect explicitly appears anywhere in the transcript of proceedings.  According to the 
evidence of Bibi and clan elders in the Ward Tribunal, Naserian was shown the shamba 
and a portion of the shamba was divided for Naserian by clan elders in the presence of 
the pledgee.  Naserian was told that she would need to work to repay the rehani on the 
shamba herself.   
Time passed and Naserian got word that the shamba was being sold.  In her evidence to 
the Ward Tribunal Naserian describes how she was told by her husband, Paulo and 
others that the shamba would be sold despite her refusal.  Naserian went to see Leleyo 
as her family guardian.  He in turn contacted his fellow family elders and a boma 
meeting was held to look into the matter.  Meanwhile, according to the boma chairman, 
Paulo took a kilo of sugar to the chairman’s house to ask for permission to sell the 
shamba.  The chairman refused and his decision was confirmed at the boma meeting.  
However, as it would later transpire, the shamba had already been sold.   
Suspicions that the shamba had been sold were aroused when Leleyo heard that cows 
had been taken to the pledgee in order to redeem the land.  The pledgee rejected the 
cows.  New trees planted on the land were further evidence of a change of ownership.  
Clan elders claimed that at a subsequent boma meeting Paulo eventually admitted to 
having sold the shamba.  On the advice of the local diwani (councillor) Naserian took 
her claim to the Ward Tribunal.  However, when the Ward Tribunal heard the matter, 
Paulo denied any knowledge of the shamba or that he had sold it.  Instead, Bibi as 
Paulo’s only witness claimed that she had sold it in order to enable her to rebuild 
Naserian’s and her own house which had recently fallen down in the rains.  Crucially, 
her evidence was supported at the Ward Tribunal’s site visit by the local Village 
Chairman who told the Tribunal that he had given his consent to the transaction 
proceeding.  Ultimately it was his evidence that the Ward Tribunal relied upon in its 
judgment that at the moment of sale the land had still belonged to Bibi. 
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Although Naserian as mdai (claimant) and Paulo as mdaiwa (respondent) were the legal 
parties to the proceedings in the Ward Tribunal and beyond, the act of selling the 
shamba opened up no less than six competing claims to it.  Of these six claims it is 
notable that Paulo, who ordinarily would have inherited land from his father and 
allegedly sold the shamba, was the only one who did not seek to stake a claim to it in 
the Ward Tribunal.  Besides the parties to the case, Bibi effectively made a historic 
claim to the land as the purported seller; clan elders made claims as guardians of the 
land for past, present and future generations; the pledgee claimed a debt of cows in 
exchange for his interest in the land; and the buyer staked his claim physically by 
planting trees on the land.   
The claims of the pledgee and the buyer were only indirectly heard through the voices 
of other actors in the Ward Tribunal proceedings.  Despite their interest in the land they 
were not joined as parties and there is nothing in the transcripts to indicate that this 
issue was considered by the Tribunal.  The elder who divided the land and Bibi each 
describe how the buyer made his interest in the shamba known – by planting trees on 
the land.  The pledgee’s voice was heard indirectly through the guardian - Leleyo, the 
family elder who divided the land, Bibi and the Village Chairman.  Each of them told of 
the pledgee’s refusal to receive cows to redeem the shamba.   
The ways in which these various actors discursively construct the shamba reveals much 
about why disputes arise when family land is sold to an ‘outsider’ without family 
consent.  On one construction the shamba forms part of family and clan identity, 
connecting and sustaining past, present and future generations as a home, a place for 
growing food, rearing livestock and raising children.  Marriage and death are therefore 
the key events at which claims to land are traditionally observed.  Although family land 
may nominally be held by an individual, wider family members retain an interest in it.  
This is illustrated in the present case by the expectation that claims to the shamba 
should be raised at the arobaini (mourning ceremony) held after Babu’s death, the 
responsibility of clan elders to divide and allocate the shamba to Naserian, and the 
requirement for clan elders to consent to any sale.  Alternatively, the shamba is 
constructed as an owned economic asset which can be sold to anyone for the personal 
financial gain of the individual in possession of it.   
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These two constructions of the shamba, as a resource which also symbolises family and 
clan identity, and as a private economic asset, are not however completely dichotomous.  
The case illustrates how on both constructions land is regarded as currency which can 
be exchanged for cash, animals and, through bridewealth – women and children.  
However, whereas sale of family land to someone outside the family constitutes 
permanent alienation of the land which will usually be met with great disapproval by 
family elders, pledging land through rehani for a reason such as bridewealth, is 
commonplace and does not sever the family from the land.  Moreover, rehani pledges 
are frequently made to a pledgee within the wider family.  Rehani constructs a 
relationship whereby return of the animals or cash to the pledgee serves to repay the 
debt and redeem the land. 
6.2 The dispute in the Ward Tribunal 
Evidence given in a Ward Tribunal is written down simultaneously by the tribunal 
secretary.  As such, a secretary’s transcript of ward tribunal proceedings constitutes the 
official record of the trial tribunal and is relied upon by higher levels of court as 
constituting an accurate account of what was said.
236
  It should be noted that for the 
purpose of an academic case study, it cannot be claimed that the official transcript of the 
proceedings constitutes a complete or wholly verbatim transcription of the evidence 
presented to the Ward Tribunal.  With this caveat in mind, the Ward Tribunal transcript 
in this case is nonetheless extremely rich in cultural and linguistic detail and reveals 
much about subject positionings and power dynamics between actors and how they seek 
to contest competing claims and persuade the tribunal.   
As is often the case in court proceedings, the evidence as a whole contains many 
contradictions and inconsistencies, both within the evidence of a witness and between 
witnesses.  In contrast to an English court’s approach to resolving inconsistencies by 
focussing on chronology and details of events; timescales, dates and the sequence of 
events are rarely identified in this case.  Much of the individual narratives move non-
sequentially between events that occur several years apart, with no indication as to how 
much time has passed in-between.  Some important issues appear to be left unresolved.  
                                               
236 A translated version of the Ward Tribunal transcript discussed in this chapter is contained in a separate 
annexe, which is available from the author upon request – translation by Miriam Matinda and Helen 
Dancer. 
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An appeal tribunal unfamiliar with the land and people in question would need to spend 
a great deal of time carefully considering the various conflicting accounts to make an 
assessment of the evidence and legal merits of the different claims.  
The claimant - Naserian 
Naserian founds her claim to the shamba not by recourse to her statutory rights, but by 
reference to local customary practices concerning the allocation of land to a woman 
upon marriage.  As such, her claim is rooted in her own construction of her gender 
identity, as a young wife married into the boma who is responsible for tilling her 
husband’s family land as part of her marital role.  Naserian establishes the basis of her 
claim in her first sentence: 
Naserian: I say that the shamba is mine because when I came to that 
boma I asked Bibi when I met her where is the shamba that I will be 
tilling; she told me there was one. ... (Mimi ninasema shamba ni langu 
kwa kuwa nimekuja katika boma hilo nikamwambia Bibi niliyemkuta 
likowapi shamba nitakalo lima akaniambia lipo.)   
Naserian narrates the process of asking to see her portion of land as a new wife in the 
boma and being shown it in the traditional way by Bibi and the clan elders.  She further 
links herself to the shamba by reference to her responsibility for redeeming the rehani 
that was pledged for her bridewealth.  As is clear from her final sentence (below), she 
contests the possibility that the shamba was still with Bibi on the basis that Bibi did not 
make a claim to it at the arobaini held after Babu’s death: 
Because if she [Bibi] had stood up in the boma meeting and said that the 
shamba is her property I would not have troubled myself with that 
shamba (Maana ingekuwa ameamka kwenye kikao cha boma na akasema 
shamba ni mali yake nisingeangaika na hilo shamba). 
The language used by Naserian conveys her sense of responsibility for cultivating the 
shamba rather than a right to own it.  This is illustrated by Naserian’s question to Bibi: 
‘... where is the shamba that I will be tilling ...’ (... liko wapi shamba nitakalo lima ...). 
Although the shamba is referred to in various places as ‘mine’, ‘the child’s’, ‘Bibi’s’, or 
‘ours’ these possessives appear to reflect a sense of shared responsibility for the shamba 
as land that is held by, for and between successive generations.  It may be ‘mine’ to use 
for the time being, but ultimately the shamba is commonly regarded as being an object 
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of the family, which is passed from one generation to the next, never to be owned, 
bought or sold by a single individual acting unilaterally.  This is encapsulated in the 
following question from the Tribunal members and the guardian, Leleyo’s response: 
Question: Is this shamba your boma’s or was it bought? Answer: It’s ours 
(Swali: Je shamba hili ni la boma lenu au imenunuliwa? Jibu: ni yetu). 
In Naserian’s narrative this sense of responsibility for the shamba and the importance 
that she attaches to it for maintaining family life is reflected in her repeated refusal to 
agree to the sale:   
Naserian: I told him this shamba will absolutely not be sold ... 
(Nikamwambia halitauzwa kabisa shamba hili ...); and her determination 
to redeem the shamba despite being twice prevented from doing so by 
other actors: ‘I still haven’t given up’ (bado sijakata tama). 
Naserian’s language, which conveys determination and responsibility, is qualified by a 
sense of limited agency over the fate of the shamba, which is ‘to be sold’ by other 
actors in greater positions of authority, despite her legal right to refuse sale.  In the 
following extract note the repeated use of the passive construction by Naserian when 
narrating decisions concerning the future of the shamba and her housing arrangements 
(passive constructions emboldened for emphasis):   
Naserian: He [the chairman] told me the shamba will be sold and you 
will be built a house and bought a shamba.  I told him this shamba will 
absolutely not be sold for me to be built a house.  Because the boma had 
sat it was decided they would give support for me to be built a house. 
(Akaniambia shamba litauzwa na utajengewa nyumba na utanunuliwa 
shamba.  Nikamwambia halitauzwa kabisa shamba hili nijengewe 
nyumba.  Maana boma imekaa ikaamuliwa wapasue nguzo kuchanga 
nijengewe nyumba.) 
Various actors discursively construct Naserian as an actor who has limited agency, 
despite her legal rights.  There is a commonly understood expectation that the older 
generation (including Bibi) have a responsibility to look after wives as ‘children’ 
(watoto) brought into the boma.  The limits of Naserian’s agency over her own property 
as a wife are most graphically illustrated when Paulo becomes involved in a fight and he 
uses Naserian’s animals, which she had bought to redeem the shamba, as compensation 
to pay for his wrongdoing.  In relation to the shamba, Naserian is told by the 
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chairman
237
 that if she refuses the sale the consequences are that she will be left without 
a husband – a role that as a woman she is told by the chairman she can never fulfil:  
Naserian [quoting the chairman]: ... will you be the husband if your 
husband is sent to jail? (... utakuwa mume ikiwa mume wako atapelekwa 
magereza?)   
There are many other examples in the transcript of discourse which reinforces the 
authority of male elders over family life and land.  These include appointment of the 
deceased’s brother as family guardian after Babu’s death; questioning why Naserian did 
not make a request for assistance to redeem the shamba at the arobaini; refusal of the 
pledgee to accept cows to redeem the shamba from anyone other than an elder; 
responsibility of the boma to build Naserian a house or offer her a place to stay; 
expectations that clan elders and brothers-in-law will be consulted or take responsibility 
for helping to rebuild the houses; Paulo taking a kilogram of sugar to the chairman of 
the boma to seek permission to sell the shamba, and so on.  
Without her own documentary evidence that the land was given to her or sold, Naserian 
was wholly reliant on the support and oral evidence of clan elders and the minutes of 
their meetings to corroborate her account.  This illustrates that whilst in local patrilineal 
systems of land tenure, women can generally expect to have access to their husband’s 
family land; in circumstances of a dispute women may find themselves on shaky ground 
when it comes to actually proving their claim, and are reliant on good social relations 
with male elders of the family to try to substantiate it.   
In this case three clan elders gave evidence in support of Naserian in the Ward Tribunal 
– Leleyo, the chairman of the boma, and the elder who divided the land.  Boma meeting 
minutes were referred to as proof that the boma did not consent to a sale.  However, the 
credibility of the elders’ evidence was directly challenged in several places by both 
Paulo and the Tribunal members.  For example, it was noted that the minutes which 
were produced included names of elders who were not present at the meeting.  The 
chairman was unable to say how many cows were given in exchange for pledging the 
shamba, and there were contradictions between the elders concerning whether the 
shamba was pledged before or after Babu died.   
                                               
237 It is unclear from the transcript whether the chairman she refers to here is the chairman of her boma or 
the Village Chairman. 
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Questions from the tribunal members by reference to local customary practices also 
served to highlight apparent weaknesses in Naserian’s claim.  For example Naserian 
admitted that she never tilled the shamba, and Paulo’s elder brother was not present at 
the time of the allocation, thereby casting doubts on whether the land was ever given to 
her.  Naserian did not raise the issue of redemption at the arobaini meeting - the 
traditional place to stake a claim.  When asked, she admitted that she had no 
documentary evidence to support her claim.   
The respondent - Paulo 
Whereas Naserian founds her claim on her gendered responsibilities and positioning as 
a wife married into the boma, in contrast the basis of Paulo’s case as respondent is 
denial. This runs throughout his answers to questions from his wife.  Paulo’s evidence 
consists of a single sentence in which he places responsibility for sale of the shamba on 
his mother, Bibi; however, he does not substantiate this further through a narrative of 
his own: 
I Paulo I don’t know I feel sad because I have been brought here and I 
haven’t sold the land, the one who sold it is Bibi (my mother) ... (Mimi 
Paulo sijui nasikitika kwajili nimeletwa hapa na mimi sijauza shamba 
aliyeuza shamba ni Bibi (mama yangu) ...) 
The contrasting ways in which the parties construct and present their claims illustrates 
the distinction between ‘relational’ and ‘rule-oriented’ accounts.238  Naserian’s account 
may be characterised as ‘relational’ - focusing on social relations, positions and 
expectations.  Naserian asks very few questions of other actors to forward her claim and 
her questions of both Paulo and Bibi are event-based rather than rule-based.  Paulo’s 
evidence is more ‘rule-oriented’ and challenges the apparent weaknesses in others’ 
claims by reference to certain principles.
239
  Paulo’s rule-based approach is evident in 
                                               
238 For further discussion of ‘relational’ and ‘rule-oriented’ accounts see Conley and O’Barr (2005: 67-68) 
and 4.4 of this thesis.  Gender differences in male and female courtroom discourse have been noted 
elsewhere.  For example, Hirsch observes a distinction between women’s storytelling narratives and 
men’s authoritative ‘meta-narratives’ in Kenyan Khadi courts, the latter of which enable men to place 
themselves on the same terms as the Khadi hearing the case (Hirsch 1998: 165-179).   
239 The extent to which these contrasting approaches to persuading a court may be considered intrinsically 
gendered is questioned by Conley and O’Barr.  They argue that although studies reveal a gendered 
distribution of the two kinds of accounts, gender influences this indirectly.  They suggest that the ability 
to produce rule-oriented accounts is a skill which tends to be acquired by those who have exposure to 
cultures of business and law, which are largely male-dominated spheres (Conley and O’Barr 2005: 73). 
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his questioning style.  In the following extracts he cross-examines Naserian and the 
elder who divided the shamba on principles of rehani: 
Paulo’s question [to Naserian]: When you say you went to be apportioned 
a shamba is it possible for a shamba which is pledged to be divided?  
(Swali: Unaposema umekwenda kugawiwa shamba je shamba lililoko 
katika rehani inawezekana likagawiwa?)  
Naserian: Yes it was divided by my Father-in-law (Jibu: ndio 
limegawiwa na Baba mkwe) 
 
... 
Paulo’s question [to the elder who divided the land]: When you say you 
went to divide the shamba can a pledged shamba be divided? (Swali: 
unaposema umekwenda kugawa shamba je shamba liliko rehani 
linagawanywa?) 
Elder: Yes, because if you can redeem it you can go on and redeem it. 
(Jibu: Ndio maana ukiweza kulikomboa ukomboe.) 
The Tribunal members question Paulo’s defence in two ways.  Firstly, they question 
him on his attitude to his wife’s authority to refuse sale of family land – her statutory 
right.  Secondly, they challenge the possibility that he would not be given a shamba as a 
son in the boma – his customary expectation: 
Question: As your wife has she the power to protect all of your property? 
(Swali: Je anaweza kuwa mke wako anauwezo wa kulinda mali zako 
zote?) 
Answer: Yes (Jibu: ndio) 
Question: Do you deny what she has said as your wife?  
(Swali: Je unaweza kukataa neno ambalo amekueleza na wakati ni mke 
wako?) 
Answer: I deny it because I don’t know that shamba. (Jibu: Nilimkataa 
maana sijui shamba hilo.) 
Question: We have been told you are three, so which number child are 
you? (Swali: Tumeelezwa kuwa mpo watatu je wewe ni mtoto wangapi?) 
Answer: Third (Jibu: Watatu) 
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Question: How can you say you don’t have a shamba? (Swali: Unawezaje 
kusema wewe hauna shamba?) 
Answer: I have two shamba plots, but I can’t enter in an area where I am 
not welcomed. (Jibu: Mimi nina shamba vipande viwili, bali siwezi 
kuingilia katika eneo ambalo sijakaribishwa.) 
Question: Are you tilling those shambas? (Swali: Je unalima hizo 
shamba?) 
Answer: Yes. (Jibu: Ndio.) 
Ultimately however, these potential weaknesses in his evidence are not determinative in 
the Ward Tribunal’s judgment.  
Bibi 
Paulo’s defence relies heavily on his mother, who makes an admission in her brief 
evidence that she was the one who sold the shamba.  However, she does not claim that 
the shamba was ‘her’s’ at the time it was sold.  In her replies to the tribunal members’ 
questions she admits that the shamba had been allocated to Naserian, but she 
nevertheless justifies the decision to sell the shamba on the basis of necessity – the 
shamba was all her husband left to her and no one helped her to repair the houses that 
fell down in the rains.  At the site visit she further justified the sale because she had 
been unsuccessful in asking the pledgee to increase the rehani on the shamba.  She then 
asked ‘the government’ (meaning the Village Chairman) for agreement to the sale of the 
shamba and he accepted.   
In a similar way to Naserian, the overarching tenor of Bibi’s account is one of taking 
responsibility for the protection of ‘her children’ under circumstances of limited agency; 
thereby minimising any liability that might have arisen from her sale of the land.  In 
short her defence as a non-party to the proceedings is that there was nothing else she 
could have done in the circumstances and she acted in the best interests of herself and 
the future generations of her husband.  However, it is noticeable from the transcript that 
the lack of compliance with the legal procedures for sale,
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 and Naserian’s right to 
object to the sale as a ‘derivative right holder’ were issues apparently left unexplored in 
evidence.  As to why Bibi and the Village Chairman allowed the sale to proceed without 
                                               
240 VLA s.30, LA s.161(3)(b). 
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involving Naserian or any other boma elders is an important issue which is left 
unresolved. 
Role of local leaders in the dispute – the Village Chairman 
The Village Chairman is the final actor, who was present when the Ward Tribunal 
conducted a site visit to the shamba.  His influence is notable in the Ward Tribunal’s 
judgment.  The transcript records that he saw it as part of his role to address the problem 
of the collapsed houses by telling Bibi’s sons and Naserian to join efforts with the boma 
to rebuild them.  On his evidence he accepted a letter signed by Bibi and her sons and 
daughter (but not Naserian) seeking permission from ‘the government’ to transfer the 
shamba so that Bibi could secure her housing situation.  He supports Bibi’s account that 
she sold it and unsuccessfully attempted to redeem it with cows afterwards.  He claims 
no son objected but he did not involve Naserian or the wider family.  In fact he 
maintains that he had tried to get the chairman of the clan and the pledgee arrested for 
building a house on the shamba.  He is critical of the elders’ and pledgee’s involvement 
in the dispute:  
Village Chairman: So the ones who are causing this disturbance are the 
pledgee and those elders of the clan without looking at the fate of the 
widow ... (Hivyo wanaoendesha vurugu hii ni mwekewa rehani na wale 
wazee wa ukoo bila kuangalia hatima ya mama mjane ...) 
The judgment of the tribunal members relies heavily on his account, discrediting the 
clan elders and finding that Naserian was never given the shamba - despite Bibi 
acknowledging this in her own evidence. 
Ward Tribunal judgment 
In their judgment the tribunal members found that Bibi had been left the shamba by her 
deceased husband and that she had pledged it for bridewealth and later sold it on the 
advice of the Village Chairman in order to rebuild the houses that had fallen down in 
the rains.  No reference is made in the judgment to the evidence from various witnesses 
- including the clan elders and Bibi herself - that the shamba had been divided for 
Naserian.  Instead, the tribunal members concluded that Naserian had not tilled or been 
given the shamba by Bibi.  The Ward Tribunal ruled that the mmiliki (owner/possessor) 
of the shamba was Bibi, not the claimant or the respondent.  They also found that the 
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pledgee (who had not given evidence before the tribunal himself) had tricked Bibi and 
refused to accept the cows to redeem the shamba because he had wanted to take it for 
himself.  They found that Leleyo had been of no help to Bibi but that ‘the government’ 
(meaning the village government) had ‘stood firm to defend the right of the widow 
Bibi’ (Serikali ilisimama imara kutetea haki ya bibi huyu mjane ... ) to get the help in 
order to rebuild the damaged houses. 
The tribunal members were of the opinion that the true respondent should have been 
Bibi, not Paulo; however they did not join her as a party to the proceedings.  This would 
later prove to be an issue of crucial importance upon appeal.  Their final determination 
was that the respondent Paulo had ‘won’ the case (mdaiwa katika shauri hili [Paulo] 
ameshinda).  The Ward Tribunal further stated that the cows and goats should be 
returned to the pledgee through the village government.  When the matter was first 
brought to the Ward Tribunal a stop order was issued, which prevented anyone from 
building or doing anything else permanent to the land.  At some point a house was built 
on the land.  At the site visit the Village Chairman claimed that this house was built by 
the pledgee with the clan elders.  Although it is not stated in the tribunal proceedings, I 
was told that this house had been built by clan elders for Naserian.  The tribunal ruled 
that the house should be removed immediately and that those who had trespassed on the 
shamba by building the house should be dealt with by the village government and Ward 
Executive Officer under their powers.  This house was later destroyed. 
The tribunal members’ opinion on the role and powers of clan elders gives some insight 
into their perspective on the case generally: 
The tribunal also suggests that when a husband dies and leaves his wife 
as owner/possessor of all the property it’s the wife’s and children’s not 
the clan elders’ because many of them now don’t follow ethical 
procedures which they were given they put income first.  What will 
become of the orphans and widows? (Baraza pia linapendekeza kuwa 
mume anapokuwa amefariki akamwacha mke mmiliki wa mali yote ni 
mke na watoto na sio wazee wa ukoo kwani wengi wao sasa hawafuati 
taratibu za maadili walizopewa wanatanguliza mapato.  Je yatima na 
wajane watafanywaje?) 
The Ward Tribunal judgment appears to rest almost entirely on the account given by the 
Village Chairman at the site visit.  The tribunal members are critical of the clan elders 
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and their perceived failure to act to protect Bibi and Naserian, whose houses had fallen 
down – further echoing the stated opinion of the Village Chairman.  No reference is 
made to any of the evidence which supported Naserian’s case.  There is no evaluation of 
the competing witness accounts or the weight to be accorded to minutes of boma 
meetings.  The tribunal does not consider Naserian’s customary interests in the land and 
her statutory rights under the Land Acts to object to the sale. 
6.3 The dispute escalates 
The local mwenyekiti wa kitongoji had become involved in the case and gave Naserian 
shelter and support.  Three months after the Ward Tribunal’s judgment she appealed to 
the DLHT.  Whilst the appeal process was ongoing the dispute took on a parallel 
political dimension when the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji himself was arrested, threatened 
and cursed by some people who were close to him.  The mwenyekiti wa kitongoji 
believed that his arrest and the threats and curses were engineered in an attempt to 
intimidate and stop him from helping Naserian and discouraging anyone else from 
helping her.   
During my interviews I was told that there had been growing discontent amongst many 
of the villagers about the Village Chairman’s conduct in a number of village matters.  
Eventually, a village meeting was convened by all the wenyekiti wa vitongoji of the 
village, attended by several hundred villagers and the local councillor.  The Village 
Chairman was impeached on a number of grounds including unlawful sale of family 
land, and a new chairman was elected in his place.   
These political matters were not raised before the DLHT.  Nine months later the DLHT 
produced its decision.  The chairperson hearing the case noted that as it was brought 
outside the 45 day time limit the appeal was technically time barred,
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 but nevertheless 
gave judgment on the merits of the appeal – perhaps an example of the flexible 
approach of Tanzanian courts to technicalities where there are litigants in person.  The 
grounds of appeal stated that the Ward Tribunal did not evaluate the evidence of the 
guardian and clan elders or the minutes of the clan meeting.  However, the chairperson 
noted that the minutes showed that Bibi was not in attendance at the meeting and that by 
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that time the land had already been sold.  The chairperson described the land as ‘leased’ 
(rather than pledged) in order to pay bridewealth.   
Upholding the decision of the Ward Tribunal and dismissing the appeal the chairperson 
found that the land had still been the property of Bibi when it was sold.  The finding 
was based on Naserian’s own replies to questions – that she had not tilled the land 
herself.  However, the chairperson did not consider in the judgment the legal question of 
whether procedures for sale under the Land Acts had been complied with.  In particular, 
VLA offers legal protection against sale for ‘derivative’ right-holders, including 
successors in title.
242
   
Some five months later Paulo made an application for execution requesting: 
The judgment debtor [Naserian] be evicted from the suit land. 
A permanent injunction order be issued to restrain the judgment debtor or 
her agents, servants or heirs from interfering with the decree holder 
[Paulo] in his peaceful enjoyment of the suit land.  
Having lost her original application and subsequent appeal Naserian sought legal advice 
for the first time.  Unable to afford an advocate she eventually obtained legal help from 
a legal aid clinic.  By this time her legal options for appeal had become extremely 
limited.  She was too late to lodge an appeal against the substantive appeal judgment of 
the DLHT and was faced with eviction from the shamba.  However the decision of the 
Ward Tribunal that Bibi – not Paulo, was the owner of the shamba left open the 
possibility of a technical legal defence to the application for execution: Paulo did not 
have the locus standi
243
 to make the application because the Ward Tribunal had 
determined that the land did not belong to him. 
There is a brief note in English on the DLHT record of the submissions made by the 
parties at the execution hearing, which would have been conducted in Kiswahili: 
Applicant: I pray this tribunal to make an order so that I can be given that 
land and the judgment debtor be evicted as I won at the ward tribunal and 
to this tribunal. 
                                               
242 VLA s.30(4)(b). 
243 i.e. the right of a party to appear and be heard before a court. 
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Respondent: I will reply on my written submission.  I pray the tribunal to 
consider the same. 
The central argument in the written submission for the Respondent, which was 
produced in English reads as follows: 
... the suit land was declared by both the trial tribunal and the appellate 
tribunal to be the lawful property of the alleged decree holder’s mother 
after analyzing the evidence tendered and in that respect the alleged 
decree holder has no locus standi to make this application for execution 
for the land which is not his. 
However the argument failed to persuade the DLHT and an injunctive order was made 
to permanently restrain Naserian from entering the shamba: 
 ... I have perused the judgment at the ward tribunal and found that, the 
judgment pronounced the decree holder as the winner of that suit land, I 
quote: ‘... katika shauri hili [Paulo] ameshinda’ end of quotation.  This 
decision was also confirmed by the District Land and Housing Tribunal, I 
believe the judgment debtor has failed to show cause why execution 
against the suit land should not be carried out. 
In the execution ruling it appears that the DLHT missed a key issue: whilst the Ward 
Tribunal had declared Paulo ‘the winner’ it also made a clear finding that Bibi was the 
owner of the shamba and should have been the respondent to the proceedings, not 
Paulo.  This was to form the basis of a further appeal to the High Court Land Division. 
The legal issue of locus standi was Naserian’s only remaining legal route to regaining 
use of the shamba after failing to appeal in time against the first DLHT judgment, 
which was itself an appeal out of time.  The legal technicality argument represented a 
significant departure from the substantive moral basis of her original claim against sale 
of the land - that the shamba was hers by virtue of her marriage into the boma.  Her 
original moral claim was also supportable by her legal right to refuse sale of family 
land; even though she was not aware of her legal rights at that stage.  Pursuing claims 
through courts and tribunals often involves a reconstruction of moral claims in a way 
which will persuade a court to give a legal ruling in a party’s favour.  Having failed to 
appeal within statutory time limits, Naserian’s moral claim was transformed into 
technical appeal points in order to access the higher levels of court.  The language of her 
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claim was in turn reconstructed, from the moral claim - shamba ni langu to the technical 
Latin legal argument - locus standi.   
6.4 Appeal to the High Court Land Division 
Three weeks after lodging her High Court appeal against the execution ruling, the house 
on the shamba was destroyed, crops were uprooted and trees planted.  With the 
assistance of the legal aid clinic Naserian issued an urgent application for a temporary 
High Court injunction to restrain Paulo and the buyer from disturbing her occupation of 
the land.  In a subsequent counter-affidavit Paulo stated that after the execution ruling in 
the DLHT court brokers had been appointed and performed their duty.  In the affidavit 
written in English accompanying Naserian’s application, the substantive moral basis of 
her original claim re-emerged: 
... the applicant depends on the suit land for day-to-day need.  The suit 
land has been used by the applicant for raising her kids and paying for 
school fees.  
.... the applicant has no any other farm/land which she can use for 
cultivation so as to enable her to feed her children. 
Naserian represented herself and Paulo was absent at the hearing of the application for 
an injunction.  The hearing would have been conducted in Kiswahili though the note of 
the applicant’s submissions on the court file is in English: 
I pray for interim order to stop him from doing anything whatsoever 
regarding the suit land. 
On the basis of the applicant’s submissions and affidavit in support the High Court 
granted a temporary injunction:  
... restraining the respondent, his agents, workmen or whosoever from 
damaging, alienating or rather doing any other act whatsoever regarding 
the suit land that may prejudice the interest of the applicant herein until 
determination of the application inter partes. 
The injunction was nailed to a tree on the shamba and Naserian returned to cultivate 
vegetables on the land.  The temporary injunction did not allow her to plant permanent 
crops or build a house.  Over the course of the next year and a half the case was listed 
and adjourned several times due to the absence of one or other party or the judiciary.  A 
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few months after the temporary injunction was granted the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji was 
arrested again for allegedly threatening to harm the buyer with a machete.  While he 
was remanded in custody the banana trees in the shamba were slashed.  The prosecution 
failed.  I was told that as at July 2012 the case had yet to be finally determined by the 
High Court Land Division.   
6.5 Reflections on the case study 
Whilst lawyers and legislators focus on rights and statutory law, it is crucial to 
recognise that gendered subjectivity within customary practices of land tenure remains 
integral to both men’s and women’s claims to land and to the way in which ward 
tribunals approach their task of determining interests in land.  In this case, Naserian 
framed her claim to inherited family land by reference to customary practices of 
marriage and land tenure.  Similarly, the customary basis of men’s claims to land is 
highlighted in the questions that the Ward Tribunal members asked Paulo as a successor 
to his father’s land.  References to customary practices permeate the evidence of all 
actors in the Ward Tribunal.  Examples include: pledging land through rehani for 
bridewealth; the process of dividing and allocating land to wives married into the boma; 
cultivation and making permanent improvements to the land as a basis for establishing a 
claim; the practice of appointing a guardian upon the death of a father; making claims to 
land at an arobaini; the boma meeting as the venue for decision-making over family 
land; boma elders having responsibility for dividing and supervising the allocation of 
family land, and so on. 
These various practices underpinned Naserian’s attempts to secure her interests in the 
shamba with the assistance of her guardian and other elders.  In their courtroom 
discourse Naserian and her witnesses constructed Naserian’s moral claim in accordance 
with her gendered subjectivity as a wife married into the boma.  This discursive 
construction served both to establish and to limit Naserian’s agency as a member of her 
husband’s family, with only limited capacity to directly challenge what was happening 
to the land.  These family power dynamics and capacity to act in the family context 
were reproduced in the Ward Tribunal.  With no documentation to support her claim to 
the land, Naserian was reliant on the oral testimony and meeting minutes of her 
husband’s family elders. 
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There are many possible reasons why Naserian’s claim failed in the lower tribunals.  
There was a lack of clarity in the way her claim was presented – both in her own 
evidence, and in the evidence of other witnesses.  Both parties’ claims contained 
evidential weaknesses and inconsistencies, but some important factual issues 
concerning Naserian’s use of the land and the terms of the rehani were left unresolved.  
Naserian did not make much use of questions to clarify or challenge evidence.  She had 
little documentary evidence to support her claim.  In contrast, Paulo was rule-oriented in 
his approach to giving evidence and made much greater use of questions to challenge 
the apparent weaknesses in Naserian’s case.  His evidence was supported by the Village 
Chairman – a powerful local leader, whose account prevailed in the evidence that 
informed the Ward Tribunal’s judgment.  The evidence of the family elders who 
supported Naserian’s claim was largely discredited by that of the Village Chairman, 
who declared himself responsible for the decision to allow sale of the land.  It appears 
that the Village Chairman’s impeachment from office was not brought to the attention 
of the DLHT; yet this fact would have had significant bearing on his credibility as a 
witness who had become involved in the sale of the land.   
There was a lack of attention to legal issues in both the Ward Tribunal’s and DLHT’s 
judgments and it appears that there was no explicit attention drawn to Naserian’s 
statutory rights.  Both levels of tribunal appeared to focus more on factual than legal 
issues – particularly whether or not Naserian had tilled the land.  According to 
Naserian’s own evidence, she had not.  However, the fact that this was a family shamba 
which had been pledged meant that identifying the person who had been tilling the land 
was insufficient to establish the identity of all persons with an interest in the shamba.  
For example, Bibi gave evidence that the shamba had been divided for Naserian, and 
Naserian gave evidence of her own efforts to redeem the rehani on the shamba.  
Although Paulo repeatedly raised questions concerning the nature and implications of 
the rehani in his own cross-examination of witnesses, these issues were not fully 
addressed in the judgments.  LA leaves the law in respect of so-called ‘customary 
mortgages’ wide open for interpretation.244  In this case a number of issues about the 
rehani were left unresolved, such as the implications of Naserian being given 
responsibility to redeem the rehani on the divided land herself.  Even when Bibi was 
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declared to be the owner of the shamba, the tribunals did not address the consequence 
of claims to land between generations or the protection of derivative rights under VLA. 
The Ward Tribunal transcript is not an easy document to read and an appeal tribunal 
that had not heard the evidence and did not know the people and land in question would 
have needed to spend a good deal of time carefully analysing the transcript in order to 
give full consideration to the points raised by Naserian on appeal.  Naserian’s appeal to 
the DLHT was out of time and neither of the parties had legal representation.  It was not 
until Naserian had lost her appeal to the DLHT that she sought help from a legal aid 
clinic.  By that stage the time limit for appeal had passed and it was already too late for 
her to challenge the substantive findings made by the Ward Tribunal and DLHT.  
Arguably, if Naserian had had greater awareness of her legal rights and court procedures 
at an earlier stage she would have been in a position to pursue the legal arguments that 
fortified her moral claims to the land with much greater effectiveness – all the more so 
if she had been legally represented in court.  Instead by the time she had obtained legal 
advice there was only a narrow legal point available to her to pursue.  This was 
eventually successful at the first stage of the High Court process, where for the first 
time she obtained a favourable ruling which enabled her to return to the land under a 
temporary injunction. 
As at July 2012 the High Court Land Division had yet to reach a final determination of 
the case.  Whatever the final outcome in the High Court, it seems unlikely that the 
dispute will ultimately be resolved through the legal system, and that some other form 
of social dispute resolution will be needed.  Losing her appeal in the High Court would 
leave Naserian and her children landless.  Winning her appeal against the execution 
ruling would be unlikely to resolve matters, since the original Ward Tribunal and DLHT 
judgments in favour of Paulo would still stand.  However, having failed to join Bibi, the 
pledgee and the buyer as parties to the proceedings, these judgments would be incapable 
of enforcement by them.  It therefore remains to be seen how a legal resolution to the 
dispute in this set of proceedings would provide a social resolution for all those who 
claim an interest in the land – whether they were legal parties or not.   
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6.6 Conclusion 
The social and legal issues concerning sale of family land that are raised in this case 
reflect a significant period of social change in Arusha.  With the rapid expansion of the 
town in the last 10-15 years and the coming into force of the Land Acts, land is now 
increasingly seen as an economic asset and sale of family land without a family’s 
consent has become a significant social problem.  In contemporary Arusha, where 
pressure on land is intensifying and more and more family land is being sold, the Land 
Acts offer legislative protection against sale for those who have unregistered interests in 
land, most notably women.  Yet as this case illustrates, although statute protects many 
women’s interests in land and women are making legal claims, women’s land rights are 
not always recognised or protected by village authorities and land tribunals in practice.  
This extended case study has sought to offer an illustrative explanation as to why this 
may happen.   
On a number of levels the courts and tribunals hearing this case were left with a very 
confused and incomplete picture of the social reality when they adjudicated Naserian’s 
claim.  This reflects the challenges faced by women and men in effectively presenting 
their claims to legal fora and in overcoming barriers to justice that are the consequence 
of social and political power relations that interface the court system.  It also 
demonstrates weaknesses in the process of adjudication where important legal and 
factual issues are not brought to the court’s attention or are not given sufficient 
consideration.  It is typical for legal processes to seek to confine the task of adjudication 
to the issues that are considered relevant by the court.  Hence, many events surrounding 
court processes are either not brought to the attention of courts, or are ignored as 
irrelevant to the court’s substantive task.  Yet, as the history of this and other cases 
show, dispute resolution in courts is often accompanied by social and political incidents 
away from the court.  Such events are extremely relevant to litigants and witnesses 
engaged in processes of disputing.  In themselves they represent obstacles to justice.   
Maintaining or defending a claim in court requires resilience and the support of people 
capable of influencing the outcome – whether as witnesses, allies or intermediaries.  In 
this case despite the uprooting and slashing of crops, the destruction of Naserian’s 
home, intimidation and cursing of allies, and delays in the legal proceedings, Naserian 
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continued to pursue her claim through the courts.  Delay – particularly in the High 
Court Land Division – compounds these social challenges surrounding access to justice.  
This has the potential to cause a party to give up on their claim altogether, or perhaps 
seek alternative methods for resolving the dispute – whether through elders, local 
leaders or by other means of self-help.  In this case, a major factor in Naserian’s ability 
to continue to pursue her claim was the support she received from her local mwenyekiti 
wa kitongoji and family elders, who played a major role as witnesses, providing moral 
and social support and by escorting her to court. 
Ultimately, there is no one factor which can explain why Naserian was so unsuccessful 
in her legal claim in the Ward Tribunal and DLHT.  Whilst the influence of the Village 
Chairman appeared to be pivotal in the Ward Tribunal, timely and good legal 
representation at the DLHT stage could have made a significant difference to the 
substantive outcome.  Naserian wanted an advocate to represent her but was unable to 
afford one.  Her struggles for justice provide a vivid illustration of the need for change 
in the process of adjudicating legal claims and good quality legal representation for all.  
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7.  Conclusion 
Mimi naomba mtoto wa kike hana urithi kwani baba yangu alishanipa ... naomba 
haki itendeke.  (I ask why a daughter cannot inherit, because my father gave me 
[that land] ... I ask that justice be done.) 
 
-  Concluding words from a woman litigant’s statement to a ward tribunal, Arusha 2009. 
I began this research project from the perspective of a practising lawyer, with a belief 
that human rights could serve as a legal tool to challenge inequality and realise 
women’s interests in land.  However, influenced by feminist and postcolonial critiques 
of human rights I chose not to pursue a human rights-based approach to data collection 
and analysis; instead taking women’s experiences of law and legal processes as the 
starting-point for a socio-legal enquiry into the law in action.  During my fieldwork I 
was soon to re-encounter the language of rights in social and legal contexts of women’s 
claims to land.  Reflecting on the ways in which people engage with law and ideas of 
rights in practice, I have returned to my original belief in their value for individual 
empowerment.  However, in light of the lessons learned from women’s experiences of 
engaging with the Tanzanian legal system - and my own experiences as a family lawyer 
in England - my perspective on how women can and could realise their interests in land 
using law and human rights has shifted considerably. 
Using international or state-driven human rights law as a starting-point for ‘rights-based 
approaches’ to legal empowerment involves adopting a framework of rights-speak that 
is legalistic, technical and ultimately delimited by state interests.  Within this 
framework, although rights may become ‘vernacularised’, at the local level they 
nonetheless retain a hegemonic essence.  Though legalistic vernacularised rights 
represent a legal tool, their origins as state instruments mean that they lack the 
‘humanity’ and felt sense of justice that flow most naturally from counter-hegemonic 
people-driven notions of rights – as Santos proposes.  It is this latter notion of rights that 
in Tanzania appears to resonate in the discourse of haki and haki sawa.  Although the 
gender equality provisions in the Land Acts have been brought into public 
consciousness through a discourse of ‘haki sawa’, this discourse was not created by the 
legislation, but rather strengthened by it.  It is this discourse which in turn carries the 
power to bring a deeper moral sense of justice into legal decision-making, just as the 
woman litigant invites the court to do in her statement quoted above.  My contention is 
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therefore that rights talk can be most powerful in social and legal spheres when it is 
born from a counter-hegemonic desire for freedom and justice, rather than created by 
legal instruments.  In Tanzania rights, freedom and justice are encapsulated in the 
national discourse of haki.  Arguably, it is when rights are part of such an everyday 
moral discourse that they hold the greatest potential to gradually change social attitudes 
and legal processes of decision-making: there is power in the discourse of rights itself. 
The nature of women’s interests in land 
Whilst policy-makers, activists and lawyers in Tanzania have been much focused on 
statutory equal rights provisions to realise women’s interests in land, it is crucial to 
recognise that particularly in the case of inherited family land – both men and women 
frequently frame their claims by reference to customary practices of inheritance, 
marriage and land tenure.  Hence in practice both men’s and women’s claims to land in 
these contexts are in their essence gendered and intergenerational.  Chapter 2 of this 
thesis discussed the social backdrop of women’s claims to land in Arusha.  The 
enduring force of local patrilineal principles of land tenure in Arusha means that in the 
case of ‘family land’ which has passed through the hands of successive generations, the 
circumstances in which women inherit tend to be more restrictive than in the case of 
‘self-acquired land’ that is acquired either by purchase or cultivation free of prior lineal 
interests.  Equally, patrilineal ties to land tend to be looser in recently developed urban 
and peri-urban parts of Arusha where much land is purchased or otherwise acquired for 
the first time by a nuclear family. 
Amongst Arusha’s local patrilineal tribes the most common rationale for male 
inheritance of family land appears to be founded on a cultural and socio-linguistic 
distinction that a daughter will ‘be married’ away from her natal family (whereas a son 
‘marries’).  Hence it is often said that a daughter does not need a piece of land of her 
own, as she will have access to her husband’s land.  Land given to a daughter is often 
seen as a loss to her natal family when she is ‘sent off’ to join her husband’s family and 
take his name.  Despite this there is nothing new in women in Arusha being given 
portions of inherited ‘family land’ by their fathers.  However, in the disputes I 
encountered during my fieldwork the circumstances in which women had been given 
inherited family land were quite specific.  These included situations where a father had 
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no sons, daughters remained unmarried, or a conditional bequest had been made to a 
daughter who would in turn pass the land to her son.  Such practices appeared to be 
largely accepted by the family elders involved in the disputes as operating within a 
wider framework of patrilineal customary practices and the legitimate exercise of a 
father’s discretion to allocate family land.  As such, whilst atypical they did not 
represent a significant challenge to gendered customary practices of tenure relations, but 
rather, were examples of how such practices had been adapted to particular sets of 
circumstances.  In these cases disputes within the family often arose when a male family 
member seized control of the land or sought to contest the basis of a woman’s interest in 
land by commencing litigation. 
There is now widespread social debate on whether fathers should give land to their 
daughters on the basis of gender equality.  During my fieldwork year I met a number of 
parents who indicated that they were willing and wished to give land to both their sons 
and daughters – particularly in circumstances where daughters would have caring 
responsibilities for their parents.  Studies in other regions of Tanzania have also 
reported that attitudes on this issue are changing favourably towards female inheritance 
(BACAS 1999 (Kigoma), Koda 2000 (Kilimanjaro), Ashimogo et al 2003(Morogoro) – 
all cited in Isinika and Mutabazi 2010: 135) However, based on my observations and 
conversations with inhabitants of Arusha it remains the case that patrilineal principles of 
succession still underpin the dominant viewpoint on land tenure amongst both men and 
women.   
Despite this enduring gender-based distinction concerning inheritance of family land 
there is also an awareness of the risk for women of not having their own land in the 
event of marriage breakdown.  Accordingly, some parents choose to give a small 
portion of land to their daughters as a kind of insurance.  The rationale for doing so is 
different from dividing land on an ideological basis of equality.  It represents a solution 
to the problem that in terms of social practice in the event of marriage breakdown a 
woman must leave her husband’s land and return to her parents.  Hence, giving 
daughters a small portion of land may be seen as an attempt by parents to mitigate the 
social consequences of this.  This is a sensitive issue because it goes to the heart of 
challenging power inequalities within marriage and facilitating female agency by 
making a woman less economically dependent on her husband.  She is therefore more 
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able to leave a marriage, for example in circumstances of domestic abuse, by returning 
to her own land.  Indeed, just the possibility of this may affect the way that she is 
treated by her husband during the marriage. 
It is often at a time of critical life events, such as after the death of a husband or father, 
or relationship breakdown, that women may find themselves in a particularly vulnerable 
social and economic position within the family.  Power relations between a woman and 
other members of her family shift throughout her lifetime as her gendered status within 
the family changes – whether as a widow, daughter of a late father, or separated wife.  
These shifts in power relations are closely connected with a woman’s tenure security 
over her home and land.  Vulnerability due to a woman’s position within the family 
may be increased by other social factors such as illiteracy, low income, poor health, lack 
of awareness of legal rights or of a husband’s financial dealings, domestic abuse, local 
political power dynamics, social ostracism, violence, threats or harassment.  My 
findings indicate that tenure insecurity linked to social vulnerability can often provide 
the catalyst for land to be taken or sold without a woman’s knowledge or consent, or for 
an old dispute over land to flare up and tenure relations renegotiated.  It follows that 
when family disputes over land occur, power relations within the family are critical to 
the protection of women’s interests in the land, which are often dependent on kinship 
relations rather than a legal title.   
Claims to land by men against women often represent challenges to a woman’s existing 
ownership or occupation of land.  A noticeable feature of these claims is that I found 
they were often brought against women who had inherited land from their father.  In 
contrast, claims to land brought by women tended to constitute a defensive response 
against the act of a male relative who had sold or mortgaged land without consent or 
chased the woman away.  Law is an instrument that may be used proactively or 
reactively.  My findings suggest that legal claims to land by women in land courts 
represent a reactive use of the law as a weapon of last resort.  This is in contrast to 
women in a stronger social and economic position who have the knowledge and funds 
to be able to proactively secure their interests in land from the outset - for example 
through legal titling, registering a caveat, by becoming an administrator of their 
deceased husband’s estate, or by using favourable social relations to ensure their 
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interests are protected.  Women in these situations tend not to be seen in land courts 
fighting for land through protracted litigation processes. 
The Land Acts offer seemingly good statutory protection for women’s interests in land, 
including untitled and ‘customary’ interests.  However, in order to assess their 
effectiveness in practice it is essential to consider the operation of law and legal 
processes in their social context – as part of a ‘semi-autonomous social field’ (Moore 
1973).  As the cases drawn from my fieldwork clearly illustrate, whilst women’s equal 
rights to land are enshrined in law and women are using statutory dispute resolution fora 
to defend their interests in land, the process of litigation through land courts raises many 
challenges and uncertainties for women in practice. 
Designing laws for women 
The Land Acts of 1999 were an important landmark in the progressive realisation of 
women’s property rights in Tanzanian law.  In chapter 3 I argued that they also 
represent a missed opportunity for a more fundamental reconfiguration of the way in 
which gender and land tenure relations are constructed in statute.  Instead of focusing on 
the lived realities of Tanzanian families and the inseparability of marriage, succession 
and land tenure for the majority of ordinary men and women, the central political 
agenda behind the Land Acts was the creation of land markets and formalisation of 
property interests.  Hence, both substantive law and legal institutions under the Land 
Acts were designed first and foremost to meet this neo-liberal economic agenda.   
From the perspective of women’s interests in land, there were progressive developments 
concerning spousal land rights both under LMA and the Land Acts, and formal gender 
equality is a central pillar of the National Land Policy.  GLTF saw the presumption of 
spousal co-occupancy and the power to void a disposition without spousal consent as 
provisions which significantly strengthened women’s land rights.  Yet, the latter 
provisions remain inadequate for protecting women’s interests in land.  The 
implementation of land registration programmes in Tanzania is in its early stages and 
much land remains unregistered.  The process of surveying and registering land is 
expensive and out of reach of the majority of Tanzanians.  Many men and women are 
unaware of their legal rights, resistant or reluctant to the idea of registering land in the 
joint names of spouses.  Whilst the Land Acts provide a set of rules for buyers and 
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mortgagees to follow which will protect their interests, in practice it is easy for an 
individual to provide buyers and mortgagees with the documentation they require 
without their spouse’s consent.  Where unregistered interests in land are concerned, 
statutory safeguards need to require more than a signature or affidavit if women’s 
interests are to be meaningfully protected.  This may call for greater involvement of key 
community actors in the legal process of dispositions.  
Concerning female inheritance of land the passing of the Land Acts has seen land, 
family and succession laws in Tanzania become more fragmented and inconsistent than 
ever.  Whilst the Land Acts include a statutory equality ‘trump’ over discriminatory 
practices in land disputes, codified discriminatory customary laws of succession were 
left unchanged by the Land Acts, and uncodified discriminatory customary practices 
also remain recognised in Tanzania’s plural legal system.  Such discriminatory laws and 
practices are still applied in estates matters heard in the ordinary courts.   
The creation of a separate system of land courts was an important priority for both the 
Tanzanian government and the Shivji Commission to remedy a number of deficiencies 
in the administration of justice in land cases.  However, this has also served to amplify 
the fragmented statutory approach to land in family contexts.  Where land disputes 
between spouses are concerned there is confusion amongst many litigants in identifying 
the appropriate legal fora to make a claim.  In reality there is a substantial legal lacuna 
in statutory protection of a wife and her interests in land within a subsisting marriage, as 
Elizabeth’s case in chapter 4 highlights.  Whilst land courts can issue injunctions 
against unauthorised sale or mortgage of land by a spouse, they have no jurisdiction to 
make orders regulating the occupation of family land between spouses within marriage, 
or to make injunctive orders to protect an individual against domestic violence.   
NGO activists, women judges and lawyers in Tanzania have been campaigning for laws 
to protect women against domestic violence, including property grabbing.  A number of 
cases from my fieldwork graphically illustrate that the act of issuing a legal claim can 
often be met with violence and property dispossession against a woman claimant and 
those who help her.  If land courts had a more comprehensive set of legal tools at their 
disposal to deal with the range of social issues, including violence, that arise in family 
land disputes, this would go some way to protecting women and strengthening women’s 
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agency throughout the litigation process.  However, such legal measures would need to 
be supported by effective police action and social awareness.   
Access to justice and social power relations 
It is often claimed that women favour local level dispute resolution over the fora of 
legally qualified lawyers and judges.  However, my discussions with women claimants 
in Arusha suggest that attitudes to this issue are quite mixed.  Situated in the local 
communities they serve, village land councils and ward tribunals are undoubtedly best 
placed to handle claims from litigants who only speak their local vernacular language.  
Their knowledge of local people also holds advantages for grasping the history and 
factual complexities of a dispute and ensuring that a litigant’s actual family members 
and local political leaders are the ones called to give evidence before the tribunal.  They 
are also generally quicker at resolving disputes and work with family elders and 
community leaders to reach a peaceful settlement.  
The higher the level of court the more removed the court is from a local community.  
This may raise practical challenges in terms of taking time away from employment and 
caring responsibilities and journeying to courts by foot or on public transport.  It also 
carries significant disadvantages for those who are illiterate and/or converse mainly in 
their vernacular language.  The more removed from the community the less likely 
tribunal members are to know - or think they know - the people and history of a dispute.  
This means that although it may be harder for a more distanced tribunal to establish the 
factual basis of the dispute and have confidence in the reliability of particular witnesses, 
the tribunal itself is less likely to prejudge the litigants and witnesses and the merits of 
the claim.   
Whether a person favours one form of dispute resolution or level of court over another 
may greatly depend on whether personal circumstances and relationships place them at 
an advantage or disadvantage in the minds of the legal actors involved in the dispute.  
As fora which are socially disembedded from litigants’ local communities, at the higher 
levels of court social power relations can shift according to litigants’ abilities to 
negotiate a very different institutional framework.    This may represent a new 
opportunity for securing justice – particularly where local actors have obstructed claims.  
This was an important issue for one woman I came to know who had been harassed and 
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branded mchawi mlevi (a drunkard witch) by her neighbours.  She had no confidence 
that ‘the village’ would give her a fair hearing and believed that ‘someone will pay 
someone’.  Instead she wanted her claim to be resolved by a lawyer or a court in town.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis analysed the making of legal claims to land as an on-going 
process of agency, resistance, negotiation and contestation of social power relations.  
Furaha and Elizabeth’s experiences demonstrated that the act of making a legal claim is 
in itself a moment of agency and resistance against violence and the alienation of land.  
However, the progression of women’s claims into statutory legal fora often depends on 
the support of male family and community leaders giving their blessing to a claim 
proceeding to court and providing support as witnesses.  In some cases women have 
found it necessary to pay or provide food for witnesses to gain their support in 
proceedings.   
It is easy to make assumptions and generalisations about male patriarchal attitudes to 
female land-holding; however, during the course of my fieldwork I met several male 
family elders and local political leaders who, through their actions, demonstrated a 
commitment to helping women litigants to realise their claims to land.  As An-Na’im 
and Hammond argue, whilst ‘predisposed to act in culturally sanctioned ways, [people] 
are to varying degrees agents of change in the transformation of their own culture’ 
(2002: 13).  Much depends on the individual sensibilities of those in positions of local 
power.   
The social and political power of these pivotal actors permeates the legal sphere of the 
Ward Tribunal, which is located in the executive rather than the judicial branch of 
government.  As a locus of enmeshed local power structures ward tribunals and their 
previous institutional incarnations have long been criticised as politicised institutions 
that are vulnerable to corruption or the perception of corruption.  From the perspective 
of women’s claims the location of the ward tribunal in local government and local 
community brings additional challenges of negotiating male-dominated power 
dynamics between social, political, executive and legal actors at the interface of family, 
community and the tribunal itself.  The presence of women as members of the ward 
tribunal may help to bridge a gendered social divide between female litigants and those 
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judging claims, but it does not prevent dealings between tribunal members and other 
actors which can impact upon the outcome of a dispute behind the scenes. 
At an institutional level, facilitating access to justice in village land councils and ward 
tribunals would require no less than a structural dismantling of the fusion of executive 
and judicial power in local government, proper funding of tribunals and their members 
and regulation of tribunal fees to address the challenges of corruption.  From the 
perspective of women’s access to justice in particular, access to justice agendas must 
also address the impact of male-dominated social power relations in legal processes.  
This calls for legal literacy programmes that work with women and those in existing 
positions of authority, and reflect not just on the mechanics of law and legal processes 
but on their social implications from gender perspectives.   Nyamu-Musembi has called 
for open-mindedness in looking for positive openings in a community’s value system 
and collaboration with community members committed to social change as a basis for 
realising women’s property rights (2002: 126).  This approach to legal literacy is not 
unrealistic where local leaders are willing actors in processes of social transformation.   
Twenty years have passed since activism on access to justice and legal literacy 
programmes began in Tanzania.  To date mass sensitisation on the implications of the 
Land Acts in the region has been carried out principally by the local district councils in 
association with LHRC.  Their programmes have included training sessions for local 
village and clan leaders and selected villagers on land rights and legal procedures, as 
well as seminars at village assemblies open to all villagers.  TAWLA’s Arusha office 
also conducts periodic seminars for women and children on particular topics.  In order 
to reach the widest possible local audience LHRC broadcasts ad hoc local radio 
programmes on a range of civic, legal and human rights issues and maintains a profile at 
public events in the region, for example International Women’s Day and HIV/AIDS 
awareness days.  However, reaching women directly through mass media remains a 
challenge in rural areas due to lack of electricity, male control of communications such 
as the radio in male-headed households and unequal division of labour which may give 
some women less time to listen to the radio (TGNP 2007: 50-51).   
Whilst more still needs to be done to educate ordinary men and women on their legal 
rights local NGOs and district councils lack resources to be able to carry out sustained, 
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direct mass sensitisation work.  As a consequence strategies for educating the wider 
public on their rights have tended to be indirect or at public meetings, which women 
may be less likely to attend.  Much of the legal literacy education in Arusha has targeted 
local leaders and officials, who are mostly men, charged with responsibility for 
implementation of law and procedure under the Land Acts.  This reflects a wider picture 
across Africa.  A review of 20 African countries in 1996 showed that due to limited 
state initiatives NGOs were focussing their training efforts on certain people within 
communities whom it was intended would disseminate legal information to local people 
(Tsanga 2007: 437).  One challenge with indirect approaches to knowledge 
dissemination is that they effectively hand power through knowledge acquisition to 
those who have responsibility for recognising an individual’s rights and advising them 
on where to go for legal advice and access to justice beyond the family.  This is urgent 
work if laws are to be applied in practice, but it remains unclear to what extent this 
knowledge is being transferred to the wider population, particularly women.   
Legal education programmes need to be sensitive to social power relations both in the 
way that they are publicised and in ensuring that it is not only the most powerful 
members of a community who participate and gain knowledge.  In terms of their aims 
and substantive content women’s access to justice initiatives require an approach to 
engaging with law and legal processes which directly addresses the social challenges 
that women face.  Such initiatives must move beyond the technicality of law and 
information provision to providing environments for women to speak out about their 
experiences – both in women-only environments and in discussions with men.  It is 
difficult to achieve this through one-off seminars or piecemeal project work.  TGNP in 
Dar es Salaam runs weekly seminars which give ordinary men and women a unique 
open forum to engage in debate on a variety of social issues.  These seminars are 
invariably well attended and women and men alike are encouraged by the organisers to 
sauti! – speak out and make their voices heard.  It is hard to overestimate the 
significance of this for women who are precluded from speaking in social contexts 
elsewhere and must then face a male-dominated legal tribunal to present their claims to 
land in person.    
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Law’s patriarchy and the transformatory potential of haki sawa 
The male-dominated environment of some ward tribunals and social power structures 
that interact with legal processes illustrate the patriarchal dimensions of legal 
institutions at the local level.  The cases explored in this thesis have illustrated the 
importance of hekima (wisdom/judgment) and amani (peace) as normative discourses 
that reflect conciliatory approaches to doing justice by both land tribunals and family 
elders and local leaders.  Accordingly, both ward tribunals and the DLHT pay close 
attention to family processes of dispute resolution which are governed by mainly male 
elders and community leaders.  This is illustrated in the importance attached to the oral 
evidence of family elders and documentation such as boma meeting minutes, as well as 
the practice of ‘sending cases back home’ via a mwenyekiti wa kitongoji to ‘endelea 
weka amani’ (go and make peace).  Such norms and processes are discretionary and 
inherently conservative in that their practice serves to preserve (male-dominated) social 
power relations.  However, they can also positively serve women by recognising and 
upholding their interests within these social power structures.  
These male-dominated structural features of legal processes are reinforced by the 
patriarchal nature of ‘customary law’, which land tribunals are required to apply in 
Tanzania’s plural legal system.  My fieldwork findings show that in contrast to the 
textual approach of the higher courts in general (discussed in chapter 5) ward tribunals 
and the DLHT in Arusha do not tend to refer to codified versions of customary law in 
their decision making.  In practice tribunal members engage with their own 
contemporary understandings of customary practices concerning marriage, land 
acquisition and use.  As discussed in chapter 1, some practitioners and academics term 
this a ‘living law’ approach, which has the effect of imbuing social practices with the 
normativity of ‘law’.  One consequence of this is that by its uncodified nature 
interpretations of ‘living law’ are seen to exist in the minds of those local authority 
figures who claim to know it.  If courts recognise this in their approaches to finding law 
and judging claims this renders legal processes intrinsically patriarchal and enables 
male elders to assert legal authority over the knowledge and application of customary 
practices.  It is therefore important for law reformers to reflect on the implications of 
advocating for the concept of ‘living law’, since this may serve to reinforce male 
dominated social power relations in the adjudication of disputes.  
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The statutory equality ‘trump’ in the Land Acts represents a legal centralist challenge to 
the application of customary laws that are perceived to be gender discriminatory.  
Interestingly, despite all that may be said about the patriarchal nature of the legal 
system, my fieldwork observations suggest that in the context of inheritance-related 
land disputes adjudicators in Arusha’s land tribunals appeared to be ready and willing to 
discount or reinterpret customary practices to give effect to women’s land rights.  Their 
general approach is not so much based on legal technicality as on the normative force of 
a discourse of haki sawa (equal rights).  The Land Acts provide an illustration of how 
broad discourses of gender equality and human rights have been ‘reformulated and 
legalised’ (Wilson 2007) through their use in the construction of statute.  Statute itself 
has then become used as a basis for constructing rights discourse.  Hence, the discursive 
object of haki sawa has gained normative force as a ‘tool’ which is being used in social 
and legal processes of decision-making.   
In contrast to the conservative power of amani therefore, haki sawa as a discourse offers 
transformative possibilities to challenge male-dominated social power relations and 
customary practices in land tribunals.  However, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5 in 
practice the transformative possibilities of haki sawa are generally not actively tested in 
the context of female inheritance claims.  This appears to be in part due to the atypical 
circumstances that give rise to many women’s claims to inherited land – such as land 
given to daughters by a father with no sons.  I did not see claims to inherited land 
brought by women which lacked the evidential support of at least some influential 
family elders or local political leaders.  The most likely explanation for this is that legal 
claims are generally only brought and sustained after attempts to resolve the matter at 
home have failed and family elders have given their blessing to the woman’s claim 
proceeding to statutory legal fora.  It would appear that women who lack support from 
key members of their own family or a respected local balozi or mwenyekiti wa kitongoji 
are unlikely to be in an evidential or social position to make or sustain their claim. 
In the context of disputes between spouses and unmarried couples, my fieldwork 
findings suggest that the discourse of haki sawa has had limited impact on patriarchal 
attitudes to female control of inherited family land as opposed to self-acquired land.  In 
practice, the fieldwork cases demonstrate that land acquired in these different ways is 
treated differently by both families and courts.  The distinction is significant in terms of 
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social attitudes to the legal requirement for a wife’s participation in dispositions 
concerning ‘matrimonial property’.  In some cases women reported being denied the 
right to be heard or excluded altogether from participation in meetings concerning 
family land.  Even when women expressed their views indirectly, for example via a 
family guardian, their agency in stopping a disposition effectively was contingent on 
their relations with other men in the family, as the case study in chapter 6 illustrates.  
Land courts appeared to be more willing to void dispositions of self-acquired land than 
inherited family land where spousal consent had not been obtained, notwithstanding that 
a wife’s interest in both types of land is protected under the Land Acts. 
Where there are issues of law and fact to be determined, although statements about 
gender equality regularly feature in tribunal judgments, the decision to uphold a 
woman’s claim tends to be made on some other substantive basis.  Hence, haki sawa in 
judicial decision-making is generally used in a hortatory way to give extra normative 
force to a decision that has been made in favour of a woman litigant on other more 
specific statutory or evidential grounds.  Arguably therefore, perhaps the greatest value 
of the equality ‘trump’ in the Land Acts lies in its capacity to influence social attitudes 
and the evolution of customary practices which are more favourable to women, rather 
than as a transformatory legal tool in litigation.  
‘Unlearning privilege’ - the role of lawyers and judges in the process of justice 
Across many societies lawyers and judges are popularly perceived on the one hand, as 
honourable members of an elite profession and on the other, as greedy or out of touch 
with the sense of justice of ordinary people whom courts are intended to serve.  
Undoubtedly there is much truth in the suggestion that some lawyers enter their 
profession motivated by status and riches.  Some relish the prospect of the rigorous 
intellectual challenge of law and the art of legal argument.  For some would-be lawyers 
it is about ‘justice’.  The professionalisation of a person as a lawyer or a judge is a 
process of ‘conversion’ to law: a gradual process of intellectual transformation in which 
the lawyer becomes trained eventually to view the social world through legal rules, and 
the legal concept of justice as one which is separable from a felt sense of justice or haki 
that is bonded with social relationships.  Having successfully completed this process of 
social dislocation, and wearing their professional court attire, lawyers and judges alike 
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are equipped with the rule-oriented mindset to enable them to judge claims against a set 
of criteria which the architects of law deem relevant.  Opportunities for technical 
arguments are seized upon like legal cherries – especially if it involves an adjournment 
or striking out a claim.  In adversarial legal processes truth-finding is considered 
secondary to the objective of proving and winning a client’s case.  Little wonder that 
courts the world over are such feared and alien environments for most ordinary people. 
In Tanzania, the shortage of advocates and funds for legal representation mean that the 
majority of litigants represent themselves.  Yet the practice of the DLHT and higher 
courts is structured to reflect the language, skills and expertise of legal professionals.  
As discussed in chapter 4, legal NGOs have taken a number of steps to try to make 
these higher courts more accessible to litigants in person – through document drafting, 
client coaching and the preparation of written submissions of legal arguments.  NGO 
legal officers will also try to avoid disputes going to court by offering reconciliation 
services at their legal aid clinics.  However, none of these measures are a complete 
substitute for legal representation in court; particularly where litigants are illiterate and 
do not fluently speak the official language of the court. 
These challenges in legal representation raise a number of questions: Who are courts 
for, what is the value of lawyers and how should courts operate?  If the purpose of 
courts is to do justice for the litigants who appear before them, then the values, language 
and processes of the court should reflect this.  Tanzanian law academics such as 
Rwezaura (1993) and Shivji have long been advocating for the national language of 
Kiswahili to become the language of the law.  The Shivji Commission argued that 
Kiswahili should be spoken at all levels of land court, even if statutes were to remain in 
English (URT 1994: 199).  The Commission’s recommendations on language have not 
been implemented.  However, I would argue that realisation of access to justice in the 
interests of the population as a whole will only be substantively achieved through the 
adoption of Kiswahili as the official language throughout the Tanzanian court system.  
Although there is the argument that English is the official language of government and 
business in Tanzania as well as the common language of Commonwealth legal systems, 
arguably it is more important that a litigant is able to read the judgment in their own 
case and have their evidence recorded on the court record in the same language that it 
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was spoken in; than for judgments to be produced in English for the purpose of 
Commonwealth law reporting. 
In Tanzania, lawyers are prohibited from practising in ward tribunals and primary 
courts.  Their institutional and social standing means that they are powerful players in 
the higher levels of court.  Many litigants I met wanted but could not afford the services 
of a lawyer.  Competent lawyers have the skills, procedural knowledge and confidence 
to present claims in court that many litigants lack.  It follows that legal professionals 
have the potential to redress social power inequalities within the court forum.  This can 
be transformative for those litigants who have very limited power within their own 
social sphere.  However, in practice often social power inequalities become amplified, 
because representation is usually only available to those who can afford to pay for it.  In 
a legal system where there is little pro bono representation, it must be asked whether it 
is fair to allow social power inequalities to become amplified by parties who can afford 
to engage the services of an advocate, without actively promoting other kinds of legal 
support in court – such as paralegal assistance. 
Adjudicators in the DLHT and High Court are mindful of power imbalances in 
representation and will often adopt a flexible approach to litigants in person.  However, 
from my observation of all levels of land court I would argue that more needs to be 
done by those adjudicating claims to ensure that litigants and witnesses are given the 
space and support to articulate their claims in a language that they feel confident in, or 
through an interpreter who is able to accurately and impartially interpret.  Since many 
litigants are unaware of their legal rights this may call for adjudicators to become quite 
interventionist in enabling people to make and frame their claims.  Research on access 
to justice and judging in the UK (Adler 2008) suggests that an inquisitorial approach to 
gathering evidence is preferable to an adversarial one if power imbalances in legal 
representation are to be minimised.   
As discussed in chapter 5, in the case of women’s claims to land adjudicators also need 
to be mindful of the social challenges that many women face in producing evidence that 
is generally considered persuasive for establishing a claim, and the gendered nature of 
document production concerning interests in land.  In the case of unregistered land and 
claims between unmarried couples, if adjudicators attach most weight to the witness 
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evidence and documentation of family elders and legal titles than to other kinds of more 
circumstantial evidence, they effectively adopt a male gendered approach to 
adjudication, which in many cases will tend to favour male claimants or male-
dominated power dynamics within a family.  My contention therefore is that for 
substantial justice to be done in women’s claims to land it is necessary for tribunals to 
actively consider gender issues and dynamics as an integral part of the process of 
gathering evidence and adjudicating claims. 
The Land Acts have strengthened and renewed a discourse of equal rights in the context 
of women’s interests in land, and offer women a legal tool which may be used 
proactively to secure rights, or to defend women’s interests in land through litigation.  
In the context of the law in action lawyers and judges have a key role to play in the 
realisation of women’s interests in land.  Yet their role also risks undermining women’s 
claims if they fail to adopt a litigant-centred and gender sensitive approach to the 
process of justice.  I argue that this requires judges and lawyers to not only utilise the 
skills of their profession, but – applying Spivak’s (1998) phrase – be prepared to 
systematically ‘unlearn their privilege’ and actively engage with the values and felt 
sense of haki of ordinary people, ensuring that women’s voices and experiences are 
heard and understood.  In this way the role of lawyers and judges may be 
conceptualised as one of facilitator of access to justice, rather than simply an advocate 
or adjudicator.  In the spirit of Santos (2007), the pursuit of justice and rights through 
court processes may then become a counter-hegemonic project of social emancipation. 
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Appendix A 
Research design and ethical issues 
This discussion focuses on my most significant research design choices and some of the 
practical and ethical research challenges that I faced as an ‘mzungu’ (white European) 
living and conducting ethnographic research in an African society.  In the interests of 
transparency and critical review I give particular attention to the challenges and benefits 
that were inherent in the cross-cultural dimension of my research. 
Research design 
Before commencing research in Arusha I spent an initial two months in Dar es Salaam 
undertaking an intensive Kiswahili language course and discussing my research design 
and possible fieldwork locations within Tanzania in conversations with Professor Chris 
Maina Peter at the Law School of the University of Dar es Salaam and legal officers at 
LHRC and other Tanzanian legal and feminist activist NGOs
245
 based in the city.  
Through these conversations five regions of Tanzania emerged as potential locations for 
conducting my fieldwork – all fertile agricultural areas where particular concerns had 
been identified over women’s interests in land in the context of patrilineal land tenure 
systems.  These were Kagera, Arusha and Kilimanjaro in the north, and Mbeya and 
Iringa in the south.  Pressure on land in all three northern regions had resulted in a high 
number of land disputes reaching the courts. 
In order to decide on a single location for my fieldwork I conducted scoping visits to 
four of the regions identified, spending approximately one week in each location.  I 
decided not to visit Kagera – located in the far northwest corner of Tanzania - due to the 
distance involved in scoping the various fieldwork locations across the country.   In 
each location I visited the local legal NGO (NOLA in Mbeya and Iringa, KWIECO in 
Moshi (Kilimanjaro) and LHRC in Arusha) to ascertain some of the regional issues 
concerning women and land and to discuss practical questions of access in order to 
conduct my research.  I also visited local primary courts and the DLHT to gain a sense 
of the nature and volume of legal claims concerning land that were being brought by 
women.  From these initial scoping visits Kilimanjaro and Arusha emerged as the two 
most viable places to conduct my research in terms of practical access and high volume 
                                               
245 HAKIARDHI, NOLA, TAMWA, TAWLA, TGNP, WLAC and WiLDAF. 
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of legal claims.  The socio-economic complexity of Arusha, challenges of rapid 
urbanisation, and the legacies of colonial and investor demand for Arusha’s land and 
other natural resources, were all significant factors in my final choice of Arusha as the 
location for an ethnographic study of women’s legal claims to land in contemporary 
Africa. 
The multi-sited nature of my research meant that in order to undertake a study of 
sufficient depth within the timeframe, it was necessary for me to prioritise the type and 
levels of courts and tribunals in which to conduct my research.  Although the Land Acts 
introduced a specialist system of land dispute resolution, claims to land in the context of 
divorce and administration of estates lie within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.  
One important consideration was the extent to which I should study land issues raised 
within the ordinary court system as well as land tribunals.   
It became apparent to me during the early stages of my research in the DLHT and 
LHRC that there was some degree of overlap between the ordinary courts and land 
tribunal system in some of the legal claims involving women.  I found several cases 
where male and female claimants had initially litigated inheritance or matrimonial 
claims through the hierarchy of ordinary courts and subsequently re-litigated their 
claims in a different incarnation in the land tribunals – or vice versa.  However, the high 
volume and range of issues in land claims concerning women that were handled by 
Arusha’s DLHT alone was such that I decided to focus my study on two levels of 
tribunal within the land court system rather than attempt to cover the ordinary court 
system as well.   
I had official permission by way of a research permit and letters from local government 
to conduct the research.  However, in order to establish good relations with Ward 
Tribunal members from the outset I arranged for local contacts to accompany me to the 
tribunals as an introducer – whether a district officer, local community leader, friend, 
elder or research assistant.  Thereafter I generally attended Ward Tribunal sessions with 
a research assistant (discussed further below).  Establishing rapport, becoming a 
familiar face and gaining an understanding of what we were observing meant that I and 
my research assistants found that our work in the ward tribunals was quite painstaking, 
and required great patience and concentration.  At each Ward Tribunal we visited we 
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collected data in the form of observation, court records and interviews with tribunal 
members and litigants on just two or three cases involving women litigants per tribunal.  
However, the depth and richness of the material we collected proved to be some of the 
most valuable data for interpretation from my fieldwork.   
As a result of the research design decisions I made, a weekly research pattern emerged.  
For most of my nine months of fieldwork in Arusha I lived in one of the wards I studied 
in order to participate in and observe daily life in a local community, and kept a detailed 
field diary.  In a typical week I divided my time spent observing and conducting 
archival research in legal fora between three different locations.  Most ward tribunals sat 
for two days per week.  In any given week I spent on average two days at the Ward 
Tribunal, one or two days at the DLHT and one or two days at LHRC’s legal aid clinic, 
with the remaining time spent conducting interviews with litigants, family and clan 
elders, local leaders, lawyers, adjudicators and local government executives. 
Practical and ethical issues 
Courtroom observation 
Observation is time-consuming and not always favoured over other methods of data 
collection such as interviews.  Nevertheless, I considered it essential for gaining an 
understanding of power dynamics and interactions between social and legal actors 
involved in the process of dispute resolution, the practical realities of access to justice, 
courtroom discourse ‘off the record’ and the functioning of the legal system itself.  
However, one issue that I found troubling - familiar to many a legal ethnographer 
observing courts and tribunals - was my own positioning and impact as a researcher 
present in the courtroom.  This was a particular challenge for conducting research in the 
lower courts and tribunals in local communities unused to the presence of ‘outsiders’, 
including advocates.   
I experienced this challenge on my first scoping visit to a primary court in Mbeya 
region.  Turning up at the court by myself I did not know how I might be perceived or 
received as an obvious outsider, but people were friendly and curious and I got into 
conversation with a member of the public outside the court.  Within a short period of 
time all three magistrates had come outside to meet me.  They were more welcoming 
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that I could ever have imagined – indeed, no court or tribunal I visited in Tanzania 
refused me access to conduct my research there.  I soon found myself accompanying 
one of the magistrates into the courtroom and to my surprise was invited to sit next to 
the court clerk immediately below the judicial bench.  The eyes of a packed courtroom 
of people stared back at me.  I felt enormously conspicuous and conscious that my 
positioning alongside court personnel was inappropriate for its potential to generate 
public concern and wonder as to why I was there.  It seemed to align me with the bench. 
Having experienced this reception and effect of my presence and positioning in a 
courtroom early on, at each new tribunal I visited I was careful to request from the 
outset a position in the least conspicuous place in the tribunal from where I could 
observe and take notes.  Some tribunals announced to members of the public my status 
as a researcher.  I always used a notebook rather than a laptop to take notes at court and 
dressed in a smart-casual way to avoid creating too official an appearance.  I will never 
know the extent to which my presence as an observer may have impacted upon the 
proceedings on any given day.  However, spending nine months at the DLHT and up to 
two months at each Ward Tribunal enabled me to collect a very substantial amount of 
data from different fora for comparison, including historic and contemporary data from 
occasions when I was not present.  I also became a familiar face with tribunal members, 
advocates and litigants, and over time I had many informal conversations with a range 
of court users and personnel in the hours and days spent hanging about the tribunals.  
These spontaneous and informal conversations added to the insights I was able to gain 
from other sources of data and contributed to the gradual process of theorising and 
evaluation that I engaged in throughout the period of my fieldwork. 
Archival research 
Much of the development of my research design in the early stages of my fieldwork in 
Arusha grew from research in the archives of Arusha’s DLHT.  I spent the first three 
days working with raw data from court registers to identify the volume of cases 
involving women claimants and their geographical origin within the region.  One 
immediate problem I faced was that no gender disaggregated data was available so it 
was necessary for me to go manually through the registers identifying the gender of 
litigants for each case.  This task required the assistance of an obliging member of 
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tribunal personnel since there were many local vernacular names which I did not 
recognise.  From my initial tabulation of data on appeals I established a scattering of 
cases across numerous different wards.  However, three wards in Arusha Municipality, 
Arumeru and Monduli Districts had generated a higher than average number of appeals.  
I took them as my starting-point and asked to look at the case files for the appeals from 
these wards. 
A second practical problem then arose.  One symptom of underfunding in Tanzania’s 
legal system is the very inadequate file storage system in Arusha’s DLHT.  Whilst live 
case files were relatively easy for administrative staff to access I was unable to view a 
number of the older files I had requested that had been bundled and stacked away.  Over 
the course of the nine months however, I made detailed notes on over fifty separate 
cases involving women litigants from ward, DLHT and High Court archives and some 
LHRC case files, giving a substantial sample of detailed court data from which to 
generate theory and findings.  I requested most of these case files after observing the 
cases in the tribunal.  Hence, my choice of case files was largely driven by what I had 
observed rather than by pre-determined criteria – other than the gender of litigants.  This 
also meant that I had observation data to enrich the archival data. 
A third challenge in following the progression of cases was the length of the court 
process.  Whilst it was possible to observe and collect archival data for several Ward 
Tribunal cases from file opening to judgment, cases in the DLHT and High Court by 
contrast took considerably longer - sometimes years - to conclude.  This meant it was 
impossible to observe many DLHT cases from start to finish during my nine months in 
Arusha.  I was able to collect judgments from 22 of the cases and was reliant on archival 
data to track appeals from ward to DLHT and from DLHT to High Court.   
 
Interviewing litigants 
I considered interviews with women litigants extremely important for bringing women’s 
voices and experiences of accessing justice into my research.  The value of personal 
narratives and life histories has been emphasised by a number of scholars of legal 
ethnography.  In her ethnographic study of the Kwena of Botswana Griffiths found life 
histories an important tool for understanding the context in which people pursue claims, 
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or desist from doing so (Griffiths 1997, 2002).  As Caplan writes, personal narratives, 
including life histories, ‘... provide a vital entry point in interaction between the 
individual and society’ (Caplan 1997: 14).  They may also, as Hirsch suggests, ‘offer 
possibilities for women to make observations about their lives that they might not 
articulate in everyday contexts’ (Hirsch 1998: 61).  Yet conducting interviews, 
including life histories, proved to be the most sensitive and difficult aspect of my data 
collection.   
Critiques of feminist ethnographic research as a whole have drawn attention to its 
inherent ethical tensions rooted in power inequalities and the risk of objectification, 
manipulation and betrayal of informants whose private lives are made public by the 
researcher (Patai 1991, Stacey 1991).  Such risks may be mitigated by ensuring 
informed consent and developing respectful relations based on reciprocity, although 
arguably they can never be entirely overcome.  In the context of my research on access 
to justice I was faced with conflicting priorities.  On the one hand, on several occasions 
I was asked to help or support someone who had given their time to contribute to my 
research project.  On the other hand I wanted to remain as ‘neutral’ as possible in order 
to be able to speak to various parties to a dispute and achieve a balance of perspectives.  
I had to try to resolve such dilemmas whilst becoming part of a community, engaging in 
everyday interactions with informants and developing friendships.  I found conducting 
interviews in such circumstances an ethically and socially complex business, bound up 
in a web of social relations.  I in turn became the subject of my informants’ questions 
and decisions. 
These complexities of ethics and bias have been discussed by other scholars conducting 
legal ethnographic research.  Coutin, for example, reflecting on her own commitments 
and biases in undertaking research and voluntary work with legal services programmes 
in community organisations, argues that ‘to view fieldwork as merely or even primarily 
research can underestimate the complexity and embeddedness of social interaction and 
overestimate the power of ethnographers’ (Coutin 2002: 109).  Moreover: ‘because 
social interaction is multifaceted, fieldwork unavoidably creates competing obligations 
of one sort or another’ (Coutin 2002: 119; see also Coutin and Hirsch 1998).  I resolved 
that the most ethical approach where I was in a position to offer some modest practical 
assistance to a woman who asked for my help was to do so, whether directly, or in the 
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case of legal advice, by referring her to the LHRC.  In such circumstances I prioritised 
feminist-inspired research ethics over maintaining the position of a passive bystander 
for the sake of a more ‘neutral’ approach to data collection.  I considered that this was 
necessary for conducting my research in the most ethical way possible, but also for 
gaining a meaningful understanding of women’s experiences of accessing justice.   
My ethical choices in these cases shaped my research findings to the extent that it gave 
me access to particular insights whilst excluding others.  It was through such cases that I 
acquired an appreciation of the nature of the women’s struggles for access to justice that 
I could not have learned from a single interview.  Female bias in these cases was, I 
would argue, not only justified given my research aims, but also balanced with male 
perspectives in my data collection as a whole.  I also undertook interviews with male 
family members, elders, community leaders and male litigants in other cases and 
obtained male witness testimony from observation and archival research.  The majority 
of Ward Tribunal members and lawyers I met were also male. 
Due to the sensitive nature of family land disputes I wanted to prevent any adverse 
social consequences for informants as a result of participation in my research.  This 
meant that the process of arranging and conducting interviews had to be done discretely, 
which was not straightforward in the case of litigants I met at tribunals.  In the case of 
LHRC clients this was somewhat easier as legal officers assisted with introductions and 
arranging the interview appointments.  However, interviews via the LHRC carried two 
major disadvantages.  Firstly, I considered that ethically I would not be able to 
interview other parties to the dispute because of the conflict of interest this would 
generate.  Secondly, it became evident that, despite what they had been advised, some 
informants had hopes that I would be in a position to assist them with their case either 
by representing them myself or by paying for an advocate to represent them in court.  
This was a particular issue during my fieldwork period because, faced with very limited 
funding for legal representation, the approach of Tanzanian legal NGOs was invariably 
one of coaching clients to appear in person.  However, several litigants I spoke to told 
me they were afraid of representing themselves and wanted an advocate.  In a couple of 
cases I found myself in the uncomfortable situation of disappointing hopeful 
informants. 
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I also wanted to interview litigants who were pursuing their cases without the benefit of 
any legal advice.  Meeting litigants in person was difficult at the DLHT, where the long 
corridor outside the hearing rooms in the Regional Commissioners’ Building – whilst a 
good place to chat with advocates I came to know – was not conducive to striking up 
conversations with people I did not know.  In contrast, ward tribunals proved to be more 
natural places to meet litigants, local leaders and elders who were involved in the court 
process, in their own communities.  Sometimes opportune moments arose when I could 
ask someone if they would be willing to participate in my research.  Alternatively, 
simply sitting in the vicinity of the Ward Tribunal on my own or with my research 
assistant I found that over time people would approach us themselves and we would 
then discuss with them whether they would be prepared to talk to us about their case. 
One particular difficulty I encountered when interviewing some women litigants was in 
ensuring that others whom they had brought to the interview did not speak for them or 
inhibit what they might say.  Some of the women I interviewed were accompanied by a 
man such as a family elder, guardian or a son.  Anxious to make my interviewees feel as 
comfortable as possible - and concerned not to transgress social norms or cause any 
cultural offence - I gave the women the choice as to whether others remained for the 
interview, and often they chose for them to stay.  However, one disadvantage of this 
was that sometimes the accompanying man would answer questions posed to the 
woman for her and I would have to make it clear that the woman should answer the 
questions.   
In my observations of legal aid clinic conferences I noted that sometimes female clients 
would be accompanied by men to the clinic and the same situation would occur with 
substantial conversations taking place between the legal officer and the accompanying 
man while the woman remained silent.  I discussed my observations and own 
difficulties in conducting interviews with a legal officer at the clinic.  We were in 
agreement that lawyers and researchers should be alert to the impact of allowing others 
to sit in on interviews and if necessary take their own judgment on whether a third party 
should be present in the conference or interview.  From my experiences of conducting 
and observing others’ interviews with women litigants I would urge both lawyers and 
researchers to ensure that they create the necessary space to allow a woman to speak in 
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her own cause and take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that what she says 
is not potentially affected by any vested interests of her entourage. 
Translation 
As Birbili notes, collecting data in one language and presenting the findings in another 
involves taking translation-related decisions that have a direct impact on validity 
(Birbili 2000).  This was a significant issue in my fieldwork, which involved collecting 
data in four different languages – English, Kiswahili, Kimeru and Kimaasai.  My 
Kiswahili language training enabled me to converse with many informants directly.  
However, I decided to engage research assistants to translate in-depth interviews and 
help bridge cultural gaps between interviewees and myself.  Translation of questions 
and answers was done simultaneously and I wrote verbatim notes in English paying 
attention to any particularly significant Kiswahili words and phrases.  If informants 
consented I also recorded interviews on a voice recorder for future reference.  However, 
several informants preferred me not to use the voice recorder. 
The challenge of simultaneous translation was not simply my own.  Ward Tribunal 
secretaries and DLHT chairpersons routinely simultaneously translate witness testimony 
from the vernacular to Kiswahili or from Kiswahili to English in order to record 
proceedings in the official language of the tribunal.  This has a direct impact on the 
accuracy of the ‘verbatim’ recording of witness testimony on the court record – a factor 
I had to take into account when analysing court records as textual discourse.  
Proceedings in the land courts were not officially tape recorded.  Therefore, for the 
purpose of my research project I asked my research assistants to make their notes of 
tribunal observations in Kiswahili.  We would then go through the notes together at the 
end of the day’s work to produce an English translation to supplement the handwritten 
tribunal record of proceedings.   
In ward tribunals located in Meru and Arusha areas I found it necessary for my research 
assistants to be able to speak English, Kiswahili and the local vernacular language since 
tribunal members and witnesses would often mix Kiswahili and their vernacular 
language to such a degree that a Tanzanian who did not speak the local language 
sometimes could not understand what was being said.  Over the period of nine months 
in Arusha I had to engage four research assistants to be able to adequately address the 
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translation-related challenges of my research.  My research assistants were all law 
graduates and therefore interested in and sensitive to legal processes as well as fluent in 
English and Kiswahili.  Three of my research assistants also spoke the vernacular 
language of their respective tribes.  A significant proportion of the court documentation 
I collected was in sometimes quite broken Kiswahili.  My research assistants translated 
court documents into English, which I then reviewed and edited.    
Being mzungu 
This account has endeavoured to highlight some of the very real challenges I faced in 
conducting cross-cultural research in multiple legal and social contexts and with a 
diverse range of informants.  My experience as a lone foreign researcher was at times, 
and especially in the early stages, overwhelming, puzzling and full of the unexpected.  
Being regularly labelled ‘mzungu’ by strangers and friends grew extremely wearing, but 
I learned to accept it as a kind of exoticism of the white person who looked so out of 
place walking around a Tanzanian mountain village or travelling in a daladala.  At the 
same time, I was regularly struck and humbled by the warm welcome of ‘karibu sana’ 
(‘you are very welcome’) that I was greeted with throughout Tanzania. 
I made a conscious choice to distance myself from – though not abandon entirely – my 
cultural comfort zone of Arusha’s ex-pat community, and live instead with Tanzanian 
families.  Choosing cultural unfamiliarity and conducting multi-sited research proved 
exhausting and left me initially with a feeling of isolation between worlds.  My field 
diary became my most important daily resource for reflection on my research, my own 
subjectivity and emotions and for unravelling the sensitive ethical dilemmas I faced.  It 
was in these early stages of unfamiliarity and cultural isolation that I was able to notice 
and question most vividly the everyday.  This, I came to appreciate as one of the most 
valuable features of cross-cultural ethnography.   
Reflecting on my own experiences I believe that the researcher can never conduct their 
project entirely detached from their own normative commitments, subjective 
positioning, social and cultural background, knowledge, emotions and preconceptions.  
Reflexivity serves as a tool for analysis but it cannot change the researcher’s own 
position in the world.  Yet, the naivety and emotional discomfort I experienced, together 
with my overt status as an outsider carried the advantages of freedom to question 
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normality and a heightened sense of my own subjectivity.  My own background served 
as a point of comparison and contrast, providing me with openings for exploration that 
might have remained closed by familiarity to a researcher in their own society.  For this 
reason I would welcome cross-cultural research of my own society and legal 
institutions.  I would argue further, that projects conducted collaboratively by insiders 
and cross-cultural researchers provide an interesting model for socio-legal and feminist 
research founded on ethics and reciprocity, with the potential to yield particularly rich 
findings and original thought. 
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Appendix B 
Table of legislation 
Constitutional legislation 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 Cap. 2 R.E. 2002 
Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act (Act No. 15 of 1984) 
Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council 1961 
 
Primary legislation 
Administration (Small Estates) (Amendment) Ordinance R.L. Cap. 30 
Civil Procedure Code (Act No. 49 of 1966) Cap. 33 R.E. 2002 
Courts Ordinance (No. 6 of 1920) R.L. Cap. 3 
Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act (Act No. 47 of 1968) Cap. 377 R.E. 2002 
Evidence Act (Act No. 6 of 1967) Cap. 6 R.E. 2002 
Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act (Act No. 24 of 1963) Cap. 
393 R.E. 2002  
Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act (Act No. 44 of 1969) 
Cap. 367 R.E. 2002 
Indian Acts (Application) Ordinance of 1920 R.L. Cap. 2 
Interpretation of Laws Act (Act No. 4 of 1996) Cap. 1 R.E. 2002 
Judicature and Application of Laws Act (Ordinance No. 7 of 1920) R.L. Cap. 2, 
(Ordinance No. 1 of 1961) R.L. Cap. 453, Cap. 358 R.E. 2002 
Labour Utilization Ordinance of 1947 R.L. Cap. 243 
Land Act (Act No. 4 of 1999) Cap. 113 R.E. 2002. 
Land (Amendment) Act (Act No. 2 of 2004) 
Land Disputes Courts Act (Act No. 2 of 2002) Cap. 216 R.E. 2002 
Land Ordinance (No. 3 of 1923) R.L. Cap. 113 
Land Registration Act (Ordinance No. 36 of 1953) Cap. 334 R.E. 2002 
Land Registry Ordinance (No. 15 of 1923) R.L. Cap. 116 
Land (Settlement of Disputes) Act (Act No. 25 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 524 
Law of Limitation Act (Act No. 10 of 1971) Cap. 89 R.E. 2002  
Law of Marriage Act (Act No. 5 of 1971) Cap. 29 R.E. 2002 
Laws Revision Act (Act No. 7 of 1994) Cap. 4 R.E. 2002 
Local Courts Ordinance (No. 14 of 1951) R.L. Cap. 299 
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Local Courts (Minister for Justice and Regional Local Courts Officers) Act (Act No. 16 
of 1962)  
Local Government (District Authorities) Act (Act No. 7 of 1982) Cap. 287 R.E. 2002  
Local Government Finances Act (Act No. 9 of 1982) Cap. 290 R.E. 2002 
Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (Act No. 13 of 2006) 
Local Government Negotiating Machinery Act (Act No. 11 of 1982) 
Local Government Service Act (Act No. 10 of 1982) 
Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act (Act No. 8 of 1982) Cap. 288 R.E. 2002  
Magistrates’ Courts Act (Act No. 55 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 537 
Magistrates’ Courts Act (Act No. 2 of 1984) Cap. 11 R.E. 2002 
Magistrates’ Courts (Amendment) Act (Act No. 18 of 1969)  
Mortgage Financing (Special Provisions) Act (Act No. 17 of 2008)   
Native Courts Ordinance (No. 5 of 1929) R.L. Cap. 73 
Nyarubanja Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act (Act No. 1 of 1965) 
Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (Act No. 11 of 2007)  
Probate and Administration of Estates Act (Act No. 9 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 445, (Act No. 
55 of 1963) R.L. Cap. 29, (Act No. 33 of 1964) R.L. Cap. 30, (Act No. 9 of 1965) R.L. 
Cap. 326, Cap. 352 R.E. 2002 
Regulation of Land Tenure (Established Villages) Act (Act No. 22 of 1992) Cap. 267 
R.E. 2002 
Village Land Act (Act No. 5 of 1999) Cap. 114 R.E. 2002 
Ward Tribunals Act (Act No. 7 of 1985) Cap. 206 R.E. 2002 
 
Secondary legislation 
Arbitration Tribunals Regulations (G.N. 219 of 1969) 
Customary Law (Limitation of Proceedings) Rules (G.N. 311 of 1964) 
German Foreign Office Decree of 15.1.1907 
Imperial Decree regarding Creation, Acquisition and Conveyance of Crown Lands and 
regarding the Acquisition and Conveyance of Lands in general in German East Africa, 
promulgated 26.11.1895 
Land Disputes Courts (District Land and Housing Tribunal) Regulations (G.N. No. 174 
of 2003) 
Land (Mortgage) Regulations (G.N. No. 43 of 2005) 
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Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order (G.N. 279 of 1963), Cap. 358 R.E. 2002  
Local Customary Law (Declaration) (No. 4) Order (G.N. 436 of 1963), Cap. 358 R.E. 
2002 
 
Regional and International instruments 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 (the Banjul Charter) 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights  
of Women in Africa 2003 (the Maputo Protocol) 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1979 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 
 
Indian legislation 
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 5 of 1908) 
Hindu Wills Act (Act XXI of 1870) 
Indian Succession Act (Act X of 1865) 
 
English legislation 
Family Law Act 1996 chapter 27 
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Appendix C 
Table of cases 
Tanzanian cases 
Bahari Binti Rajabu v Juma Abdallah High Court of Tanzania (PC) Matrimonial Civil 
Appeal No. 8 of 1984 (Unreported) 
Bi Hawa Mohamed v Ally Sefu Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Civil 
Appeal No. 9 of 1983, [1983] TLR 32   
Boniface Muhigi v Philemon Muhigi [1967] HCD 231 
Deocras Lutabana v Deus Kashaga Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza, Civil 
Appeal No. 1 of 1981, [1981] TLR 122 
Elizabeth Stephen and Salome Charles v The Attorney General High Court of Tanzania 
at Dar es Salaam Misc. Civil Cause 82 of 2005 (Unreported) 
Ephrahim v Pastory & Another High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza (PC) Civil Appeal 
No. 70 of 1989, [1990] LRC (Const.) 757  
Hadija Mwere v Ally Mbaga High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza Civil Appeal No. 40 of 
1995 (Unreported)  
Haji Athumani Issa v Rweutama Mituta Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civil Application 
No. 9 of 1988 (Unreported) 
Hamida Abdul v Ramadhani Mwakaje High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam (PC) 
Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1988 (Unreported) 
Joseph Sindo v Pasaka Mkondola High Court of Tanzania Civil Appeal No. 132 of 
1991 (Unreported) 
Khasim Hamisi Manywele v Republic High Court of Tanzania at Dodoma Criminal 
Appeal No. 39 of 1990 (Unreported) 
Leons Challamila v Mayalla Edward Masunga High Court of Tanzania at Dar es 
Salaam Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1999 (Unreported) 
Letisia Buguma v Thadeo Magoma and Another High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza 
Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1989 (Unreported) 
Maagwi Kimito v Gibeno Werema Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civil Appeal No. 20 of 
1984, [1985] TLR 132  
Magdalena Zacharia v Daniel Zacharia High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza (PC) Civil 
Appeal No. 23 of 1989 (Unreported) 
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Maryam Mbaraka Saleh v Abood Saleh Abood Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civil 
Appeal No. 1 of 1992 (Unreported) 
Matei Kijuu v Omari Salehe [1961] Dig. 206 
Mikidadi v Mwanaisha Hashim High Court of Tanzania (PC) Matrimonial Civil Appeal 
No. 8 of 1980 (Unreported) 
Naiman Moiro v Nailejiet K.J. Zablon Court of Appeal of Tanzania [1980] TLR 274 
National Bank of Commerce v Vitalis Ayemba High Court of Tanzania at Mwanza Civil 
Case No. 37 of 1988 (Unreported) 
NBC Limited v M/S Konje Multi Traders Co. Ltd and 2 Others High Court of Tanzania 
at Dar es Salaam (Commercial Division) Commercial Case No. 284 of 2002 
(Unreported) 
Ndewawiosia d/o Ndeamtzo v Imanuel s/o Malasi High Court of Tanzania at Moshi 
(PC) Civil Appeal D/80/66, [1968] HCD 127  
Paulo Abdullah v Mohamed Bin Abdullah High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam 
Civil Appeal No. 150 of 1999 (Unreported) 
Re Innocent Mbilinyi [1971] HCD 283 
Rukuba Nteme v Bi. Jalia Hassan and Another Court of Appeal of Tanzania Civil Case 
No. 19 of 1986 (Unreported) 
Scholastica Benedict v Martin Benedict Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza Civil 
Appeal No. 26 of 1988, [1993] TLR 1  
Shija Kadasa v Mahuyi Kadasa [1961] Dig. 208 
Zakia Haji v Hamisi High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Matrimonial Civil 
Appeal No. 84 of 1983 (Unreported) 
Zawadi Abdallah v Ibrahim Iddi High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam Civil Appeal 
No. 10 of 1980, [1981] TLR 311  
 
South African cases 
Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), 2005 (1) BCLR 10  
Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 
Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa and Other 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) 
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Appendix D 
Key provisions from  
the Land Acts and Law of Marriage Act 
Land Act (Act No. 4 of 1999) 
Section 3  
(2) The right of every woman to acquire, hold, use and deal with land shall to the 
same extent and subject to the same restriction be treated as the right of any man, is 
hereby declared to be law. 
Section 85  
If a lease is entered into by (a) two or more lessors as cooccupiers; or (b) two or more 
lessees as cooccupiers, and the lease is terminable by notice, the notice must be given 
by and to all the cooccupiers, unless all the parties to the lease have agreed otherwise, 
expressly or by implication. 
Section 114 (formerly s.112 - as amended by LAA and MFSPA)  
(1)  A mortagage of a matrimonial home including a customary mortgage of a 
matrimonial home shall be valid only if - 
(a) any document or form used in applying for such a mortgage homes is signed 
by, or there is evidence from the document that it has been assented to by the 
mortgagor and the spouses or spouses of the mortgagor living in that 
matrimonial home; or 
(b) any document or form used to grant the mortgage is signed by or there is 
evidence that it has been assented to by the mortgagor and the spouse or spouses 
living in that matrimonial home. 
[(2)  For the purpose of subsection (3), it shall be the responsibility of a mortgagee to 
take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the applicant for a mortgage has a spouse or 
spouses.]   
Repealed by MFSPA and replaced as follows: 
(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1), it shall be the responsibility of the mortgagor 
to disclose that he has a spouse or not and upon such disclosure the mortgagee shall be 
under the responsibility to take reasonable steps to verify whether the applicant for a 
mortgage has or does not have a spouse. 
(3)  A mortgagee shall be deemed to have discharged the responsibility for 
ascertaining the marital status of the applicant and any spouse identified by the 
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applicant if, by an affidavit or written and witnessed document, the applicant declares 
that there were spouse (sic) or any other third party holding interest in the mortgaged 
land. 
(4)  An applicant commits an offence who, by an affidavit or a written and witnessed 
document, knowingly gives false information to the mortgagee in relation to existence 
of a spouse or any other third party and, upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not 
less than one half of the value of the loan money or to imprisonment for a term of not 
less than twelve months. 
Section 115 (as amended by LAA) 
(1)  The creation and operation of customary mortgages of land shall, subject to the 
provisions of this section, continue to be in accordance with the customary law 
applicable to the land in respect of which the customary mortgage is created.   
... 
(4)  In any case concerning a customary mortgage, the Village Land Council 
determining the case shall, where it appears to the Village Land Council that - (a) there 
is a lacuna in the customary law applying to that mortgage; and (b) no other system of 
customary law makes adequate or any provision for the matter in respect of which there 
is a lacuna, be guided by the relevant provisions of this Part of this Act. 
Section 161 
(1)  Where a spouse obtains land under a right of occupancy for the co-occupation, 
and use of both spouses or where there is more than one wife, all spouses, there shall be 
a presumption that, unless a provision in the certificate of occupancy or certificate of 
customary occupancy clearly states that one spouse is taking the right of occupancy in 
his or her name only or that the spouses are taking the land as occupiers in common, the 
spouses will hold the land as occupiers in common and, unless the presumption is 
rebutted in the manner stated in this subsection, the Registrar shall register the spouses 
as joint occupiers accordingly.  
(2)  Where land held for a right of occupancy is held in the name of one spouse only 
but the other spouse or spouses contribute by their labour to the productivity, upkeep 
and improvement of the land, that spouse or those spouses shall be deemed by virtue of 
that labour to have acquired an interest in that land in the nature of an occupancy in 
common of that land with the spouse in whose name the certificate of occupancy or 
customary certificate of occupancy has been registered.  
(3)  Where a spouse who holds land or a dwelling house for a right of occupancy in 
his or her name alone undertakes a disposition of that land or dwelling house, then-  
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(a) where that disposition is a mortgage, the lender shall be under a duty to make 
inquiries of (sic) the borrower has or as the case may be, have consented to that 
mortgage accordance with the provisions of section 59 of the Law of Marriage 
Act, 1971-  
(b) where that disposition assignment or a transfer of land, the assignee or 
transferee shall be under a duty to make inquiries of the assignor or transferor as 
to whether the spouse or spouses have consented to that assignment or transfer 
in accordance with section 59 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 and where the 
aforesaid spouse undertaking the disposition deliberately misleads the lender or, 
as the case may be, the assignee or transferee as to the answers to the inquiries 
made in accordance with Paragraphs (a) and (b), the disposition shall be 
voidable at the option of the spouse or spouses who have not consented to the 
disposition. 
 
 
Village Land Act (Act No. 5 of 1999) 
Section 20  
(2) Any rule of customary law and any decision taken in respect of land held under 
customary tenure, whether in respect of land held individually or communally, shall 
have regard to the customs, traditions, and practices of the community concerned to the 
extent that they are in accordance with the provisions of sections 9 and 9A of the 
Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance and of any other written law and subject 
to the foregoing provisions of this subsection, that rule of customary law or any such 
decision in respect of land held under customary tenure shall be void and inoperative 
and shall not be given effect to by any village council or village assembly or any person 
or body of persons exercising any authority over village land or in respect of any court 
or other body, to the extent to which it denies women, children or Persons with 
disability lawful access to ownership, occupation or use of any such land. 
Section 22 
(1) A person, a family unit, a group of persons recognised as such under customary 
law or who have formed themselves together as an association, a primary co-operative 
society or as any other body recognised by any law which permits that body to be 
formed, who is or are villagers, or if a married person who has been divorced from, or 
has left for not less than two years, his or her spouse, was, prior to the marriage, a 
villager, and all of whom are citizens, may apply to the village council of that village for 
a customary right of occupancy. 
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Section 30 
(4)  The village council shall disallow an assignment which- 
... 
(b) would operate or would be likely to operate to defeat the right of any woman 
to occupy land under a customary, right of occupancy, a derivative right or as a 
successor in title to the assignor; 
(c) would result in the assignor occupying an amount of land insufficient to 
provide for his livelihood or where he has a family or other dependants, for their 
livelihood; 
... 
(6)  An assignment that infringes the criteria set out in subsection (4) or that is made 
notwithstanding the service of a notice to disallow on one or both parties to the 
assignment shall be void. 
 
 
Law of Marriage Act (Act No. 5 of 1971) 
Section 2 
(1) ... 
“Matrimonial home” means the building or part of a building in which the husband and 
wife ordinarily reside together and includes –  
(a) where a building and its curtilage are occupied for residential purposes only, that 
curtilage and any outbuildings thereon; and  
(b) where a building is on or occupied in conjunction with agricultural land [or pastoral 
land],
246
 any land allocated by the husband or the wife, as the case may be, to his or her 
spouse for her or his exclusive use. 
Section 56  
A married woman shall have the same right as has a man to acquire, hold and dispose of 
property, whether movable or immovable, and the same right to contract, the same right 
to sue and the same liability to be sued in contract or in tort or otherwise. 
 
                                               
246 The definition was repeated in LAA s.112 (with the addition of ‘pastoral land’).  
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Section 58  
Subject to the provisions of section 59 and to any agreement to the contrary that the 
parties may make, a marriage shall not operate to change the ownership of any property 
to which either the husband or the wife may be entitled or to prevent either the husband 
or the wife from acquiring, holding and disposing of any property. 
Section 59  
(1)  Where any estate or interest in the matrimonial home is owned by the husband 
or by the wife, he or she shall not, while the marriage subsists and without the consent 
of the other spouse, alienate it by way of sale, gift, lease, mortagage or otherwise, and 
the other spouse shall be deemed to have an interest therein capable of being protected 
by caveat, caution or otherwise under any law for the time being in force relating to the 
registration of title to land or of deeds. 
(2)  Where any person alienates his or her estate or interest in the matrimonial home 
in contravention of subsection (1), the estate or interest so transferred or created shall be 
subject to the right of the other spouse to continue to reside in the matrimonial home 
until- 
(a) the marriage is dissolved; or 
(b) the court on a decree for separation or an order for maintenance otherwise 
orders, 
unless the person acquiring the estate or interest can satisfy the court that he had no 
notice of the interest of the other spouse and could not by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence have become aware of it. 
(3)  Where any estate or interest in the matrimonial home is owned by the husband 
or by the wife and that husband or wife, deserts his or her spouse, the deserted spouse 
shall not be liable to be evicted from the matrimonial home by or at the instance of the 
husband or the wife, as the case may be, or any person claiming through or under him or 
her, except- 
(a) on the sale of the estate or interest by the court in execution of a decree 
against the husband or wife, as the case may be; or 
(b) by a trustee in bankruptcy of the husband or wife, as the case may be. 
(4)  Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting any of the provisions of 
the Rent Restriction Act, 1962, conferring upon a party to a marriage the right of 
continuing to reside in any premises of which her or his spouse or former spouse is or 
was a tenant. 
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Section 60 
 
Where during the subsistence of a marriage, any property is acquired- 
(a) in the name of the husband or of the wife, there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that the property belongs absolutely to that person, to the exclusion of his or her spouse; 
(b) in the names of the husband and wife jointly, there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that their beneficial interests therein are equal. 
 
Section 61 
Where, during the subsistence of a marriage, either spouse gives any property to the 
other, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the property thereafter belongs 
absolutely to the donee. 
Section 63 
Except where the parties are separated by agreement or by decree of the court and 
subject to any subsisting order of the court - 
(a) it shall be the duty of every husband to maintain his wife or wives and to provide 
them with such accommodation, clothing and food as may be reasonable having regard 
to his means and station in life; 
(b) it shall be the duty of every wife who has the means to do so, to provide in similar 
manner for her husband if he is incapacitated, wholly or partially, from earning a 
livelihood by r n (sic) of mental or physical injury or ill-health. 
Section 66  
For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding any custom to the 
contrary, no person has any right to inflict corporal punishment on his or her spouse 
Section 114 
(1)  The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a decree 
of separation or divorce, to order the division between the parties of any assets acquired 
by them during the marriage by their joint efforts or to order the sale of any such asset 
and the division between the parties of the proceeds of sale. 
(2)  In exercising the power conferred by subsection (1), the court shall have regard- 
(a) to the custom of the community to which the parties belong; 
(b) to the extent of the contributions made by each party m money, property or 
work towards the acquiring of the assets; 
(c) to any debts owing by either party which were contracted for their joint 
benefit; and 
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(d) to the needs of the infant children, if any, of the marriage, and subject to 
those considerations, shall incline towards equality of division. 
(3)  For the purposes of this section, references to assets acquired during a marriage 
include assets owned before the marriage by one party which have been substantially 
improved during the marriage by the other party or by their joint efforts. 
Section 139 
The court shall have power during the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings or on 
or after the grant of a decree of annulment, separation or divorce, to order any person to 
refrain from forcing his or her company on his or her spouse or former spouse and from 
other acts of molestation. 
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Appendix E 
Original Kiswahili texts with translation for chapter 4 
Barbed wire
247
 
Original Kiswahili transcript  
Mimi nadai shamba langu nililopewa na 
baba yangu.  Hili shamba baada  
ya baba yangu kufariki na mume wangu 
kufariki shemeji yangu tuliye mfanya 
kama mlezi akaja kuuza.  Akabakiza 
sehemu kidogo, akabakisha ile nyumba 
yangu akaja akajenga katika shamba tu.  
Akaleta waya akazungusha pale.  
Akajenga nyumba ya mbao pale nje 
kwangu.  Akanizuia hata mahali pa choo.  
Akaleta michongoma akaniwekea.   
Hilo ni shamba moja.  Shamba la pili ni la 
mume wangu.  Lile  
shamba kuna wakati tumekosa  
fedha za kulima kwani tulikuwa tunalima 
kwa trekta.  Akasema hili shamba  
halina hali mimi nitakwenda kulilima.  
Ikawa hatuja kubaliana naye akafanya 
nguvu akaenda kulilima. Baada ya kulima 
mazao ikaiva akatoa.  Nikaugua mwaka 
wa pili ikawa sijaweza kulima.   
Nikapona, shamba likatolewa mazao, 
nikamwendea nikamweleza nataka kulima 
sasa shamba langu.   
Akaniambia sikupi.  ...  
Basi akaendelea kuwa yeye, ndiye 
English translation  
I am claiming my shamba which I was 
given by my father.  This shamba, after 
my father died and my husband died,  
my brother-in-law whom we made a  
guardian came to sell it.  He left a  
small portion, where my house was and 
then he built in the same shamba.   
He brought wire and fenced that area.   
He built a timber house outside my place.  
He obstructed me from the toilet area.  
He brought thorns and put them there.  
That was one shamba.  The second 
shamba was my husband’s.  In that 
shamba there was a time when we lacked 
money to farm it because we used to farm 
it using a tractor.  He said this shamba 
cannot be left in this state I’ll go and farm 
it.  We had not agreed but he used force 
to go and farm it.  After farming, the 
crops were ready for harvesting.  I fell ill 
the second year and I wasn’t able to farm.  
Then I was well, the shamba produced 
crops, I went and told him that I now 
wanted to farm my shamba.   
He told me I won’t give it to you. ...  
So he continued to be the one using that 
                                               
247 Translated by Miriam Matinda 
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anatumia hilo shamba hivyo  
... 
Juzi sasa akaniambia kwani umeenda 
kuniletea samosi?   
Kuna kitu unachodai hapa?  Nitakuuwa 
basi na hakuna mtu atakayenidai mimi.  
Akamkuta kijana wangu ...  
akata kampiga mtoto.  Nikamuuliza kwa 
nini umpige.  Akanirukia nilikuwa 
nakutaka wewe, akanifuta katika sengenge 
ikanikata na akanipiga teke.  
Akaniangusha chini,  
akanishika shingo akainua  
panga akageuza akanipiga nayo.   
Baada ya watu kulia akaniachia, nika 
amka nikaenda polisi kituoni.  Nikapewa 
maaskari wa kuja kuchukua  
tukaja tukamkuta yupo  
na mwenyekiti wa kitongoji. ...  
Mwenyekiti akasema tulikuwa tumekuja 
tuongealee lakini kwa sababu mmekuja 
itabidi tuende.  Akapelekwa kituoni  ... 
Akawekwa ndani kabla hajawekwa ndani 
akasema ninamjua mwizi aliyeniibia na 
aliyesababisha nikatoa ngomvi na huyu 
mama ...  Akamuonyesha kijana wangu. ...  
Akashikwa akawekwa ndani, wote wawili, 
kile.  Mwenyekiti akasema kwa sababu 
huyu ni mwanafunzi na ni ndugu moja 
tunaomba haya maneno yasiende 
mahakama wasipelekwe [word not clear]  
nyumbani tutaenda kuongelea ...   
shamba.  
...   
The day before yesterday he asked me 
why did you bring a summons against 
me?  Do you claim anything here?  I will 
just kill you and no one is going to claim 
anything from me.  He found my son ... 
he wanted to beat the child.  I asked him 
why he hit him.  He turned on me and 
told me I want you, he pulled me against 
the barbed wire fence it cut me and then 
he kicked me.  He pushed me to the 
ground, held my neck and picked up a 
machete turned it and hit me with it.  
After people cried out he let me go, I got 
up and went to the police station.  I was 
given officers to come with me and bring 
him and when we arrived we found him 
with the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji. ...  The 
mwenyekiti said we had come to talk but 
since you [officers] have come you will 
have to go.  He was taken to the station. 
... Before he went into custody  
he said I know the thief who stole from 
me and who caused me to fight with this 
woman. ... He pointed at my son. ...  
They arrested him, both were kept in 
custody.  The mwenyekiti said that since 
he is a student and they are relatives we 
ask that this matter does not  
go to court [word not clear] 
they will go to talk about it at home. ...   
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Kikao kikakaa, wakaongea, akakutwa yule 
mtoto sio mwizi ...  
Na wazee wakasema ile shauri lako la 
madai ya samosi siendelee.  
... 
Nilianzia nyumbani kwanza na wazee wa 
ukoo.  Ikashindikana.  Nikaleta katika ofisi 
ya kijiji.  Ikashindikana.  Tukapalekana  
tena paka polisi.  Likarudishwa likaingia 
pale TAWLA ... Wazee wa ukoo 
wakaomba, wakasema tutaenda kumaliza 
nyumbani.  Kikao ikaitishwa.  Yule baba 
akavuruga akakataa. 
... 
The meeting was held, they talked and 
found that the child was not a thief. ...  
The elders said [to me] that your claim 
should proceed by summons. 
... 
I started at home with the clan elders.  It 
was unsuccessful.  I brought it to the 
village office.  It was unsuccessful.  We 
took it again to the police station.  It was 
sent back to go to TAWLA ...  The clan 
elders asked, they said we will go and 
finish it at home.  The meeting was held.  
That man disturbed it and refused. 
... 
 
A blanket
248
 
Original Kiswahili transcript 
Kulikuwa na matatizo matatizo akaanza 
kunipigapiga mpaka kuanzia akanitoa, nini, 
meno.  Saa hiyo alianza [word not clear] 
siku hiyo nilienda  
kwetu.  Nikakaa miaka mbili.   
Niliporudi  
nikakuta amefukuza vijana wangu  
lakini si yeye.  Alikuwa akiambia huyo 
kijana chake cha huyo mama mwingine.  
Anawaita huko kwake,  
ehe, ndiye aliwaita huko kwake, 
akawaambia kila siku saa kumi na mbili 
njoo.  Akapiga wale watoto; akapiga wale 
English translation 
The big problems were when he [Anaeli] 
started beating me until I lost, well, my 
teeth.  There was this time he began [word 
not clear] this day I went back to my 
[parents’] place.  I stayed for two years.  
When I returned  
I found that he had chased away my sons 
but it wasn’t him.  He is telling  
his son [Michael] from the other woman 
[wife].  He [Michael] called them [my 
sons] to his place, yes, he called them to 
his place, he told them every day at six in 
the morning come.  He beat those children; 
                                               
248 Translated by Miriam Matinda and Helen Dancer.  Extracts from the original Kiswahili interview 
recording were transcribed by Cecilia Kimani. 
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watoto mpaka wakaenda.  Halafu anapiga 
wale watoto na faru.  Kila siku saa kumi na 
mbili watoto wanalalia hiyo fori.   
Kama huyu,  
ana nyumba yake na sasa  
amevuruga hiyo nyumba  
imejengwa kwa hizo ekari mbili na  
kumfukuza. 
... 
Sasa, huyo Michael ndiye alikuwa mtoto 
mkubwa kwa nyumba, baba akamwambia 
hivi: “Nimekupa na ile blanketi yangu mwe 
mtoto mkubwa”.  Halafu akasema kwa vile 
amekuwa mtoto mkubwa hakuna 
kulalamika.  Akanisumbua nikaenda 
kulalamika huko kwenye baraza, na yeye 
anaenda hakuna mtu akanisikia.  Na huyo 
mtoto, kitu anatembea nacho ni ile blanketi 
ya babake na kusema  
“Mimi ndiye mkubwa, sasa mimi ni 
mtendaje wa kata, sasa mtanifanyia nini?” 
... 
Mimi kile kitu ninataka kifanyike anipe 
haki yangu.  Ile yote nimekaa kwa nyumba 
yake kwa miaka hiyo yote;  
anipe haki yangu.   
Mtu akikaa kwa mtu hata mfanyikazi 
hakuna hata mshahara?   
 
 
 
he beat them until they left.  Then he beat 
those children with a faru.
249
  Every day at 
six in the morning he beat the children 
with that faru.  For example, this one 
[Samwel] has his house and now  
he [Michael] has destroyed the house that 
he [Samwel] built in those two acres and 
chased them away. 
... 
Now, this Michael is the elder son of the 
household, his father told him  
this: “I am giving you my blanket as you 
are the elder son”.  Then he said now I am 
the elder son no one can  
complain.  He disturbed me until I went to 
complain to the tribunal, and when he  
went no one listened to me.  And that 
child, the thing is he was walking around 
with his father’s blanket and saying “I am 
the elder son, now I’m the ward executive 
officer, now what are you going to do?” 
... 
Me the thing that I want to happen is for 
him to give me my right.  All those [years] 
I have lived in his house for all those years; 
he [should] give me my right.  If a person 
stays with a person as a worker won’t they 
get a salary?   
 
Elizabeth is then asked to clarify how she 
wants the court to divide the land. 
                                               
249 A piece of rubber used in beatings.  The word ‘faru’ refers to the rhinoceros tail that was once used to 
beat slaves and prisoners 
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Nataka anipe haki yangu kwa miaka hiyo 
yote nimeishi huko kwake.  Sasa,  
mtu saa yote anakupiga kesi si  
anatakiwa kukusaidia.  Hiyo kesi ninatumia 
pesa, na watoto wake nimemtunzia.   
Korti inisaidie kuuliza mzee anisaidie,  
miaka hiyo yote  
nimekaa kwake na kumtunzia  
watoto, na ardhi yake iko wapi?  
Wamuulize: Hawa watoto wa huyo mama 
unajua wanakula nini?   
Wanavaa nini?  Ninataka nipasuliwe ile 
ardhi.  Sasa hao wanawake watatu, si kila 
mtu ana yake?   
Sasa hiyo ya kwangu,  
itaenda wapi?  Si hiyo ni yangu  
na watoto wangu?  Watoto wangu 
wataenda wapi?  Mimi ninataka haki 
yangu, miaka hiyo yote nimekaa kwake. 
I want him to give me my right for all 
those years that I lived at his place.  Now, 
when a person keeps involving you in 
cases instead of helping you. I want the 
costs for this case, and for caring for his 
children.  The court can help me to ask that 
man [my husband] to help me, all those 
years that I lived at his place and cared for 
the children, and where is his land?  They 
[the court] can ask him: Those children of 
this woman do you know what they eat?  
What do they wear?  I want to have a share 
of that land.  Now those three women 
[wives], doesn’t each of them have their 
own [land]?  Now the one that’s mine [i.e. 
the land], where will it go?  Isn’t it mine 
and my children’s?  My children where 
will they go?  I want my right, for all those 
years that I have lived at his place. 
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Appendix F 
Case Reports for chapter 5 
1. Rehani                   Ward Tribunal application 
The claimant was an Arusha widow and the only child of her father.  During his lifetime 
the claimant’s father had two adjacent shambas in a rural Arusha area – the ‘northern 
shamba’ and the ‘southern shamba’.  The widow claimed both plots on the basis that 
the southern shamba had been under rehani for 10,000 Tsh
250
 and the northern shamba 
under rehani for a sheep and a bull.  At the time of the proceedings the respondent, who 
was the claimant’s paternal aunt by marriage, was using the southern shamba, and the 
respondent’s son, the northern shamba.  After the claimant’s father died the claimant 
tried to redeem the rehani by offering 10,000 Tsh to her aunt but the aunt had refused.   
In relation to the northern shamba the aunt claimed that this had been bought through 
her contribution of a sheep and a bull to slaughter at the funeral.  She disputed the claim 
that this farm was also under rehani.  Elders from the claimant’s paternal family gave 
evidence that the southern shamba was under rehani but the northern shamba had been 
sold for a sheep and a bull.  The husband of the respondent, who was the claimant’s 
paternal uncle and guardian, also gave evidence.  Two documents were produced during 
the proceedings.  One was the minutes of a boma meeting at which the guardian 
confirmed that the southern shamba was under rehani for 10,000 Tsh to his wife and 
was the claimant’s inheritance from her father.  The second was a statement purportedly 
written during the funeral recording that the guardian was to take care of the deceased’s 
estate on behalf of the claimant.  The mwenyekiti wa kitongoji was present at the site 
visit. 
The tribunal members noted the witness evidence of boma elders who had confirmed 
that the northern shamba was sold for a sheep and a bull, but the southern shamba had 
been under rehani for 10,000 Tsh and should therefore be redeemed by the claimant.  
The judgment concludes:  
All the members of the tribunal have unanimously decided that in 
accordance with the Land Laws of 1999-2001 the wife and husband have 
                                               
250 Equivalent to approximately £5 at 2010 exchange rate. 
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equal RIGHTS (HAKI sawa)
251
 to own (kumiliki) land. [The claimant] has 
been ordered to give/pay [the respondent] Tsh 10,000 at once in front of 
the tribunal members.  As from today [date] the southern shamba shall be 
held by her (amekabidhiwa) and the second northern shamba shall 
remain with (litabakia) the family of the respondent _____ after being 
proved that she bought it for one sheep and a bull.
252
 
 
2. Aulo
253
                DLHT appeal 
The claimant was an Arusha woman in her sixties at the time of the legal claim.  Her 
father passed away leaving only daughters, no sons.  The claimant, her sisters and their 
widowed mother lived on the family land in a peri-urban Arusha village under the care 
of a family guardian.  Sometime later the claimant’s mother passed away and she and 
her sisters left the area as married women to live with their husbands.  The guardian 
died and another family guardian was appointed to take over his role.  The second 
guardian and his children invaded the land and built houses on it.  When the claimant 
and her sisters had problems with their husbands they tried to return to their land.  They 
brought claims to the family elders and later to the Ward Tribunal against the guardian. 
Clan elders gave evidence at the Ward Tribunal of their efforts to attempt to ensure the 
daughters were given back the land.  The Ward Tribunal upheld the daughters’ claim:  
In his generation the late babu was blessed with daughters/girls only.  He 
had no sons.  All his daughters were married.  Therefore, there was no 
child who remained at home, except the wife who later died. ...  
Considering that these are orphans without their father.  Also considering 
that they are girls who are now recognised by the laws and the Nation in 
general as the same as boys.  The tribunal disclaim all the statements by 
[the respondent’s] children that girls do not have inheritance.   
The Ward Tribunal ruled that the part of the aulo land which had not been built on be 
allocated to the daughters, but that the areas with houses remained; ‘…if the children 
[i.e. the daughters] continue to claim they have the right to claim [those areas].’   
                                               
251 Capitalisation is the Tribunal’s own. 
252 All extracts of Ward Tribunal judgments are translations from the original Kiswahili. 
253 Gulliver discusses the significance of aulo to the Arusha - an undivided grazing area inherited and 
shared by the sons of a deceased father, and its potential to generate bickering and disputes (1963: 79-80). 
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The guardian appealed to the DLHT.  Both parties were litigants in person and the 
matter was dealt with on written submissions.  One assessor (male) commented on the 
‘outdated assumption that female children had no right to inherit land which formerly 
belonged to their parents.’  The other assessor (female) concluded: ‘Because the late 
[father] had no male children, the appellant took an opportunity of scolding the female 
children by the intention of grabbing their land just because they cannot inherit the land 
the system which is now time barred’.  Citing the equality clause in LA the DLHT 
chairperson upheld the Ward Tribunal’s decision:   
... the appellant and his allies who want to grab the land from [the 
respondents] are still overwhelmed by old age concept when to many 
societies.  It was believed that a woman has no right to inherit a land, But 
to date things have changed, even our laws have been changed to 
consider the women’s rights of ownership over land is equally the same 
as that of the men, Vide The Land Act 1999 No 4, on s.3(2). 
 
3. Roadblock               DLHT appeal 
In a Muslim family living in a peri-urban Arusha village all the sons and daughters were 
given portions of their late parents’ shamba during their lifetime.  The maternal uncle of 
the litigant brother and sister gave evidence that he had witnessed the allocation of the 
land and that all but the claimant daughter of the deceased had sold their lands.  In her 
evidence to the Ward Tribunal the claimant daughter said that she kept the plot to 
develop and build a house on it, but that her brother (the respondent) had invaded her 
shamba.  She tried to solve the matter by recourse to the balozi, village office and 
police.  Practical action by family elders and the VEO also failed to end the dispute.  
Eventually she took the matter to the Ward Tribunal.  There her maternal uncle gave 
evidence of the attempts that were made to restore the land to her.  The Village 
Chairman, balozi and neighbours also supported her claim.  Minutes of family meetings 
were produced.  The Ward Tribunal found that the respondent had chased her and later 
sent relatives with machetes who blocked the road which gave access to her land.     
The Ward Tribunal concluded: ‘Anahaki ya kutumia kama watoto wengine walipopewa 
haki zao’ (She has the right to use [the land] like any other child who had been given 
241 
 
 
their rights).  The respondent brother did not participate in the Ward Tribunal 
proceedings but appealed its decision.   
In the DLHT neither party had legal representation.  The brother failed to attend on a 
number of occasions and his daughter appeared on his behalf under a power of attorney.  
One assessor (male) noted the brother’s non-attendance at the Ward Tribunal, the fact 
that all the deceased’s children were given land before his death, the brother’s actions in 
blocking the road and the brother’s failure to attend the site visit.  The brother had not 
given any convincing reasons to support his appeal.  The other assessor (female) 
concluded that the appellant brother had used delaying tactics throughout the legal 
proceedings.  The chairperson concluded:  
In the event it is clear that, the intention of the appellant is to unjustly 
take the respondent’s piece of land by force under the umbrella that, the 
land in dispute is under administrator of the deceased’s Estate and not 
the lawful property of the respondent.   
The land was declared the property of the daughter and the appeal dismissed with costs. 
 
4. A will               Ward Tribunal application 
A Meru widow wrote a will in which she bequeathed to her daughters, grandson and 
great grandchildren land in a lowland Meru village that she and her husband had cleared 
and cultivated together.  Her husband’s nephew, who was the administrator of her late 
husband’s estate, objected on the basis that the farms were for the coming generation 
and should only go to her unmarried daughter and male grandchild.  The clan took the 
case to the Village Land Council for dispute resolution but the matter was moved to the 
Ward Tribunal after the Village Land Council failed to resolve it.  The Ward Tribunal 
was persuaded by the evidence of the clan elders who had blessed the will and gave 
evidence in support of the widow. 
It is clear without argument that the defendant had no reason to refuse to 
attend the meeting which the applicant had called, because by doing so 
the defendant raised hatred and caused a communication breakdown 
between them ... The daughter of the applicant was right when she took 
her mother to stay with her and nurse her because there was nobody to 
take care of her ... the woman did not have care when she was sick as the 
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defendant and his wife did not visit this woman or bring her food or any 
help...  
The applicant showed strength of character and cleverness in wanting to 
produce her will in writing rather than orally in front of the elders of the 
clan, because the law on wills states that a written will is better than 
words ... The government and lawyers insist or advise Tanzanians to 
write wills early or when they are alive to prevent disputes of estate ...  
[Quoting LMA section 56] For important reasons which carry legal 
weight, it is evident that the outdated male system is reaching the end ... 
this tribunal in front of the [elders of the clan] has seen to it that this 
woman has every right to give her child that piece of land in dispute 
without any argument because she is the one who has taken care of her in 
all situations. 
 
5. Amani                DLHT appeal 
The woman in this case was the respondent in a claim brought by her patrilateral male 
cousin.  At the time of the claim she was an old woman.  She was the only daughter in 
an Arusha family of six siblings living in a rural Arusha village on the slopes of Mount 
Meru.  During their youth all of her brothers were given land.  In a fieldwork interview 
conducted in Kimaasai she described being given a plot of land by her father to 
cultivate for herself.  He told her that when she got married and had a son, she should 
name him after her father and that he would inherit the land from her.
254
  She 
commented to me that at that time according to the Arusha tradition it was not usual for 
a girl to be given land – she was just lucky because her father loved her very much.  
Over the next fifty years she married, had children and continued to cultivate the land.  
She planted maize and beans at first and later, permanent crops of coffee and bananas.  
Some years later she gave the land to her son.  After her husband passed away she and 
her son decided to build a couple of rooms for rental on the land to gain some additional 
income.  Her cousin (the claimant) complained to the Village Chairman and the matter 
eventually came before the Ward Tribunal. 
                                               
254 This is an example of an Arusha practice noted by the Shivji Commission whereby fathers make 
conditional bequests of family land to daughters whose sons in turn bear the name of their grandfather 
(URT 1994: 251). 
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In his evidence to the Ward Tribunal the claimant cousin stated that after his father died 
the respondent’s father (his paternal uncle) became mmiliki (the ‘owner/possessor’) of 
the land and chased his mother and family away.  When they returned in their twenties, 
the claimant and his brothers were ‘given’ (pewa) some of the land by their maternal 
uncles, but the respondent’s shamba remained with her.  Around thirty years ago the 
claimant’s father passed away and the claimant continued to cultivate the land 
thereafter.  Many years later her husband also passed away.  A dispute arose after the 
respondent saw building work being carried out on the land.  Stating that he believed 
the land had been sold he began his legal claim in the Ward Tribunal.   
After hearing evidence from several witnesses the tribunal concluded that the 
respondent had indeed been given the land by her father, adding ‘hakuna mtu ambaye 
angeweza kumkataza kwani alikuwa na nguvu’ (no one could forbid him from doing so 
because he had the power).  They noted that her father had ‘given’ her (alimpa) the land 
although ‘it related to’ (inahusiana) the claimant’s father.  Notwithstanding their 
finding that the respondent’s father had given her the land, after hearing the evidence 
and meeting on a separate occasion with family elders, the tribunal decided to divide the 
land between the parties ‘to bring peace in the boma’ (kuleta amani katika boma) as 
they were relatives.  The Tribunal’s decision meant that the respondent and her son 
would effectively lose half the land that she had been cultivating for some fifty years. 
The respondent appealed to the DLHT.  The Ward Tribunal’s judgment had not 
considered the legal position that the twelve year limitation period
255
 for a suit to 
recover land had expired many years previously.  I am told that the respondent was 
successful in her appeal to the DLHT on the basis of limitation.     
 
6. A grave         DLHT application 
The claim was brought by a maternal aunt as next friend of a female orphan, against the 
orphan’s guardian, the Village Chairman, balozi and purchasers of the land in question.  
None of the parties were legally represented.  It was claimed that the child, along with 
her maternal aunt and uncles, had inherited a portion of her maternal grandfather’s plot 
                                               
255 Law of Limitation Act (Act No. 10 of 1971) Cap 89 R.E. 2002, s.3 and Schedule Part I no.22.  See 
also Customary Law (Limitation of Proceedings) Rules 1963 (G.N. No. 311 of 1964), s.2 and Schedule. 
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of land in an urban part of Arusha.  The family was Arusha, although it was claimed by 
the maternal aunt that sons and daughters of the orphan’s maternal grandfather had 
inherited portions of his land.  The child’s mother had already died by the time the land 
was allocated, and she had been buried on the land.  It was claimed that the plot had 
been allocated to the orphan as the child of her late mother.  It was further claimed that 
the land had been entrusted to the care of her maternal uncle – her guardian, until she 
attained her majority.  The respondent uncle later sold the land without her consent, 
claiming that it was his to sell.   
In the DLHT the guardian, Village Chairman, balozi and family elders all gave evidence 
for the respondents confirming that they had given their authority to the sale 
proceeding.  The case for the claimant orphan relied on the evidence of her maternal 
aunt, a town planner, another balozi who was present at the allocation of the land and 
the local district councillor.  It was said that the guardian uncle had made an oral 
promise before the councillor to give the orphan an alternative piece of land by way of 
compensation.   
The claim was dismissed.  The two assessors (male and female) and DLHT chairperson 
preferred the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses – the family elders and balozi, 
finding that the land had been allocated by the grandfather only to his own wife and son.  
It was found that there was no documentary evidence and insufficient testimony to 
prove the orphan’s claim that she had inherited the land, or that she had been promised 
alternative land after it was sold.  The chairperson found that the claim had not been 
proved on the balance of probabilities. 
 
7. Boma meeting        DLHT application 
A wife made a claim against her husband and mortgagee for pledging a family shamba 
inherited from his father as security for 15 million Tsh without her consent.  She sought 
a declaration that the shamba was the children’s property, that the disposition was null 
and void, and a permanent injunction against the respondents from interfering with her 
occupation of the land.  Both parties were litigants in person.  In evidence it was not 
disputed that the wife had not agreed to the mortgage and that a young man, who was 
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identified to the mortgagee as being the husband’s son, had been present with the 
husband when he signed the mortgage agreement.   
Problems arose after the husband lost the money he had received from the mortgagee in 
a con trick.  When the husband failed to repay the money the mortgagee asked for the 
elders of both families to meet.  The boma meeting agreed that the mortgagee should be 
repaid without interest within six months, failing which the shamba would be forfeited.  
The wife stated in evidence that she had been present at the boma meeting but had not 
been given the chance to speak.  The balozi gave evidence that he had refused to sign an 
agreement without the whole family consenting to the transaction.  Elders from both 
bomas gave evidence to the tribunal and a marriage certificate, children’s birth 
certificates, mortgage contract and boma minutes were tendered in evidence.   
The assessors noted the problem that an agreement had been signed and that the family 
had nowhere else to go.  One male assessor favoured a solution that involved the case 
returning to the clan and reverting to the DLHT with a progress report within a fixed 
period, failing which the agreement would have to be abided with.  The other female 
assessor noted that the wife had ‘tried her best to prohibit the land from being sold to 
[the mortgagee]’ and that it was a ‘backdoor’ transaction, but nevertheless thought that 
the mortgagee’s prayers should be granted with costs.   
The chairperson noted the evidence of elders and boma meeting minutes but did not 
make reference to the wife’s or balozi’s evidence and concluded: 
... it is my humble belief that [the mortgagee] gave that money to [the 
husband] on good faith and belief that [the husband] had the blessing of 
his family, as he came with somebody ... who was identified as a son of 
[the husband] ...   
The chairperson also ‘positively not[ed] efforts made by clan elders 
meeting of both sides which resolved that in order to keep peace and 
harmony among the parties and two bomas it is prudent and for the 
interest of justice that [the mortgagee] be given his money.   
Finally, the chairperson concluded that since the shamba was inherited from the 
husband’s father it could not be said to be ‘purely a matrimonial property’.  The 
chairperson ordered a sale of part of the shamba to enable the mortgagee to be repaid.  
The wife subsequently appealed to the High Court Land Division. 
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8. Collusion                DLHT appeal 
A wife brought a claim in the Ward Tribunal against a friend of her husband for 
disturbing her use of land.  The land in question was located in a rural Meru village and 
had been purchased by the claimant’s husband and cultivated by the couple during the 
subsistence of the marriage.  Neighbours and village leaders had given evidence at the 
Ward Tribunal that the land had been acquired by matrimonial efforts and that the wife 
had used it for more than 10 years.  In a linked case between the purchaser and the 
husband the Ward Tribunal had found that the land had been sold by the husband to the 
purchaser without the wife’s consent.  In the claim between the wife and the purchaser, 
the Ward Tribunal also found in favour of the wife that the land was matrimonial 
property.   
The purchaser appealed to the DLHT and was represented by an advocate.  The 
respondent wife was in person.  The appeal was dealt with on written submissions.  
Although the purchaser produced sale agreements, purportedly endorsed by the village 
council to support his claim, these were disregarded by the DLHT chairperson in favour 
of the oral evidence of village leaders which the Ward Tribunal had relied upon in its 
judgment. 
The DLHT assessors differed in their opinions.  The male assessor was persuaded by 
the purchaser’s advocate’s submissions and the documentary evidence supplied by the 
appellant purchaser in support of his appeal: 
I am of the opinion that the submission made by the appellant’s counsel 
are more stronger to what the respondent has said.  The respondent’s 
reasons are mere allegations instead of giving material supporting 
evidence. 
The female assessor concluded: 
Her husband has not refuted [that the respondent was married to the 
appellant’s close friend] and he did not appear before the tribunal to 
refute that the suit land was a matrimonial property.  He colluded with 
the applicant, he told lies and later apologised to the ward tribunal 
simply because he wanted to force her to move out merely for the reason 
she has no child... [The ward tribunal] came to a fair and right 
judgement. 
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The DLHT chairperson observed:  
... all the neighbours, witnesses and the village government 
authorities/leader who testified before the trial tribunal seemed to know 
and recognise the respondent to be the wife of ___, who had decided 
fraudulently to sell the suit land.   
The chairperson concluded that the purchaser had failed to establish that the suit land 
was his property; the wife had used it for more than 10 years and it was therefore 
matrimonial property - ‘any move to dispose of the same then consent of [the wife] be 
sought first’.    
 
9. Compensation               DLHT appeal 
The woman in this case was the respondent in both the Ward Tribunal and DLHT 
appeal.  The claim was brought by her husband to whom she had been married 
traditionally.  He was the father of her children.  The husband claimed that she had 
mortgaged and sold their matrimonial property without his consent.  The woman stated 
that although the parties had been married traditionally, unbeknown to her, her husband 
had already legally married another wife, whom he eventually returned to.  It was not 
disputed that the husband had purchased the land.  Having been abandoned by her 
husband, in the years that passed the respondent built a house on the land with money 
from her relatives and a loan from an NGO.  She provided the Ward Tribunal with 
documentary evidence of the NGO loan.  She stated that she had sold part of the land to 
repay the loan in order to safeguard the house that was pledged as security.   
In the DLHT neither of the parties was legally represented, and the case was dealt with 
on written submissions.  The husband’s claim was founded on the basis that the 
property in question was ‘matrimonial’ and he denied that he had had another wife or 
that the parties had ever separated.  The respondent argued that having been abandoned 
by her husband she became entitled to the land as her sole property by virtue of section 
114 LMA.   
The DLHT assessors (both female) found in favour of the woman.  One assessor 
described the land as ‘compensation for not being able to marry her legally’ – a ‘gift’ 
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for ‘his mistress and her offspring’ which was no longer a matrimonial home because 
he had abandoned her and she had had to develop the land on her own with the help of a 
donation.  The other assessor stated:  
It is my view that she was right to mortgage/sell the suit land because 
there was no other way out of solving the tabled problems for the interest 
of her three abandoned children.   
Upholding the original decision of the Ward Tribunal in the woman’s favour, the DLHT 
chairperson concluded: 
... since the suit land was bought by the appellant in cooperation with the 
respondent and since the appellant has returned to his legal wife ... and 
stayed there for 6 years then there is no doubt that the suit land ought to 
have been the property of the respondent together with her ... children.   
 
10. Sale agreement        DLHT application 
A woman brought a claim against a man she had known for 10 years and regarded as 
her husband though they were never legally married.  Neither party was legally 
represented in the proceedings.  The application concerned a sum of 800,000 Tsh that 
the woman claimed she had given to the man to enable him to ‘build a house for their 
babies’ – the two children of the parties – on a plot of land that he had purchased 
previously.  The man had subsequently moved into the newly built house with another 
woman whom he claimed to be his wife.  The claimant wanted an order for sale with the 
proceeds divided between the parties and their children.  The man stated that he had 
purchased the plot with a male friend, who gave evidence to that effect at the hearing.  
He also produced a sale agreement in support.  The woman called her landlord and a 
neighbour to confirm that she had been living in rented accommodation and the 
respondent had been visiting her there for a few days once every 2-3 months.  Her 
witnesses regarded the parties as husband and wife.  The respondent called his brother 
as a witness who confirmed that she was a girlfriend. 
Both the male and female DLHT assessors were of the opinion that the parties were not 
officially married and that the house was therefore not matrimonial.  The application 
lacked evidence (by way of a marriage certificate) and there was no documentary proof 
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that the claimant had contributed the 800,000 Tsh.  However, the female assessor 
expressed some sympathy for the woman’s position: ‘the tribunal has to find legal 
actions so as [she] can be compensated’.  The DLHT chairperson found a relationship 
of ‘concubinage’ but added: 
... this court is not a proper forum to adjudicate matters relating to their 
marital affairs, whether they were legally married or not is not a matter 
that interests to this tribunal.  The interested part to this tribunal is to 
determine if at all the applicant contributed Tsh 800,000 to the building 
of the disputed house.   
The chairperson concluded that it was difficult to prove the woman had donated the 
800,000 Tsh.  Her application was dismissed with costs. 
 
11. Selling ‘bites’         DLHT application 
A man brought a DLHT claim for unpaid rent and an eviction order against the woman 
respondent.  The man was represented by an advocate and the woman was a litigant in 
person.  The parties had previously litigated in civil proceedings in the Primary, District 
and High Courts on the issue of monies that the woman alleged she had given to the 
man for buying the plot in question.  The Primary Court had decided in the woman’s 
favour, but that decision was subsequently quashed by the District Court and an appeal 
to the High Court was never substantively determined.  The woman had claimed that 
she had begun a relationship with the man many years previously.  He had impregnated 
and abandoned her.  Years later she introduced her son to him and they resumed a 
relationship.  She claimed that she gave him 2.5 million Tsh in the presence of her 
children to buy a plot.  He did so and said that he would build a house.  She later moved 
in and bought materials for the house at his request.  She was introduced to a woman 
whom she later discovered to be his girlfriend/wife.  When the girlfriend/wife tried to 
evict her she lodged her claim in the Primary Court.   
After the case had progressed to the High Court the man filed a case in the DLHT 
claiming that the respondent was his tenant.  He claimed that he had known her in the 
past but did not remember having a child with her.  Years later they met again and she 
told him she was looking for a house.  He rented his house to her but did not reduce the 
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agreement into writing as they knew each other.  She paid one instalment of rent.  He 
tried to recover further rent from her by involving the mwenyekiti wa kitongoji and his 
wife.  He called the seller of the property, his uncle and a workman as witnesses in 
support of his claim.  The woman called her son and another workman as witnesses. 
There was only one assessor’s opinion in this case.  She found that the woman was a 
second wife and that she was a co-owner of the property as a ‘nyumba ndogo’.  There 
was no document to support the man’s claim that she was his tenant.  Although the 
woman produced no document supporting her claim that she had contributed the money, 
this was a relationship of trust and they had a child together.  The woman’s claim was 
supported by her son and photographs which gave the appearance that they were a 
couple.   
The DLHT chairperson also inclined to the assertion that the woman had contributed to 
the upkeep of the house.  This was on the basis of circumstantial evidence that a woman 
selling ‘bites’ (snacks) in the market could not afford to lease a five-roomed house and 
provide for her children’s schooling and basic needs.  There was no tenancy agreement 
and the claimant’s wife had not been aware of the house at first.  Although there was no 
documentary proof of the woman’s financial contribution, the chairperson concluded 
that she was a co-owner by virtue of her contribution to the building of the suit land as 
his ‘concubine’.  The judgment made no reference to the District Court’s conclusion 
that there was no evidence to support the woman’s claim that she had made a financial 
contribution.  The man subsequently appealed to the High Court Land Division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
